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THREE ESSAYS ON MIGRATION AND ORGANIZED CRIME
Jakub Lonsky, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2019
This doctoral thesis consists of three independent essays on the economics of international migra-
tion and organized crime. Chapter 1 explores the relationship between immigration and voting
for the far-right party in Finland. I find that one percentage point increase in the share of foreign
citizens in a municipality decreases Finns Party’s vote share by 3.4 percentage points. The far-right
votes lost to immigration are captured by the two pro-immigration parties. Turning to potential
mechanisms, the negative effect is only present in municipalities with high initial exposure to im-
migrants. Moreover, I provide some evidence for welfare-state channel as a plausible mechanism
behind the main result. Chapter 2 studies the public health effects of a recent immigrant regular-
ization program in the United States – the 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).
I find that DACA increased insurance coverage among eligible immigrants. Despite the increase in
insurance coverage, there is no evidence of significant increases in health care use, although there is
some evidence that DACA increased demand for mental health services. After 2012, DACA-eligible
individuals were also more likely to report a usual place of care and less likely to delay care because
of financial restrictions. Finally, I find some evidence that DACA improved self-reported health
and mental health among eligible individuals. Chapter 3 analyzes the origins and consequences of
the Russian Mafia (vory-v-zakone). Using a unique web scraped data, I first show that Russian
Mafia originated in the Gulag - Soviet system of forced labor camps which operated in the USSR
primarily during the 1920s-1950s Stalin era. Second, I document that the distance to the nearest
camp is a strong negative predictor of mafia presence in Russia’s communities in the early-to-mid
1990s. Finally, I show that the communities with mafia presence in the 1990s experienced a dra-
matic rise in crime driven by turf wars which erupted among rival clans around 1993 and lingered
on until the late 1990s. This is suggested by a sharp increase in attacks against the members of
Russia’s economic elite in places with mafia presence.
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1 INTRODUCTION
International migration and organized crime are both topics of significant (and often heated) public,
political, and academic debate. Between 2010 and 2017, the number of migrants worldwide has
grown by almost 50% (Kobler and Lattes, 2017), while the total organized crime profits from various
illicit activities – including migrant smuggling – have been recently estimated at some $6.2 trillion
(10% of global GDP) (Novakoff, 2015). This doctoral thesis analyzes migration and organized crime
as two separate topics, although it is without a doubt that the two issues are connected in many
different ways.
The thesis consists of three independent essays, two of them analyzing recent policy-relevant
issues in migration, while the third one delves into the 20th century history of the Russian (Soviet)
organized crime, prison system, and their lasting effects on society.
More specifically, Chapter 1 focuses on the recent rise of the far-right parties in Europe, exploring
migration as potentially a key factor determining their electoral support. I conduct a case study
of Finland’s Finns Party after the 2004 EU enlargement, where the effect of immigration on far-
right votes is analyzed on a micro (municipality) level. Chapter 2 is a policy evaluation of the
2012 temporary immigrant authorization program in the United States – the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA). The focus is on the impact of policy on immigrant health insurance
coverage, access to and demand for health care, and a broad set of physical and mental health
outcomes. Finally, in Chapter 3, I explore the origins of the Russian Mafia during the 1920s-1950s
Stalin-era Gulag archipelago, and its consequences on Russian Communities in the mid-1990s. The
latter focuses on the impact of Russian Mafia on local crime and violence, as those were endemic
throughout the post-Soviet Russia.
1
2 DOES IMMIGRATION DECREASE FAR-RIGHT
POPULARITY? EVIDENCE FROM FINNISH 
MUNICIPALITIES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The popularity of far-right (sometimes also referred to as populist radical right)1 parties across
Europe has been rising rapidly in recent years. In December 2015, the National Front won the
first round of the regional election in France. In December 2016, the Freedom Party of Austria’s
candidate lost presidential election only after a repeated runoff. In May 2017, National Front’s
leader Marine Le Pen captured a respectable 34 percent in the French presidential election runoff.
And last year, the Northern League placed third in the Italian general election, forming a populist
coalition government with the Five Star Movement. Thus, it is clear that the far-right no longer
belongs to the fringes of the European political spectrum. Moreover, latest political developments
in Europe such as the upcoming Brexit suggest that the surge of the far-right could have significant
negative economic and political consequences for EU as a whole.
The rise of the far-right appears to be driven (in large part) by immigration. Virtually all
far-right parties have strong anti-immigration platforms, a feature stemming from their ideology of
ethno-nationalism (or nativism). According to Betz (2008), nativism is defined as a strong belief
that different societies and cultures adopt entirely different values, which are neither inferior, nor
superior, but essentially incompatible with each other. This ideology makes far-right parties both
nationalistic and xenophobic, and in recent years also Islamophobic (Mudde, 2007). Since the early
1990s, Europe has experienced significant migration flows. First, the East to West migration from
post-communist countries which began with the fall of the Soviet Union, and accelerated after the
EU enlargements in 2000s. And in recent years, a large inflow of asylum seekers from Asia and
Africa fueled by a number of armed conflicts. Both of these immigration shocks likely sparked
1The term far-right (or far right) is used in Betz (2008), Davies (2008), Ellinas (2010), Goodwin (2008), and
Roxburgh (2002). The label populist radical right is preferred by Arter (2010) and Mudde (2007). Still, others use
the terms right-wing populist (Norocel, 2016; Swank and Betz, 2002) or even extreme right (Carter, 2005; Ignazi,
2003). These different labels generally refer to the same party family.
2
nativist sentiments across the continent contributing to an unprecedented wave of electoral success
among far-right parties.
This paper studies the effect of immigration on voting for the far-right on a local (municipality)
level. The local effect of immigration, which can be very different from the national effect (e.g.
national media, politicians), is theoretically ambiguous2 and thus requires empirical examination.
This study focuses on Finland, a country which had a single far-right party (the Finns Party) for
nearly 25 years (1995-2017), but was long considered immune to the surge of the far-right seen
in other European countries (Figure 1; Ellinas 2010; Goodwin 2008; Ignazi 2003). The period of
study is 2006-2015. These years are characterized by both the historically largest inflow of foreign
citizens into Finland (Figure 2; Koivukangas 2003), and a remarkable rise in Finns Party’s popu-
larity (Figure 1). Indeed, taken together, Figures 1 and 2 suggest a positive correlation between
immigration and far-right voting on the national level. The analysis employs a novel panel dataset
which spans 7 election years and 297 municipalities (all of mainland Finland). All types of national
elections (i.e. parliamentary, presidential, and European parliamentary) are considered.
The sudden and unprecedented increase in immigration into Finland that followed the 2004
EU enlargement also provides an excellent setup for identification. The 2003 distributions of im-
migrants by continent of citizenship can be used to construct a “shift-share” instrument (Altonji
and Card, 1991; Orrenius and Zavodny, 2015a) to identify the effect of immigration on far-right
voting. One thing that makes this instrument particularly convincing in this case is the change in
immigrant composition that followed the 2004 enlargement. While the 1990s and early 2000s were
characterized primarily by an influx of Ingrian Finns from the former Soviet Union and asylum
seekers from countries such as Somalia and former Yugoslavia (Koivukangas, 2003), the 2004 and
the subsequent EU enlargements brought in mostly economic migrants from Central and Eastern
Europe. This minimizes the concern that IV results could be driven by a persistence of trends in
anti-immigrant or pro-immigrant attitudes across municipalities.
Using the shift-share instrument, I find an economically meaningful and statistically significant
negative effect of municipal in-migration of foreigners on Finns Party’s vote share. The IV coef-
2Group conflict theory (Sherif et al., 1961) and ethnic competition theory (Olzak, 1992) suggest a positive
effect, while the intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954) predicts the opposite. Economic theories of labor market
competition and welfare-state are less clear-cut; the predictions depend on the precise characteristics of immigrants
and natives (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Facchini and Mayda, 2012; Dustmann and Preston, 2007).
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ficient from the preferred specification suggests that one percentage point increase in the share of
foreign citizens in municipality (68% of the mean) decreases Finns Party’s vote share by about 3.35
percentage points (28% of the mean). A placebo test using pre-period (1996-2003) data confirms
the IV estimate is not driven by persistent trends at the municipality level. To further validate the
IV design, I re-estimate the main specification using a shift-share instrument constructed with 1991
immigrant distributions.3 The resulting coefficient remains negative, statistically significant at 5%,
and slightly larger in magnitude than the original estimate. Additional robustness checks such as a
first-difference estimation, exclusion of potential outliers, and estimation with larger geographical
units confirm the main result.
Considering the effect of immigration on voting for other parties, I find that the strongly pro-
immigration Green League and Swedish People’s Party gain votes. Indeed, their positive coefficients
roughly add up to the negative estimate for the Finns Party. These positive effects are also rela-
tively large; one percentage point increase in the foreign share increases Green League’s vote share
by 23% and Swedish People’s Party’s vote share by 57% with respect to the sample mean. Im-
migration also increases voter turnout (3% with respect to mean) while the share of protest votes
remains unaffected.
Heterogeneity analysis reveals that the negative effect of immigration on Finns Party’s vote
share is only present in municipalities with above-median initial immigrant share. In addition,
municipalities with below-median initial far-right vote share experience a larger reduction in Finns
Party’s support due to immigration. However, I find no effect heterogeneity with respect to initial
population size, density, level of education, or economic conditions. Finally, using the same shift-
share instrument, I find a mild positive effect of immigration on municipality per capita personal
income tax revenue, while there appears to be no effect on municipal per capita spending on so-
cial services, health care, and education. This evidence is consistent with welfare-state channel as
a plausible mechanism behind the main result (Facchini and Mayda, 2012, 2009; Dustmann and
Preston, 2007).
My analysis contributes to the growing economics literature on the effects of immigration on
3Before any major immigrant inflow into Finland occurred.
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voting for the far-right and other anti-immigrant parties in Europe.4 5 Most studies find a positive
effect (Halla et al., 2017; Barone et al., 2016; Becker and Fetzer, 2016; Edo et al., 2018; Gerdes and
Wadensjo¨, 2008; Harmon, 2012; Mendez and Cutillas, 2014; Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Brunner and
Kuhn, 2014). Halla et al. (2017) use a shift-share instrument to study the effect of immigrant inflow
on voting for the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO¨). Their positive effect is driven by voters’ fear of
adverse labor market effects of immigration as well as a negative effect of immigrant inflow on local
compositional amenities. In an Italian setting, Barone et al. (2016) find that foreign municipal in-
migration increases vote share of the anti-immigrant center-right coalition (which includes the far-
right Northern League). Proposed mechanisms in this study include cultural diversity, competition
in the labor market and for public services, and political competition.
In contrast with the previous studies, Dustmann et al. (2016) use a quasi-random allocation of
refugees into municipalities to study the impact of immigration on voting in Denmark. Documenting
a large effect heterogeneity, the authors find that in all but the most urban municipalities, refugee
inflow increases vote share of both anti-immigrant and center-right parties, while the vote share of
center-left parties declines. However, in the most urban municipalities, refugee allocation actually
decreases support for anti-immigrant parties.
Thus far, the (overall) negative effect of immigration on far-right voting has been documented
only in Steinmayr (2018) who suggests that hosting refugees in Austrian municipalities dampened
the overall positive trend in support for the Freedom Party (FPO¨). However, he also finds that
the exposure to a large number of refugees passing through on their way to Germany actually
increased FPO¨’s vote share. These findings are largely consistent with Allport (1954)’s intergroup
contact theory, suggesting that a meaningful contact between natives and immigrants can effectively
ameliorate natives’ anti-immigrant attitudes.
This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, it is the first study
to find a negative effect of the inflow of economic migrants on far-right vote share. By contrast,
4A number of correlational studies in political science have also considered the relationship between immigration
and voting for European far-right parties. Results are mixed: positive association is found in Golder (2003), Swank
and Betz (2002), and Anderson (1996); while Du¨lmer and Klein (2005), Messina (2007), and Kitschelt and McGann
(1995) estimate a negative relationship.
5There is also a closely related economics literature on the determinants of natives’ attitudes towards immigrants
and their preferences over immigration policy. Two economic channels have been identified: the labor market hy-
pothesis (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006), and the welfare-state channel (Facchini and Mayda, 2012, 2009;
Dustmann and Preston, 2007). In addition, a number of studies have considered non-economic channels such as
xenophobia, crime, and cultural/national identity (O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Nunziata, 2015; Mayda, 2006).
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both Steinmayr (2018) and Dustmann et al. (2016) consider the exposure to refugees through
refugee allocation schemes. In addition, Steinmayr (2018) evaluates the impact of a specific and
relatively short-term event - the European refugee crisis - and considers only the extensive margin
of immigration. This paper, on the other hand, focuses on the intensive margin and the study
period spans 10 years and involves three types of national elections. Regarding Dustmann et al.
(2016), the negative effect is present only in a subanalysis of the 5% largest and most urban
Danish municipalities (the subsample consists of only 26 observations). By contrast, I find no effect
heterogeneity with respect to initial population size - the negative effect is present in municipalities
both above and below the median initial population size.
Second, this study is one of the first to provide evidence of the welfare-state channel as a possible
mechanism through which immigration affects far-right voting. This is particularly appealing given
that Finland is a country with generous welfare system (managed primarily by municipalities),
and thus native concerns about immigrant “benefit tourism” are especially relevant in this context.
Previous papers have focused mostly on labor market and compositional amenities (Halla et al.,
2017; Barone et al., 2016; Becker and Fetzer, 2016), cultural diversity (Barone et al., 2016), the
intergroup contact theory (Steinmayr, 2018), and other non-economic aspects (Otto and Steinhardt,
2014). Otto and Steinhardt (2014) do consider welfare channel as well, but they provide only
indirect evidence.
Third, this paper examines a broad set of electoral outcomes and indicators of voter behavior
such as voting for other parties, voter turnout, and protest vote. A few previous studies have
considered the impact of immigration on voter turnout. Barone et al. (2016) find a negative effect
while Steinmayr (2018) finds no effect. Dustmann et al. (2016) find a positive effect but only in
municipal elections, whereas I find an increase in turnout in context of the national elections. As
far as the protest vote is concerned, the only other paper that considers it is Barone et al. (2016).
While they find an increase in the share of invalid ballots in response to immigrant inflow, I find
no effect on the protest vote.
Fourth, I explore a unique setting which is distinct from previous studies. Before the 2004 EU
enlargement, Finland was a country with minimal immigrant inflow and very low popularity of the
far-right party. However, the study period (2006-2015) is characterized by a significant increase in
both the immigrant share and the Finns Party vote share on the national level. The negative local
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effect of foreign migration on Finns Party’s vote share that I find therefore stands in stark contrast
with the strong positive correlation observed on the national level.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the background. In Section 3, I describe
the data and identification strategy. Results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the
potential mechanisms. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 BACKGROUND
2.2.1 THE FINNS PARTY
The Finns Party (previously known as the True Finns; Finnish: Perussuomalaiset, PS) was the
single far-right party in Finland since its establishment in 1995 until it split into two in mid-2017. In
1997, its first chairman, Raimo Vistbacka, was replaced by Timo Soini who led the party until 2017.
Following a series of unsuccessful elections, the party made a break-through into the mainstream
Finnish politics during the 2009 European election when it gained 9.79% of total votes. In 2015
parliamentary election, the Finns Party finished as a runner-up and for the first time formed a
coalition government with the Centre Party and the National Coalition Party. Soini became the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Deputy Prime Minister of Finland. In June 2017, following the
election of new a chairman, Jussi Halla-aho, the party split into two: the Blue Reform remained in
the coalition government while the Finns Party went into opposition.6 My study period (2006-2015)
ends two years before the split occurred. The following description applies to the period of Finns
Party’s uniform existence.
According to Norocel (2016), some Finnish scholars argue that the party is not necessary a clear-
cut case of far-right due to its strong left-leaning political agenda on economic matters. However,
as Westinen (2014) points out, there is little doubt that the Finns Party is a nationalist-populist
movement which combines ethno-nationalism and anti-elitism, typical features of far-right parties
in Europe (Mudde, 2007).7 This view is shared by Arter (2010) who claims that the notion of
true Finnishness (suomalaisuus) is the pre-eminent concept of Finns Party’s ideology. Finally, Yla-
6The Finns Party (official website): https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/
7According to Mudde (2007), European far-right parties share three common ideological features: ethno-
nationalism, populism, and authoritarianism. Populism considers society to be ultimately separated into two groups,
“the pure people” and “the corrupt elite”, and argues that politics above all should be expression of the will of the
people. Authoritarianism is defined as a disposition to glorify, to be subservient to and remain uncritical toward
authoritative figures of the ingroup (hence the reason why far-right parties are typically led by authoritative leaders
such as Le Pen, Wilders, Soini, etc.).
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Anttila and Yla-Anttila (2015) underline the points mentioned above suggesting that the Finns
Party’s ideology combines a populist defense of a common man against corrupt elites, a defense of
welfare state against market-led policies, and a nationalist defense of the sovereignty and unity of
the Finnish people against immigration and federalist tendencies of the European Union. These
points clearly suggest that the Finns Party can be considered a member of the European far-right
family.
The party has a strong anti-immigration platform, as described in the following statement from
its 2015 parliamentary election campaign pamphlet:
Immigration will change, irreversibly, the host country’s population profile, disrupt so-
cial cohesion, overburden public services and economic resources, lead to the formation
of ghettoes, promote religious radicalism and its consequences, and foster ethnic con-
flicts. [...] It can still be possible to avoid the immigration disasters of Sweden, France
and the United Kingdom but it will require a determined policy and clear legislation
(Source: The Finns Party’s Immigration Policy, 2015).
Moreover, according to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data, which describes policy
and ideological positions of national political parties in the EU, the Finns Party has been the sole
anti-immigrant party in Finland since 2006. As Table 22 suggests, throughout the study period,
the party was consistently in favor of a tough immigration policy while strongly opposing multi-
culturalism (advocating for immigrant assimilation instead). In addition, immigration policy was
a very salient topic in Finns Party’s manifestos (Table 22, column 4). Table 22 also reveals that
none of the other main parties were anti-immigrant throughout the study period.
2.2.2 OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES IN FINLAND
There are seven main political parties in Finland (other than the Finns Party): Social Democratic
Party (SDP), Centre Party (Kesk), National Coalition Party (Kok), Green League (Vihr), Swedish
People’s Party (SFP/RKP), Christian Democrats (KD), and Left Alliance (vas.). The first three
(SDP, Kesk, Kok), each founded over a century ago, have traditionally been the strongest parties
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regularly placing on top of the electoral lists.8 SDP is a moderate center-left social democratic party,
while Kesk is centrist and Kok center-right, both of them having a liberal-conservative ideology
(source: European Election Database). Although none of the seven parties were anti-immigrant
during the study period, two of them - Green League and Swedish People’s Party - did have strong
pro-immigration platforms. Indeed, as Table 22 shows, between 2006 and 2014, Vihr and SFP/RKP
had low scores on both Immig. policy position and Multiculturalism, indicating an opposition to
tough immigration policy as well as a preference for multiculturalism. Moreover, as with the Finns
Party, Vihr and SFP/RKP both considered immigration policy to be a very important topic in
political discourse (Table 22, column 4).
2.2.3 NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN FINLAND
Parliamentary elections
Parliament of the Republic of Finland (Eduskunta) is unicameral, composed of 200 members directly
elected by people for a 4-year term. Seats in the parliament are distributed among 13 electoral
districts (or constituencies) in proportion to their populations 6 months prior to election. This
means that each constituency effectively holds its own parliamentary election. Candidates may be
nominated by political parties or constituency associations (founded by at least 100 enfranchised
persons from the same constituency). MPs are then chosen based on the number of votes they
receive as well as the number of votes received by their party (or constituency association). Elec-
tions take place on the third Sunday in April, and voting can take place either in advance or on
election day.9 Eligible to vote are all Finnish citizens aged 18 or above regardless of their domicile
(Ministry of Justice 2010).
Presidential elections
The President of the Republic of Finland is elected in a direct vote for a 6-year term. Each pres-
idential candidate must be a native-born Finnish citizen, and no individual can stay in the office
for more than 2 consecutive terms. Candidates are nominated by parties that have currently at
least 1 seat in the parliament, or by constituency associations established by at least 20,000 people
8In recent years, before the 2017 split, the Finns Party briefly joined this “elite” club.
9An exception is the 2007 parliamentary election which was held on March 18 due to the 100th anniversary of
the first Finnish parliamentary election (March 15-16, 1907).
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entitled to vote. The election proceeds in one or two rounds, the second round being essentially a
runoff between the two most successful candidates from the first round. The second round takes
place only if no candidate gains more than 50% of all votes in round 1. Each presidential election
is held on the fourth Sunday of January (round 1), with the second round taking place two weeks
later. Voting eligibility is the same as in parliamentary elections; advance voting is also allowed
(Ministry of Justice 2010).
European elections
As a member of the European Union, Finland can elect Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) who serve 5-year terms. The number of Finnish MEPs is determined by the ratio of
Finnish population to the population of the whole EU (Finland has had 13 MEPs since 2009, 14
between 1999 and 2009, and 16 from 1996 to 1999). Candidates for the European Parliament are
nominated by political parties or constituency associations (established by at least 2000 people),
and voting proceeds as in the parliamentary elections. In contrast with parliamentary elections
though, each candidate for an MEP enters the European election for the entire country. The elec-
tion day is generally the second Sunday in June (Ministry of Justice 2010).10
2.2.4 IMMIGRATION INTO FINLAND
Historically, Finland has been characterized by emigration (Sarvima¨ki, 2011). From the end of the
World War II until the early 1970s, the country attracted very few migrants. Although immigration
increased in the 1970s, throughout the 1970s and 1980s some 85 percent of immigrants were return
migrants coming mostly from Sweden. A small number of refugees from Vietnam and Chile also
arrived during this period (Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2008). It was not until the 1990s that
Finland experienced a major inflow of foreign citizens (Koivukangas, 2003). As Figure 2 suggests,
the first significant wave of foreigners began arriving in 1991 and was caused by the dissolution
of the Soviet Union and the civil wars in the (former) Yugoslavia and Somalia. Ingrian Finns
from Russia and Estonia and asylum seekers from Yugoslavia and Somalia made up the largest
10Although there are exceptions: the 1996 election was held on October 20, while the 2014 election took place on
May 25.
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foreign immigrant groups in Finland throughout the 1990s (Koivukangas, 2003). Due (in part) to
a restrictive refugee policy,11 the fraction of population with foreign citizenship remained below 2%
until 2003, one of the lowest in the EU during this period (Figure 3; Koivukangas 2003).
As Figure 2 depicts, migration flow of foreign nationals into Finland increased dramatically in
the late 2000s. In May 2004, the European Union accepted ten new member states (EU8 plus
Malta and Cyprus).12 This historic enlargement was followed by the accession of Bulgaria and
Romania (January 2007), and later Croatia (July 2013). Due to fears of mass migration of workers
induced by the large economic disparities between East and West, EU member states agreed upon
the so called transitional restrictions. These restrictions allowed each old member to postpone the
opening of its labor market to the new members for a period of up to seven years. Finland opened
its labor market to Malta and Cyprus immediately in 2004, but chose to wait until May 2006 for
all EU8 countries. For Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia, the work-related immigration restrictions
were lifted immediately upon their EU accession in January 2007 and July 2013, respectively
(Pytlikova´, 2014). Thus, while the 2004 enlargement already induced some inflow of foreigners
(such as students) from Central and Eastern Europe, the two main immigration-inducing shocks
were the 2006 and 2007 labor market openings. The period 2006 onwards is indeed the time of the
largest immigrant inflow in Finnish history, and therefore it is the focus on this study (see Figure 2;
Koivukangas 2003). As Figure 4 confirms, the vast majority of incoming foreigners during this time
were European citizens, primarily economic migrants from the new EU member states in Central
and Eastern Europe.
In the last couple of years, Finland has also witnessed a sizable inflow of asylum seekers from
Northern Africa and Middle East. However, since the last national election in Finland took place
in mid-2015, my study period ends at the onset of the recent European refugee crisis, before any
significant number of asylum seekers arrived in Finland.
11 The annual refugee quota was 500 throughout the 1990s. In 2001, the quota was raised by the Finnish Parliament
to 750. In recent years, due to an ongoing civil war in Syria, Finland has admitted more than a thousand quota
refugees per year (Source: Finnish Immigration Service).
12EU8 refers to the following countries: Czech rep., Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania.
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2.3 DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
2.3.1 DATA
The empirical analysis uses a municipality-by-election year panel dataset with 7 election years
(2006-2015) and 297 municipalities. The following elections are used in the study: 2007, 2011,
2015 parliamentary elections; 2006, 2012 presidential elections (first round only); 2009, 2014 Eu-
ropean elections. The Finns Party’s candidate in both presidential elections was its leader, Timo
Soini, who was eliminated in the first round in both cases. Municipal elections are not used in
the analysis since any foreigner with a permanent residency in a given municipality is eligible to
vote in that municipality’s local election.13 A similar concern arises with European elections since
non-Finnish EU citizens with a municipality of residence in Finland are eligible to vote for Finnish
MEPs (Ministry of Justice 2010). Figure 5 plots the distribution of the share of votes cast by
non-Finnish EU citizens across all municipalities in the 2014 European election. The histogram
shows that almost 35% of municipalities had no foreigners casting a vote.14 Moreover, almost all
municipalities are located below the 0.5% mark meaning the proportion of foreign votes cast in
most cases was negligible. Histogram generated for the 2009 European election (available upon
request) shows distribution that is even more skewed to the right. Nevertheless, as an additional
robustness check I exclude the 2009 and 2014 European elections from the analysis.
Spatially, the analysis extends to all of mainland Finland; excluded are only the A˚land Islands
(16 municipalities). A˚land is a Swedish-speaking autonomous region that belongs to Finland and
is located between continental Finland and Sweden. Its population makes up roughly 0.5% of the
country’s total population (sources: Statistics Finland, Statistics and Research A˚land). Although
the region has its own parliament, the people of A˚land also elect one member of the Finnish Par-
liament in every national parliamentary election. However, the Islands have their own political
parties and so voting for the Finns Party is not an option. Moreover, since the region is not only
linguistically but also culturally Swedish, it would not be appropriate to include these municipali-
ties in the same analysis with the rest of the country.15
In past 12 years, the number of municipalities in Finland has been steadily shrinking to 313 (as
13Data on the number of foreign votes cast in local elections (overall and for individual parties) is not available.
14102 out of 297 municipalities (34.3%) had exactly 0 foreign votes in 2014 European election.
15The Office of A˚land website: http://www.aland.ax/en/facts-about-aland/.
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of January 1, 2016). Municipality changes were mostly merges of two (or more) municipalities to-
gether. Information on all changes was provided by The Association of Finnish Local and Regional
Authorities as well as Statistics Finland. The panel dataset is constructed using the 2016 munic-
ipality format. The dependent variable in the analysis is the Finns Party’s share of valid votes.
The independent variable of interest is the share of foreign citizens in a municipality. The analysis
also includes the following municipality-specific time-varying controls that likely affect voting for
the Finns Party: log of total population, population density (per km2), share of females in adult
population, share of population (25-64) with tertiary education, share of aged 65+ in adult popu-
lation, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor (in population aged 20-64), total crime rate (per 100,000),
unemployment rate and media household disposable income (per consumption unit). More details
about the covariates are reported in Section A of the Appendix. All data comes from Statistics
Finland’s public-use StatFin database.
A potential pitfall with using election vote share is naturalization, a process through which most
foreigners without family ties to Finnish citizens obtain Finnish citizenship. Since naturalized Finns
are de facto foreigners, a significant number of votes from these individuals will contaminate the
dependent variable. However, as Gozdecka (2013) points out, Finnish citizenship has been a rather
exclusive good aimed at foreign nationals who have put substantial effort into finding employment
in Finland, learning Finnish language, and integrating themselves into Finnish society. This is
indeed reflected in the total number of Finnish citizenships granted (as a share of country’s popula-
tion), which in its peak in 2012 was only 0.17% and has been declining ever since.16 Thus, although
the problem with naturalization cannot be completely ruled out, anecdotal evidence suggests that
the number of naturalized Finns is not high enough to alter the results.
2.3.2 BASELINE FIXED EFFECTS SPECIFICATION
The baseline empirical specification is the fixed effects model of the form:
Far-righti,t = α+ β Foreigni,t +X
′
i,tγ + λt + µi + i,t (1)
16Statistics Finland: StatFin database (All vital statistics by area 1987-2015, Citizenships granted according
to country of previous citizenship 1990-2015). This number includes citizenships granted via all means, including
naturalization. Thus, if only naturalizations were counted, the number would be even lower.
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where Far-righti,t is the Finns Party’s share of valid votes in municipality i and election year t. All
elections used in the estimation take place in the first half of the year. The independent variable
of interest, Foreigni,t =
(
#of Foreign Citizensi,t
Populationi,2003
)
, is the share of foreign citizens (as % of population
in 2003) in municipality i and election year t. The foreign share is measured on the first day of the
calendar year. As commonly done in immigration literature, I standardize the number of foreigners
by the population in the base year of the IV (discussed later). Population at t is not used since
it is likely endogenous to immigration. Xi,t represents the set of municipality-specific time-varying
controls mentioned earlier. Since covariate values at time t are potential mechanisms through which
immigration affects far-right vote share, I include them as one calendar year lags instead. The main
specification also includes a full set of municipality fixed effects (µi) to capture municipality-specific
time-invariant determinants of Finns Party’s vote share, and election year fixed effects (λt) to con-
trol for year-specific shocks that equally affect all municipalities (e.g. 2009 Eurozone sovereign
debt crisis). Finally, the preferred specification also includes region-by-election year fixed effects to
control for local business cycles and other year-specific shocks that affect equally all municipalities
within the same administrative region. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for all variables.
OLS estimation of equation (1) will likely suffer from endogeneity issues arising from sorting
among both natives and immigrants. An inflow of immigrants into a municipality may trigger an
outflow of natives who face direct labor market competition (Borjas, 2006). Also, as immigrants
move in, natives who are anti-immigrant for non-economic reasons may decide to leave. A dis-
proportionate number of natives who leave might therefore consist of far-right voters, in which
case the OLS estimate will be biased downwards. On the other hand, pro-immigrant natives who
derive positive utility from living in a diverse community could decide to move in together with the
immigrants. Such inflow of natives who arguably do not support the Finns Party would bias the
OLS estimate downwards as well.
Immigrants may decide to avoid anti-immigrant far-right strongholds, or leave municipalities
that become hostile towards them. This reverse causality would bias OLS downwards. As Borjas
et al. (1996) suggest, immigrants may also cluster in areas with better socioeconomic conditions
which are less supportive of the far-right, resulting in a downward bias as well. On the other hand,
as Halla et al. (2017) point out, if a community is hit by a negative economic shock which depresses
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housing prices, it may actually attract immigrants. If this shock also shifts voters’ preferences to
the far right, the resulting bias will be positive.
2.3.3 IDENTIFICATION
To identify the causal effect of interest, I employ instrumental variable approach using a “shift-
share” IV (Altonji and Card, 1991). This instrument is based on an observation that immigrants
tend to cluster in ethnic enclaves set up decades ago. My analysis uses a version of the instrument
proposed by Orrenius and Zavodny (2015a). More specifically, I first determine the distribution of
foreigners by continent of citizenship across mainland Finnish municipalities in 2003 (base year).
Then, for each of the election years in 2006-2015, the total national17 counts of foreign citizens are
distributed according to the 2003 distributions. The instrument has the form:
̂Foreigni,t = ∑6j=1 Foreignjt ∗ Share in ij2003Populationi,2003 (2)
where ̂Foreigni,t is the predicted share of foreign citizens in municipality i in election year t, Foreignjt
is the number of foreign citizens from continent j in mainland Finland in election year t, and
Share in i j1991 is the share of foreigners with continent of citizenship j in municipality i in 2003.
As the summation indicates, immigrants are divided into 6 groups based on their citizenship (each
groups roughly corresponds to a continent): EU27 Europe,18 non-EU Europe, Africa, Asia, America
(North, Central, and South America combined), and Oceania.
For the instrument to be valid, the predicted share of foreigners can affect Finns Party vote
share only through its direct effect on the actual share of foreigners. 2003 is chosen as the base year
because it precedes the 2004 EU enlargement and the subsequent inflow of Central and Eastern
European migrants. Moreover, it marks a change in the composition of immigrants coming into
Finland (from asylum seekers to economic migrants). Thus, conditional on covariates and fixed
effects, the 2003 distributions are unlikely to be correlated with unobservable predictors of anti-
immigrant attitudes and Finns Party popularity after 2006. As an additional robustness check, the
IV analysis was re-estimated using 1991 as the base year (15 years before my study period). Since
17The term “national” refers to mainland Finland.
18This definition includes all 27 current members of the European Union (excluding Finland).
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immigration of foreigners into Finland was minimal before 1991, the results from this alternative IV
estimation serve as further evidence validating the exclusion restriction of the original instrument.
The IV estimates could still be invalid if there is a persistence of municipality-specific trends in
pro-immigrant and/or anti-immigrant attitudes. The inclusion of the region-by-election year fixed
effects mitigates this concern. In addition, I conduct a placebo test with pre-period election data
(1996-2003) to directly test for such persistence. Finally, if natives “vote with their feet” and if this
native sorting after 2006 is correlated with the baseline immigrant distributions, IV estimate will
be biased. I therefore re-estimate equation (1) using the same IV approach, but larger geographical
units (administrative subregions and regions). A significant change in the IV coefficient will indicate
a presence of such bias. In addition, I conduct a direct test of native sorting using an approach
proposed in Peri and Sparber (2011).
2.4 RESULTS
2.4.1 MAIN RESULTS
Table 3 presents main results. First three columns include OLS estimates of eq. 1 while the last
three contain IV coefficients. The coefficient of interest is negative and remains significant at 5%
in all specifications. The OLS estimates are fairly small in magnitude (5-11% with respect to
the sample mean). The IV coefficients are roughly 2-5 times larger than OLS depending on the
specification. First-stage results (Table A.1) confirm the instrument is strong; the Kleibergen-Paap
rk Wald F-statistic (22.77) exceeds the Stock-Yogo 10% maximum IV size critical value even in
the full specification. The IV coefficient from the preferred specification (last column) suggests
that one percentage point increase in the share of foreigners in a municipality (68% of the mean)
decreases Finns Party’s electoral support by about 3.35 percentage points (28% of the mean).
Put differently, one standard deviation increase in the foreign share decreases Finns Party’s vote
share by 0.58 standard deviations. The large magnitude implies an economically important effect.
The difference between the OLS and IV estimates is likely caused by attenuation bias arising
from measurement error in the main independent variable. As Angrist and Pischke (2008) explain, if
the measurement error is random, the OLS coefficient will be biased towards zero. An instrumental
variable approach can correct for this bias. In context of immigration, Aydemir and Borjas (2011)
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suggest that the attenuation bias arising from even a small measurement error can be significant if
the model includes a large number of fixed effects. That is indeed the case here. Results in Section
4.4 lend further credibility to the idea of attenuation bias. Using the same IV to estimate the
effect of immigration on other electoral outcomes (e.g. voter turnout, other parties’ vote share),
I find that in every specification, the OLS estimate is attenuated towards zero, regardless of the
coefficient sign (see Section 4.4 for more details).
2.4.2 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND PLACEBO TEST
I conduct a series of robustness checks to test the sensitivity of the IV estimates. Results are
reported in Appendix B. Using 1991 (instead of 2003) as the base year for the instrument slightly
increases the magnitude of the IV estimates, although the standard errors increase as well due
to a weaker first stage (Table A.2). In addition, the IV estimates are robust to the exclusion
of European elections (Table A.3), the exclusion of 9 largest municipalities as potential outliers
(Table A.4), and the estimation of a first-difference specification instead of the fixed-effects model
(Table A.5). Finally, I re-estimated the model separately for each election type (parliamentary,
presidential, European). The coefficient on immigrant share is negative, statistically significant,
and with comparable magnitudes across the three specifications suggesting that the negative effect
is not limited to a specific type of national election (Table A.6).
A natural concern with a shift-share instrument is that persistent trends at the municipality
level may be correlated both with the IV and the outcome of interest. To partially address this
endogeneity concern I conduct a placebo test using pre-period election data. In particular, I
estimate the following cross-sectional specification using OLS:
∆Far-righti,1996−2003 = α+ β ∆ ̂Foreigni,2006−2015 + φr + i (3)
where ∆Far-right i,1996−2003 is the level change (or % change) in Finns Party’s vote share in munici-
pality i between 1996 and 2003, and ∆ ̂Foreigni,2006−2015 is the level change (or % change) in the IV
(using 2003 as baseline) in municipality i between 2006 and 2015. The regression also controls for
region fixed effects (φr). Results of the placebo test are presented in Table 4. Reassuringly, a lack
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of any statistically significant correlation supports the validity of the IV’s exclusion restriction.
2.4.3 DIRECT TEST OF NATIVE SORTING
As noted earlier, another threat to identification comes from immigrant-induced native mobility.
Different specifications have been suggested to test for it.19 Peri and Sparber (2011) evaluate each
of these specifications using simulated data and find that some of them have built-in biases. They
suggest estimating the following model which is based on Card (2007):
(
Ni,t −Ni,t−1
Popi,t−1
)
= α+ β
(
Fi,t − Fi,t−1
Popi,t−1
)
+ φi + λt + i,t (4)
where Ni,t is the number of Finnish citizens in municipality i and election year t, and Ni,t−1 is
the number of Finnish citizens in i in t − 1 (i.e. one calendar year before t). Similarly, Fi,t and
Fi,t−1 refer to the number of foreign citizens in i at t and t − 1, respectively. Popi,t−1 is the total
population in municipality i in t − 1. The specification also controls for municipality fixed effects
(φi) and election year fixed effects (λt). The coefficient of interest is β and its interpretation is as
follows: β > 0 means there is an attraction between natives and immigrants, while β < 0 suggests
a native outflow in response to the inflow of immigrants. Sa´ (2014) further points out that OLS
estimation of eq. (4) will likely lead to an upward bias in the estimate of β, since unobserved factors
that attract immigrants into municipality could also attract natives. Therefore, I estimate (4) using
the same shift-share instrument as before (with minor adjustments).20 Eq. (4) is estimated using
both municipality-level and subregional-level data, where 67 subregions approximate local labor
markets. Results (OLS and IV) are presented in Table 5. All four coefficients are insignificant
suggesting that immigration did not induce native mobility.
Another way to confirm that native sorting does not bias the main IV estimates is to re-estimate
eq. (1) using larger geographical units (subregions and regions). Mainland Finland consists of 18
administrative regions. The required underlying assumption states that if natives are mobile, they
19Among others Borjas (2006), Card (2001), Card (2007), and Cortes (2008).
20The instrument distributes national net flows of immigrants by continent between t−1 and t, based on the 2003
distributions. The predicted net flow of immigrants in i between t − 1 and t is then standardized by population in
t− 1.
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will sort within regions but not across regions (due to family ties and other costs of moving). Esti-
mation results are shown in Table A.7. All three estimates are negative and statistically significant.
The regional-level coefficient is smaller in magnitude than its municipality-level counterpart, but
the coefficients are not statistically different from one another. The subregional-level coefficient, if
anything, is larger in magnitude than the municipality-level estimate. This mitigates the concern
that native sorting and spillover effects confound my analysis.
2.4.4 IMMIGRATION AND OTHER ELECTION OUTCOMES
An important aspect of any election study is understanding which parties benefit from one party’s
loss of votes. In context of my analysis, this means finding out which parties gained the votes Finns
Party lost due to immigration. Thus, I re-estimated eq. (1) using vote share of every main party
as the dependent variable.21 Table 6 presents the results. As expected, the two parties that gained
votes were the pro-immigration Green League and Swedish People’s Party. Their positive coeffi-
cients indeed add up to the size of the Finns Party’s negative coefficient. Moreover, the relative
gains of these two parties were large, especially for the Swedish People’s Party (57% with respect
to the sample mean).
Finally, to obtain a complete picture of the native voting behavior, it is important to consider
the impact of immigration on voter turnout (share of eligible voters who cast ballot in election)
and protest vote (fraction of total ballots that are invalid). As Table 7 shows, foreign municipal
in-migration increased voter turnout although the effect was small (3%). Protest vote was not af-
fected. This suggests immigration induced natives’ participation in the election process, potentially
activating anti-far-right voters who would otherwise not vote. It is also worth noting that the OLS
counterparts to all coefficients in Tables 6 and 7 are smaller in magnitude (see Tables A.8 and
A.9), suggesting the presence of attenuation bias due to measurement error in the share of foreign
citizens.
2.5 HETEROGENEITY ANALYSIS AND POTENTIAL MECHANISMS
In order to shed some light on the potential mechanisms through which immigration reduces Finns
Party’s support, I test for the heterogeneity in the effect with respect to various initial conditions.
21Left Alliance is not considered as it did not participate in all elections during the study period.
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In particular, first, the sample is split based on the values of initial conditions (i.e. population,
population density, immigrant share, Finns Party’s vote share, share of tertiary educated, skill ra-
tio, median household income, unemployment rate)22 into those above and those below the median.
Then, separately for each initial condition, the share of foreign citizens is interacted with the above-
median/below-median dummies. All regressions are estimated using the same IV as before. Results
are reported in Table 8. The strong negative effect is present across municipalities regardless of
their initial size, density, level of education, skill ratio, median income, and unemployment rate.
The coefficient is remarkably stable across different specifications both in terms of its magnitude
and statistical significance. However, columns (3) and (4) do show some heterogeneity in the effect,
since in both cases, the hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal can be rejected. Column
(4) suggests that municipalities with higher pre-existing support for the far-right experienced a
smaller reduction in anti-immigrant attitudes than the municipalities where Finns Party was less
popular to begin with. However, the effect of immigration on high-nationalist municipalities is still
negative and sizable, suggesting that inflow of immigrants even into the far-right “strongholds” can
ameliorate natives’ attitudes towards foreigners.
The most interesting result of Table 8 is presented in column (3). The negative effect of immi-
gration on Finns Party’s vote share is found only in municipalities with high pre-existing immigrant
share. In other words, places where natives are already living side-by-side with immigrants are the
ones that experience a reduction in anti-immigrant attitudes as a result of further immigrant inflow.
Another potential mechanism that could explain my main finding is the welfare-state channel.
There are two possible policy scenarios through which immigration affects welfare system of the
host country. On one hand, migration can lead to changes in tax rates while per capita benefits
are kept constant (tax adjustment model). On the other hand, tax rates might remain unchanged
while per capita benefits adjust (benefit adjustment model). Under both scenarios, if immigrants
are, on average, net contributors to the system (i.e. their tax contributions exceed the amount of
social assistance they receive), both high-skilled and low-skilled natives will likely benefit from the
presence of foreign workers due to a positive welfare spillover (Facchini and Mayda, 2012, 2009).
Therefore, an influx of such immigrants can ameliorate natives’ attitudes towards them, and thus
22Measured at the beginning of 2004. Finns Party’s vote share is taken from 2003 parliamentary election since
2004 European election took place after the EU enlargement.
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make natives less supportive of the anti-immigrant Finns Party.
In the absence of any individual-level data on immigrant tax contributions and social assistance
program take-up, I turn to municipality-level data instead. Using data from 2006-2010 (including
non-election years), I consider the effect of immigration on municipal tax revenue and spending.23
The analysis uses the same IV as the main estimation. I find a small positive effect of municipal
in-migration of foreign citizens on per capita personal income tax revenue (2.5%), although the
coefficient is statistically significant only at 10% (Table 9, column 2). On the other hand, there is
clearly no effect of immigration on per capita property tax revenue or corporate tax revenue (Table
9, columns 3 and 4).
The provision of social welfare in Finland is delegated to individual municipalities (source:
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health). As Hytti and Paananen (2003) explain, immigrants with a
resident permit valid for at least a year have the same rights to social security (i.e. unemployment
benefits, family benefits linked to childbirth and child-rearing, and income support) as the native
population. As Table 9, column (5) suggests, immigration had virtually no effect on municipal per
capita spending on social and health care services. In addition, there is no effect of immigration on
per capita spending on education and cultural activities. These findings suggest that an inflow of
foreigners into a municipality did not overburden the provision of social welfare and other public
services. Together with the positive effect on municipal income tax revenue, this suggests that
welfare-state channel appears to a plausible mechanisms explaining the main finding.
2.6 CONCLUSION
This paper uses a novel panel dataset to study the effect of immigration on voting for the far-
right Finns Party in Finland. Using instrumental variable approach based on previous settlement
patterns of immigrants, I show that municipal in-migration of foreign citizens has a statistically
significant and sizable negative effect on Finns Party’s electoral support. In particular, one per-
centage point increase in the share of foreign citizens in municipality decreases Finns Party’s vote
share by 3.5 percentage points (28% of the mean). This result runs contrary to most findings
in the previous literature. Placebo test using data from a pre-period suggests that the negative
23Data comes from Statistics Finland’s database titled Economic data reported by municipalities and joint munic-
ipal boards. Only limited data is available after 2010.
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effect is not driven by persistent trends at the municipality level. The votes Finns Party loses
due to immigration are captured by the two pro-immigration parties - the Green League and the
Swedish People’s Party. In addition, immigration increases voter turnout while protest vote re-
mains unaffected. The main result is robust to heterogeneity with respect to a number of initial
socio-economic conditions such as median population, level of education, and unemployment rate.
However, there is some effect heterogeneity with respect to initial far-right support and immigrant
share. Places that started with above-median far-right vote share experienced a smaller reduction
in Finns Party’s support due to immigration, although the estimated effect in these municipalities
is still negative and statistically significant. In addition, immigration reduced far-right popularity
only in municipalities with above-median initial immigrant share suggesting that the level of ini-
tial immigrant exposure matters. Finally, I provide some evidence for welfare-state channel as a
potential mechanism through which immigration affects voting for the far-right. In particular, I
find that foreign migration increases per capita municipal personal income tax revenue, while per
capita spending on social services, health care, and education remain unaffected.
Given the serious nature of the threat far-right parties pose to the European integration pro-
cess, Europe’s security (with respect to the ongoing Russian aggression), and potentially even the
future of liberal democracy, the role of far-right parties in Western societies remains one of the
most important topics of the public debate in Europe today. This paper contributes to the debate
by presenting a unique case study showing that under some conditions, local immigrant inflow
can actually reduce far-right popularity. To better understand the complexity of the relationship
between immigration and far-right voting, future research needs to carefully address the interplay
between micro-level and macro-level exposure to immigrants, and how these two, independently
and together, affect far-right popularity.
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Figure 1: Finns Party’s Vote Share (All of Finland), 1996-2015
2004 EU enlargement
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Notes - Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database.
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Figure 2: Yearly Inflow of Immigrants with Foreign Citizenship: 1990-2015
2004 EU enlargement
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Notes - Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database.
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Figure 3: Share of Foreign Citizens (% of Total Population) at the Beginning of the Year, 1991-2015
2004 EU enlargement
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Figure 4: Yearly Inflow of Immigrants by Citizenship, 1991-2015
2004 EU enlargement
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Figure 5: Distribution of Non-Finnish EU Citizens’ Vote Share (2014 EU Election)
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Table 1: Immigration Position & Salience - Main Political Parties in Finland (2006-2014)
Party Election Year Immig. policy position Immig. policy salience Multiculturalism
Finns Party
2006 8.11 8.22 7.89
2010 9.1 8.9 9.1
2014 9 - 9.38
Vihr
2006 1.56 5.89 2.67
2010 2 7.1 2.1
2014 1.38 - 1.25
SFP/RKP
2006 2 5.78 2.89
2010 2.2 6.7 2.4
2014 2.75 - 2.13
Kok
2006 5 4.33 5.56
2010 5.8 4.5 5.5
2014 5.13 - 5.25
Kesk
2006 5.67 3.89 5.67
2010 5.8 4.6 6.5
2014 5.63 - 6.25
SDP
2006 4.78 3.78 5.11
2010 5.3 4.3 5.6
2014 4.13 - 4
KD
2006 5.11 4.67 6
2010 6 5.56 6.89
2014 6.14 - 7.29
vas.
2006 3.11 4.56 4
2010 3.7 4.9 4.3
2014 2.88 - 2.25
Notes - Immig. policy position - position on immigration policy (0 - 10; 0 - ”strongly opposes tough policy”; 10 - ”strongly
favors tough policy”). Immig. policy salience - importance/salience of immigration policy (0 - 10; 0 - ”not important at all”;
10 - ”extremely important”). Multiculturalism - position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (0 - 10; 0 - ”strongly
favors multiculturalism”; 10 - ”strongly favors assimilation”). Vihr - Green League; SFP/RKP - Swedish People’s Party; Kok
- National Coalition Party; Kesk - Centre Party; SDP - Social Democratic Party; KD - Christian Democrats. Data comes from
the 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) trend file.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Standard deviation Min Max
Finns Party’s vote share 0.120 0.076 0.001 0.534
Share of foreign citizens (% of population in 1991) 0.014 0.014 0.000 0.142
Population 17,895.13 44,697.37 763 612,664
Population density (per km2) 56.93 222.74 0.17 3,051.04
Share of females in adult population 0.499 0.014 0.438 0.543
Share of population (25-64) with tertiary education 0.272 0.075 0.118 0.694
Share of aged 65+ in adult population 0.264 0.056 0.113 0.460
Ratio of skilled to unskilled labor 3.44 1.10 1.35 8.93
Total crime rate (per 100,000) 5,633.45 3,130.57 1,071.26 63,930.13
Unemployment rate 0.119 0.043 0.028 0.288
Median household disposable income (EUR) 20,572.79 2,538.48 14,765 36,799
Notes - Number of observations: 2,079. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database.
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Table 3: Main Results
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (IV) (IV) (IV)
Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party
Share of foreign citizens -0.659∗ -1.284∗∗∗ -0.656∗ -1.464∗∗∗ -4.103∗∗∗ -3.351∗∗∗
(% of population in 2003) (0.300) (0.341) (0.303) (0.373) (0.809) (0.936)
Municipality/Election Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time-varying controls (lag) YES YES YES YES
Region FE x Election Year FE YES YES
Observations 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079
Adjusted R-squared 0.832 0.836 0.880 - - -
Mean of dep. variable 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 7.56% 7.56% 7.56% 7.56% 7.56% 7.56%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. - - - 62.32 34.53 22.77
Notes - Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level. Based on slope estimate in the last column, 1 std. dev.
increase in share of foreign citizens decreases FP vote share by 4.36 p.p. (58% of its std. deviation). Time-varying controls: log
of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database.
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 4: Placebo Test (OLS)
∆ Finns Party % ∆ Finns Party
(1996-2003) (1996-2003)
∆ IV (2006-2015) 0.220
(0.179)
% ∆ IV (2006-2015) 0.131
(0.479)
Region FE YES YES
Observations 297 294
Adjusted R-squared 0.194 0.264
Notes - ∆ Finns Party (1996-2003) - level change in Finns Party’s share of valid votes between 1996 and 2003. % ∆ Finns
Party (1996-2003) - percentage change in Finns Party’s share of valid votes between 1996 and 2003. ∆ IV (2006-2015) - level
change in the predicted share of foreign citizens between 2006 and 2015. % ∆ IV (2006-2015) - percentage change in the
predicted share of foreign citizens between 2006 and 2015. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Data comes from Statistics
Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. †
Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 5: Direct Test of Native Mobility
OLS IV OLS IV
Native Net Flow Native Net Flow Native Net Flow Native Net Flow
(municipality) (municipality) (subregion) (subregion)
Immigrant Net Flow 0.118 0.709
(municipality) (0.155) (1.104)
Immigrant Net Flow 0.102 -1.894
(subregion) (0.207) (1.423)
Observations 2079 2079 469 469
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. - 18.53 - 14.91
Anderson-Rubin chi-sq. test p-val. - 0.521 - 0.117
Notes - Native Net Flow - yearly net flow of Finnish citizens (% of population at t − 1). Immigrant Net Flow - yearly net
flow of foreign citizens (% of population at t− 1). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at respective levels (municipality,
subregion). First two columns control for municipality fixed effects and election year fixed effects, while the last two columns
control for subregion fixed effects and election year fixed effects. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. ***
Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 6: Immigration and Election Outcomes (All Main Parties)
(IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
Finns Party Vihr SFP/RKP Kok Kesk SDP KD
Share of foreign citizens -3.351∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗ 2.303∗ -0.900† 0.645 -1.013 -0.317
(% of population in 2003) (0.936) (0.295) (1.130) (0.527) (0.475) (0.833) (0.251)
Observations 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079
Mean (dep. var.) 12% 5% 4.07% 17.4% 33.4% 17.5% 3.95%
Std. dev. (dep. var.) 7.56% 4.36% 13.6% 10% 16.8% 12.6% 3.38%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 22.77 22.77 22.77 22.77 22.77 22.77 22.77
Notes - Finns Party - Finns Party’s share of valid votes; Vihr - Green League’s share of valid votes; SFP/RKP - Swedish
People’s Party’s share of valid votes; Kok - National Coalition Party’s share of valid votes; Kesk - Centre Party’s share of
valid votes; SDP - Social Democratic Party’s share of valid votes; KD - Christian Democrats’ share of valid votes. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level. All regressions control for municipality fixed effects, election year fixed
effects, region-by-election year fixed effects, and the following municipality-specific time-varying controls (in lagged form): log
of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database.
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 7: Immigration and Voter Turnout, Protest Vote
(IV) (IV)
Voter turnout Protest vote
Share of foreign citizens 1.711∗∗ 0.021
(% of population in 2003) (0.530) (0.025)
Observations 2079 2079
Mean (dep. var.) 59.7% 0.51%
Std. dev. (dep. var.) 15.4% 0.24%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 22.77 22.77
Notes - Voter turnout - share of eligible voters who cast ballot in election. Protest vote - share of invalid ballots. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level. Both regressions control for municipality fixed effects, election year fixed
effects, region-by-election year fixed effects, and the following municipality-specific time-varying controls (in lagged form): log
of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database.
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 8: Heterogeneity Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party
(Population) (Popul. Dens.) (Immig. Share) (Vote Share) (Education) (Skill Ratio) (Income) (Unemploy.)
ForeignSh x Above Med -4.131∗∗∗ -3.985∗∗∗ -3.289∗∗∗ -3.468∗∗∗ -4.052∗∗∗ -4.271∗∗∗ -4.113∗∗∗ -4.176∗∗∗
(0.814) (0.847) (0.740) (0.650) (0.965) (0.871) (0.847) (0.978)
ForeignSh x Below Med -4.747∗∗∗ -4.803∗∗∗ -0.774 -4.901∗∗∗ -3.902∗ -4.933∗∗∗ -4.174∗ -4.097∗∗∗
(1.193) (0.810) (1.348) (0.888) (1.921) (1.343) (1.705) (0.808)
p-value 0.44 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.90 0.41 0.96 0.89
(F-test coef. are equal)
Observations 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079
Mean (dep. var.) 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
Std. dev. (dep. var.) 7.56% 7.56% 7.56% 7.56% 7.56% 7.56% 7.56% 7.56%
First-Stage F-stat. 11.58 18.58 17.52 16.16 12.25 8.191 20.12 21.29
Notes - Finns Party - Finns Party’s share of valid votes. ForeignSh x Above Med - interaction between share of foreign citizens
and above-median dummy. ForeignSh x Below Med - interaction between share of foreign citizens and below-median dummy.
Above/below-median dummies determined by following initial conditions (columns 1-8): population (2004), population density
(2004), share of foreign citizens (2004), Finns Party’s share of valid votes (2003), share of tertiary educated (2004), ratio of
skilled to unskilled labor (2004), median household income (2004), unemployment rate (2004). Standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at municipality level. All regressions control for municipality fixed effects, election year fixed effects, and the following
municipality-specific time-varying controls (in lagged form): log of population, population density, share of females, share of
tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household
income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1%
level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 9: Immigration and Municipality Tax Revenue & Spending (2006-2010)
(IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
Total tax Income tax Property tax Corporate tax Social & health care Edu & culture
revenue revenue revenue revenue spending spending
Share of foreign citizens 39.08 56.04† -2.43 -13.91 -11.70 -45.78
(% of population in 2003) (43.74) (33.74) (13.20) (20.06) (142.7) (43.42)
Observations 1485 1485 1485 1485 1485 1485
Mean of dep. variable 2697.7 2323.9 163.4 210.4 3235.5 1268.5
Std. dev. of dep. variable 527.4 467.5 123.9 134.4 711.6 260.2
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 21.81 21.81 21.81 21.81 21.81 21.81
Notes - Total tax revenue - total municipality tax revenue (EUR per capita); Income tax revenue - municipality personal
income tax revenue (EUR per capita); Property tax revenue - municipality property tax revenue (EUR per capita); Corporate
tax revenue - municipality corporate income tax revenue (EUR per capita); Social & health care spending - municipality
spending on social and health care services (EUR per capita); Edu & culture spending - municipality spending on education
and cultural activities (EUR per capita). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level. All regressions control
for municipality fixed effects, election year fixed effects, region-by-election year fixed effects, and the following municipality-
specific time-varying controls (in lagged form): log of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated,
share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics
Finland’s database titled Economic data reported by municipalities and joint municipal boards. *** Significant at the 0.1%
level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level.
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3 THE EFFECTS OF DACA ON HEALTH INSURANCE,
ACCESS TO CARE, AND HEALTH OUTCOMES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Immigration continues to be a contentious topic in the political arena and the discussion of im-
migration reforms ignites the public debate in many advanced economies. In 2015, there were 11
million unauthorized immigrants in the U.S., representing 3.4% of the country’s population and
more than 5% of its labor force (Krogstad et al., 2015). Despite a recent slowdown in the in-
flux of undocumented immigrants into the U.S. (source : PEW Research Center on Migration),
regulating their status without further increasing illegal immigration remains a crucial challenge
for the government. Legalization programs have been historically used as a policy tool to foster
immigrants’ integration and well-being. The debate on the costs and effectiveness has become even
more relevant with the announced changes in the U.S. immigration policy that are currently under
discussion.
Illegal immigrants constantly face the threat of deportation and the lack of work permits,
access to credit, and access to government welfare programs (e.g. Medicaid, unemployment in-
surance, Social Security). These challenges can have detrimental effects on their human capital
and productivity. Previous research shows that illegal immigrants have substantially lower hourly
wage rates (for both genders), family income, and higher male labor force participation rates than
their legal immigrant or native-born counterparts (Capps, 2007; Rivera-Batiz, 1999; Borjas, 2017).
Studies also suggest that legalization of these immigrants can increase their probability of being
employed, participate in the labor force (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002; Devillanova et al., 2014;
Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman, 2017; Pope, 2016), can lead to a significant growth in their wages
(Rivera-Batiz, 1999) and contribute to private sector GDP (Edwards and Ortega, 2017). At the
same time there is evidence that programs requiring employers to check workers’ eligibility to work
legally in the US reduce average hourly earnings among likely unauthorized Mexican immigrants
(Orrenius and Zavodny, 2015b).
Most of the political discussion on immigrant legalization programs focuses on the potential costs
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associated with regularizing undocumented immigrants. Yet little is known about how legalization
affects public programs take-up. There are two notable exceptions. In a recent study, Cascio and
Lewis (2016) explore the effects of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) on Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC), and find that areas with higher applicant shares experienced relatively
large increases in EITC transfers after IRCA. Borjas and Slusky (2017) use counterfactual analysis
to estimate the additional public costs of legalizing the undocumented population by estimating
models of disability as a function of medical conditions. However, to the best of our knowledge,
there has been no analysis of the effects of immigrant legalization on health insurance coverage
and health care use, and only a few recent studies have considered the effects on health outcomes
(Venkataramani et al., 2017; Hainmueller et al., 2017). Our paper intends to fill this gap in the
literature.
We focus on the effect of a large-scale immigration policy change - 2012 Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA). DACA is an executive memorandum issued by President Obama on
June 15, 2012, which provides certain unauthorized immigrants who came to the U.S. as minors
with temporary reprieve from deportation and work authorization (DACA status can be renewed
every two years). Although DACA does not provide a path to citizenship or a de jure legal status,
one can think of it as a (temporary) de facto immigrant legalization.
To estimate the effects of DACA, we employ a difference-in-differences strategy exploiting the
discontinuities in the DACA eligibility criteria. We confirm that DACA-eligible immigrants are
more likely to participate in the labor force and some evidence of an increase in income (Pope, 2016).
Using American Community Survey data, we document that DACA eligibility increased health
insurance coverage. We show that DACA increased insurance coverage throughout the country by
enhancing individual ability to purchase private plans. In California and New York (among the
three states with the highest DACA-eligible population), where Medicaid eligibility was granted
to DACA recipients, the increase in insurance coverage was mostly driven by an increase in public
insurance coverage. Despite the increase in insurance coverage, using data from the National Health
Interview Survey and the California Health Interview Survey, we find little evidence of significant
effects on health care use, although after 2012, DACA-eligible individuals reported more mental
health care visits. On the other hand, we provide evidence that DACA increased the likelihood
of reporting a usual place of care and reduced the likelihood of deferring care due to financial
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reasons. There is also some evidence of improvements in mental health outcomes and self-reported
health. These effects are largely driven by subjects with income below the federal poverty level.
Our findings are largely consistent with the evidence from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment
and the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (Aron-Dine et al., 2013; Finkelstein et al., 2012;
Kamberg and Newhouse, 1985) showing that health insurance coverage had no or little effect on
physical health, but possibly improved perceived health and mental health among the population at
higher risk. The lack of significant impact on health care use is likely explained by the demographic
characteristics of the DACA-eligible population.
Our paper is closely related to a handful of recent studies analyzing the economic effects of
DACA. Pope (2016) documented the positive effects of DACA on the labor market opportunities
of undocumented immigrants. There is also evidence that DACA reduced the likelihood of life in
poverty (Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman, 2016), while Ortega et al. (2018) estimate that DACA
increased GDP by almost 0.02%. The evidence on the effects of DACA on human capital is less
conclusive. Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman (2017) and Hsin and Ortega (2017) show that DACA
may have incentivized work over educational investment. However, using administrative data from
California, Kuka et al. (2018) find evidence that DACA increased high school graduation rates
and college attendance. Finally, a few recent studies examined the effects of DACA on health.
Venkataramani et al. (2017) using data from the National Health Interview Survey provide evidence
that economic opportunities and protection from deportation can have large positive effects on the
mental health of undocumented immigrants, confirming associations found by Patler and Pirtle
(2017). Using Medicaid claims data from Oregon, Hainmueller et al. (2017) find that children of
DACA-eligible mothers had 50% fewer diagnoses of adjustment and anxiety disorder than children
with non-eligible mothers. However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to provide
a systematic analysis of the effects of DACA on insurance coverage, access to care, health care use,
and health outcomes. Furthermore, our findings highlight that the effects of DACA on stress and
mental health outcomes are concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution. Our findings
mirror recent evidence on the health and mental health effects of local immigration enforcement
(Wang and Kaushal, 2018).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the background. In Section 3, we illustrate
the data and identification strategy. We present the results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
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3.2 BACKGROUND, IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY, AND DATA
3.2.1 DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA)
On June 15, 2012, President Obama issued an executive memorandum announcing the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals. It is the largest immigration reform since the approval of the Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act (IRCA, 1986). The program targets up to 1.7 million unauthorized
immigrants (Passel and Lopez, 2012) providing eligible applicants with a two-year renewable re-
prieve from deportation, work authorization, and a temporary Social Security number. DACA does
not provide any form of legal immigrant status or a path to citizenship. The United States Depart-
ment of Homeland Security’s Citizenship and Immigration Services started accepting applications
for the program on August 15, 2012.
To be eligible, applicants have to meet the following seven criteria: (1) no lawful status as of
June 15, 2012; (2) under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012; (3) entered U.S. before reaching 16th
birthday; (4) continuously residing in the States since June 15, 2007; (5) physically present in the
U.S. on June 15, 2012, and at the time of applying for DACA; (6) currently in school, with high
school diploma (or GED), or honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces
of the United States; (7) not convicted of felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more other
misdemeanors. In addition, applicants have to be 15 years or older, and they are required to pay
a processing fee of 495 dollars. DACA applicants have to provide evidence that they were living in
the United States at the prescribed times, proof of education, and confirmation of their identities.24
They also have to pass a background check, fingerprinting, and other checks that consider their
identifying biological features. Applicants do not need legal representation. Officials can revoke
DACA protection if individuals pose a threat to public safety or national security. About 1,500
people have had their deferral canceled due to a crime or gang-related activity or an admission
to such activity. This is less than 0.2% of the total number of people accepted into the program
(source: Immigration and Customs Enforcement).
As of September 2017, approximately 800,000 individuals were ever granted DACA. Out of
these, 689,800 individuals were actively enrolled in the program in September 2017, while 40,000
24Documents showing individual arrived in the U.S. before 16th birthday include: passport with
admission stamp, Form I-94, school records from U.S. schools attended. USCIS provides a com-
plete list of accepted documents for each of the eligibility criteria: https://www.uscis.gov/archive/
consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca
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had adjusted to lawful permanent resident status and roughly 70,000 either had not renewed the
status or had had their renewal request denied. There have been 606,264 renewal cases overall with
only 4,703 of the requests denied. Most of current DACA recipients come from Latin America.
Mexico is the major source country (548,000), followed by El Salvador (26,000) and Guatemala
(17,700). 75% of DACA recipients live in 20 U.S. metropolitan areas. Los Angeles-Long Beach-
Anaheim had the largest concentration of DACA enrollees (89,900 DACA recipients) followed by
New York (47,200) and Dallas (36,700). A third of DACA recipients live in California (29%), while
16% of the enrolled in DACA are in Texas. Approximately 66% of the approved applicants are 25
or younger, 53% of them women, and 85% of them are single (USCIS and PEW Research Center).
The program was rescinded by President Trump’s administration in September 2017, although
this repeal of DACA has since been blocked by three preliminary injunctions issued by federal
district court judges in California, New York, and D.C. As a result, since January 2018, Department
of Homeland Security has been accepting only requests for renewal of the existing status, but
not new applications. However, according to the most recent court ruling (August 2018), the
administration has to fully restore the program (source: U.S. Customs and Immigration Service).
The main benefits of DACA for unauthorized immigrants are the deferral of deportation and the
working permit. DACA recipients receive a Social Security Number which enables them to open a
bank account and build credit history. Furthermore, most states (the only exceptions being Arizona
and Nebraska) allow DACA recipients to obtain a driver’s license. DACA does not provide access to
federal welfare programs or federal student aid. However, DACA recipients are immediately eligible
for Earned Income Tax Credit (upon meeting all other criteria) since Social Security Administration
does not distinguish between DACA and non-DACA Social Security Numbers.
As with other unauthorized immigrants, no provisions of the 2010 Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act apply to DACA recipients. That means, DACA grantees cannot purchase health
insurance through Marketplaces (not even at unsubsidized rates). In addition, DACA recipients
are not eligible for federally-funded Medicaid program, and they are not eligible for the CHIPRA
sec. 214 state option that covers lawfully residing children and/or pregnant women. However, all
low-income undocumented immigrants do quality for federally-funded emergency Medicaid which
covers basic live-saving procedures. As such, all unauthorized immigrants (including DACA recip-
ients) are exempt from the individual responsibility requirement to have health insurance (Tiffany,
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2016).
However, DACA grantees can obtain employer-sponsored insurance or buy health insurance
directly from the carrier. Furthermore, a few states grant access to their state-funded Medicaid
programs. In New York, DACAmented individuals became eligible for Medicaid immediately be-
cause of a 2001 State Court of Appeals ruling. In California, the expansion of Medi-Cal coverage
to DACA recipients did not take place until January 2014 (Brindis et al., 2014). While other states
also expanded Medicaid to grant access to DACA-eligible population (Minnesota, Massachusetts,
D.C., Illinois, Oregon, Washington state), the expansion was limited or started after the end of our
study period.25
California and New York are respectively the first and the third state with the largest DACA-
eligible population.26 In these two states, low-income DACA recipients are eligible for full scope
state-funded Medicaid since they fall under the state definition of Permanently Residing in the U.S.
under Color of Law (PRUCOL). For these reasons, we present separate analysis for California and
New York.
3.2.2 IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
To identify the effect of DACA, we follow the difference-in-differences approach proposed by Pope
(2016) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman (2016), which exploits the discontinuities in the eligibil-
ity criteria of the DACA program and compares DACA-eligible with DACA-ineligible individuals,
before and after the implementation of the reform. DACA-eligible individuals are defined as those
who: (1) were under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012; (2) have lived in the U.S. since June 15,
2007; (3) entered U.S. before reaching 16th birthday; (4) have at least a high school degree (or
equivalent); (5) were born outside the U.S. and its territories; and (6) are not U.S. citizens.27 28
25Minnesota extended eligibility for its state-funded MinnesotaCare program to DACA recipients in January 2017
(outside of our study period). In D.C., all low-income undocumented immigrants (regardless of DACA status) are
eligible for the locally-funded Health Care Alliance program. In Washington state, only disabled DACA recipients are
eligible for the state-funded Medical Care Services. And finally, California, New York, Illinois, Massachusetts, Oregon,
and Washington state use state-only funds to provide health insurance coverage to all undocumented children.
26Migration Policy Institute’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Data Tools: https://www.
migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca-profiles.
27Similarly, to define the DACA-eligible population in year 2012 and before, we restricted to those who were: (1)
under the age 31 as of June 15 of the previous calendar year; (2) have lived in the U.S. for at least six years; (3)
entered U.S. before reaching 16th birthday; (4) have at least a high school degree (or equivalent); (5) were born
outside the U.S. and its territories; and (6) are not U.S. citizens.
28It is worth noting that as we only use a subset of the requirements listed in Section 2.1, we are comparing
potentially eligible individuals. Furthermore, there may be measurement error bias due to the fact that some legal
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In the ACS, our main estimation sample comprises all non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a
high school degree (or equivalent).29 As noted by Pope (2016), since nearly 40% of the non-citizen
sample in the ACS data are authorized immigrants (Baker and Rytina, 2014), the intent-to-treat
effect of DACA will be approximately 1.6 times larger than the estimates from our DID estimation.
Furthermore, it is worth remarking that not all DACA-eligible individuals applied and received
DACA status. As of January 2018, 682,750 individuals obtained DACA status. The Migration
Policy Institute estimates that there were 1,326,000 DACA-eligible individuals in 2017.30 Based
on these estimates the program participation rate is 52%, suggesting that the treatment on the
treated effects could potentially be as much as 2 times larger than the intent-to-treat effects.
In the NHIS and CHIS, to ensure we have enough identification power, we extend the sample to
all non-citizens and citizens aged 18-50 with at least a high school degree (or equivalent). While we
use a larger control group to increase the sample size with these survey data, as a robustness check,
we test the sensitivity of results to different sample choices. The main empirical specification has
the following form:
Yit = α+ β1Postit + β2Eligit + τPostit ∗ Eligit + β3Xit + β4Zit + Λt + Θc + Θct+ it (5)
where Yit refers to the outcome of interest of individual i in year t (e.g. health status, health
insurance coverage, etc.); Postit is a binary variable equal to one if the survey took place in a
year after DACA implementation (2013 or later); and Eligit is a dummy equal to one if individ-
ual i is DACA-eligible when the survey is administered. The coefficient of interest (τ) measures
the intention-to-treat effect of DACA. The regression also controls for individual i’s demographic
characteristics31 (Xit), year fixed effects (Λt), area (county, state, or region) fixed effects (Θc),
and state or region-specific time trends (Θct).
32 Finally, the vector Zit non-parametrically con-
trols for eligibility criteria by including fixed effects for individual i’s age, education, and age of
immigrants may be classified as part of our treatment group.
29This is the same sample used by Pope (2016).
30https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca-profiles.
31Sex, race, ethnicity, and marital status.
32Results are not sensitive to the inclusion of state-specific time trends (results without state-specific trends
available upon request).
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arrival into the U.S. Equation (1) is estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity-robust (NHIS sample; CHIS sample; ACS: California + New York sample), or
clustered at the state-year level (ACS: total U.S. sample; ACS: U.S. without CA and NY sample).33
3.2.3 DATA
We use data from three different sources: the American Community Survey (ACS), the National
Health Interview Survey (NHIS), and the California Health Interview Survey (CHIS).
ACS
To analyze labor market outcomes and insurance coverage we use data from the American Com-
munity Survey (2005-2016), the largest household survey that the U.S. Census Bureau administers
(Ruggles et al., 2017). We start with 2005 since it’s the first year with a full one-percent sample
of the U.S. population. 2016 is the last year for which the survey data is available. Designed as
a replacement for the long form of the decennial census, ACS contains a detailed set of standard
socio-demographic characteristics and labor market outcomes (e.g. employment, labor force par-
ticipation, annual income). Furthermore, since 2008, the survey provides information on health
insurance coverage and the type of coverage. The ACS also contains information on US citizenship
status, number of years spent in the US, quarter of birth, and educational attainment, which can
be used to determine respondents’ DACA eligibility status. However, the survey does not include
information about individual criminal convictions, or whether the respondent has been honorably
discharged from the military. As far as the sampling procedure is concerned, unauthorized im-
migrants are no more or less likely to be selected into the sample than authorized immigrants or
natives. This follows from the fact that U.S. Census Bureau uses a near universe of housing ad-
dresses from its Master Address File as the sample frame from which it draws systematic sample
of addresses each month. The ACS is then mailed to the selected addresses. Non-respondents are
contacted one month later for a computer-assisted telephone interview. After that, one third of
non-respondents who still remain are contacted in person to complete the ACS one month after the
telephone survey attempt (Pope, 2016). Between 2005 and 2016, The Master Address File covered
33Alternatively, we adjusted for clustering at the state level (see Table B.1 in the Appendix).
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98.3-99.1% of all housing units and 76.2-99.8% of all group quarters in the U.S., encompassing
91.9-95.1% of the total U.S. population. The survey response rate in this period was 89.9-98.0%
for the housing units and 95.1-98.0% for the group quarters.34
NHIS
NHIS is the largest health survey in the United States and the nation’s primary source of general
health information (Blewett et al., 2016). It is designed by CDC’s National Center for Health
Statistics and administered by the U.S. Census Bureau. The survey is conducted continuously
since 1957 via in-person interviews, and each annual national sample consists of roughly 90,000
individuals. The annual response rate is approximately 70% of the eligible households in the sam-
ple.35 We focus on the period 2000-2016. Unfortunately, the public version of NHIS data that we
use does not contain precise information on the number of years since migration, which determines
two of our three eligibility cutoffs. Instead, foreign-born respondents are grouped into the following
categories: (1) less than 1 year; (2) 1 year to less than 5 years; (3) 5 years to less than 10 years;
(4) 10 years to less than 15 years; (5) 15 years or more. Therefore, we classify as DACA-eligible
only those individuals for whom we know for sure that they meet the age of entry and length of
residence criteria. This measurement error will likely result in attenuation bias as many DACA-
eligible respondents will be labeled as ineligible.
CHIS
The California Health Interview Survey (CHIS) is the nation’s largest state health survey (UCLA
Center for Health Policy Research, 2016). The survey is conducted by the UCLA Center for
Health Policy Research in collaboration with the California Department of Public Health, and
the Department of Health Care Services. It is a random-dial telephone survey conducted on a
continuous basis and covers a wide range of health topics. Both landline and cellular phone numbers
are sampled and the interview is computer-assisted. The survey provides a detailed picture of
34https://www.census.gov/acs/www/methodology/sample-size-and-data-quality/
35https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhis/about_nhis.htm
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the health and health care needs of California’s large and diverse population. The first survey
was conducted in 2000-01 on 55,000 households. Biennial surveys were conducted until 2011 on
approximately 45,000 households. Starting in 2011, CHIS transitioned from a biennial survey
model to a continuous survey model, interviewing roughly 20,000 Californians (adults, teenagers,
and children) each year. Yearly samples are representative of California’s population. Our analysis
employs confidential data from 2003-2015, which includes precise information on the number of
years foreign-born individuals lived in the U.S., exact date of CHIS interview, respondent’s month
and year of birth, and other variables which enable us to minimize the measurement error in the
definition of the DACA-eligible population.36 Since CHIS is a telephone-based survey, the response
rates are lower than for the ACS or NHIS. However, as noted in the survey documentation, “CHIS
response rates are similar to, and sometimes higher than other comparable surveys that interview
by telephone.”
3.3 RESULTS
3.3.1 DACA AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of DACA on health insurance coverage are reported
in Table 10. Panel A reveals that throughout the country, DACA-eligible immigrants were more
likely to acquire insurance coverage after 2012. This finding is confirmed in Figures 6-10, which
plot the interactions between DACA eligibility indicator and year-specific indicators. In states
that extended full-scope Medicaid coverage to low-income DACA recipients (California and New
York), insurance coverage increased due to a sharp increase in public coverage (Figures 11-15).
Reassuringly, the difference in pre-trends in the outcome variables of treatment and control groups
are statistically non-significant. This increase begins in 2014 - the year when DACA recipients in
California became eligible for the state-funded Medi-Cal.37 As Panel B, column 1 reports, DACA-
eligible immigrants were 4 percentage points more likely to report insurance coverage in California
and New York, a 6% increase with respect to the insurance rate in the sample. Although this
surge in coverage is largely driven by the Medicaid (Panel B, column 2), there is also evidence
of a 1 percentage point increase in private coverage (column 3), and in particular employer-based
36Data from 2000-01 survey are not included in the analysis because many variables from this wave cannot be
trended with subsequent waves of the survey.
37As noted earlier, DACA recipients in New York became eligible for the state-funded Medicaid immediately.
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insurance (column 4).
In the rest of the U.S., there was no increase in public coverage as immigrants were not eligible
for Medicaid or other public programs, but private insurance coverage did go up (Figures 16-20).
The increase in insurance coverage is substantially smaller than in New York and California, and
it is driven by the 7% increase (with respect to the mean) in individually purchased insurance (see
Panel C, columns 1 and 5). However, we cannot reject that the effect of DACA on any private
coverage is the same in California and New York as in the rest of the states, suggesting that crowding
out effects of access to public coverage are negligible. Results on health insurance are robust to
eliminating (a number of) legal immigrants from the main sample using the residual method (see
Table B.2).38 Moreover, findings are robust to including individuals with less than a high school
diploma but still in school, as these were also eligible for DACA (results available upon request).
3.3.2 DACA, ACCESS TO CARE, AND HEALTH CARE USE
Using NHIS data, we examined the impact of DACA on access to care and health care utilization.
DACA-eligible individuals after 2012 were less likely to delay care because of financial constraints
(-20%). We also find that DACA led to a 5 percentage point decrease in the cost-related inability
to seek specialized care when needed (Figure 21 and Table 11). In California, DACA increased the
likelihood of reporting having a usual place of care by 11% and a personal doctor by 13% (Figure
22, Table 12). Despite the observed increase in insurance coverage and access to care, there is little
evidence of any increase in health care use (e.g. total doctor visits, emergency room visits; see
Figures 23-24, and Tables 13-14).39 However, in California after 2012, DACA-eligible individuals
38Following the approach proposed by Borjas (2017) and based on previous work by Passel and Cohn (2014),
we exclude from the sample immigrants who are likely to have a legal status, thus reducing the attenuation bias
of our estimates. It is worth noting that in our case, we can only use a subset of the exclusion conditions used by
Borjas (2017), as some of the criteria used to identify legal immigrants from the sample (e.g. local/state government
employment, occupational licensing) may lead to the exclusion of DACAmented individuals. In practice, we only
exclude any foreign-born non-citizen who satisfies one (or more) of the following conditions:
(a) arrived in the U.S. before 1980;
(b) was born in Cuba;
(c) is federal government employee;
(d) receives any Social Security benefits or Supplementary Security Income (SSI).
39In addition to the variables presented in Table 13, in NHIS, we tested the effect of DACA on a number of other
measures of health care utilization. We found no effect of the policy in all instances. The following variables were
considered: Number of nights in hospital (past 12 mo.); Number of times in hospital overnight (past 12 mo.); Number
of ER visits (past 12 mo.); Time since last doctor visit; Individual saw/talked to a general doctor (past 12 mo.);
Individual saw/talked to a foot doctor (past 12 mo.), Individual ever received dental care; Time since last dental care
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were more likely to receive mental care services (Figure 24, Table 14 - columns 4 and 5).40 We find
no evidence of significant differences even when restricting to individuals below the federal poverty
level (Tables B.3-B.4).
3.3.3 EFFECTS ON HEALTH STATUS AND MENTAL HEALTH
There is some evidence that DACA had mild positive effects on self-reported health status and
mental health (Figure 25 and Table 15). While the direction of the effect is consistent across
the outcomes considered (columns 1-9), results are precisely estimated only when examining self-
reported health status (columns 1 and 2). Despite the large standard errors, our estimates suggest
that DACA eligibility reduced the likelihood of reporting depression symptoms, moderate or serious
psychological distress, and hypertension. Interestingly, when we restrict the analysis to individuals
with income below the federal poverty level (Table 16), we find evidence of significant improvements
in mental health and well-being (columns 4-9). For this group, DACA reduced by 36% the likelihood
of reporting depression, by 50% the likelihood of feeling hopeless, and by 34% the likelihood of
feeling that “everything had been an effort”. In addition, the measure of non-specific psychological
distress (Kessler 6 Scale) declined by about 23%, the likelihood of reporting moderate or serious
psychological distress by 29%, and the probability of being diagnosed with hypertension also by
29% with respect to the sample mean. Results are even larger when restricting the analysis to
Hispanics with income below the poverty level (see Table B.5).
Examining CHIS data (Figure 26 and Table 17), we find mild evidence of improvements in
self-reported health status in the overall sample, but consistent with results from NHIS, there is
evidence of significant reductions in anxiety, distress, and hypertension among those below the
poverty level (Table 18). In this group, DACA eligibility reduced the likelihood of feeling restless
and experiencing psychological distress by approximately 54%, and the likelihood of reporting
hypertension by 33%.
visit; Individual had a surgery (past 12 mo.).
40The sample size in Tables 13 and 14 changes due to the fact that not all variables are available in all years and
for all the respondents. However, in both tables, restricting the analysis to a consistent sample yields similar results.
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3.3.4 POTENTIAL MECHANISMS
The increase in private insurance coverage and the mild positive effects on mental health may be
in part explained by the positive effects on labor market outcomes documented in previous studies
(Pope, 2016; Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman, 2016). Using data from the American Community
Survey, we replicated the findings of Pope (2016), extending the analysis by including 2015 and
2016. We confirm that DACA substantially increased the likelihood of recipients currently working
or having worked at some point in the past year. In addition, DACA led to a higher immigrant labor
force participation and a lower probability of being unemployed (Figure B.1). Finally, consistent
with Pope (2016), DACA had a positive effect on the number of hours worked and income of eligible
individuals, but no significant effect on self-employment (Figures B.1 and B.2).
We have also considered the effects of DACA on non-pecuniary working conditions. As Figure
B.2 depicts, there is no evidence of any changes in the work schedules or task-intensity of immigrant
jobs (Peri and Sparber, 2009; Giuntella et al., 2017), suggesting that DACAmented individuals are
not moving to “better” jobs in terms of these particular non-pecuniary characteristics. Results are
similar when restricting the analysis to California alone (Figures B.3 and B.4).
Temporary work authorization also reduced immigrants’ exposure to chronic stressors, such as
the constant fear of being deported, the inability to get a driver’s license, regular job, or open a
bank account. Observational studies suggest that undocumented immigrants who belong to the 1.5
generation report higher levels of anxiety, depression, and fear, which affect their transition from
adolescence to adulthood, during which about 75% of lifetime psychiatric disorders can emerge
(Stacciarini et al., 2015; Gonzales et al., 2014; Delva et al., 2013). Taken together, our findings
suggest that the reduced exposure to chronic stressors, increased income, higher labor force partic-
ipation, improved access to care, and the financial security associated with insurance coverage can
explain the positive effects on health and depression symptoms, which are stronger among those at
the bottom of the income distribution.
3.3.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In the Appendix, we report a full set of robustness checks. Table B.2 shows the sensitivity of
our analysis to restricting the sample to individuals who are more likely to be undocumented.
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Unfortunately, we can only conduct this test using ACS data, as we have limited information and
limited sample sizes when using NHIS and CHIS data. Reassuringly, the results lean in the same
direction and, if anything, point estimates are slightly larger than the ones presented in Table 10,
consistent with a reduction in attenuation bias due to measurement error in the definition of the
eligible population. Results are also robust to adjusting for clustering at the state-level (see Table
B.1).
As mentioned above, in the baseline analysis we treated 2012 as a control year. However,
omitting the adoption year (2012) yields substantially identical results (see Tables B.6-B.9). As
age-cutoffs may be vulnerable to non-parallel trends (Slusky, 2017), we confirm the main results
using a shorter time window around the policy change (2011-2012 vs 2013-2014). Furthermore, the
results are robust to dropping individulas who were 30-31 in 2012 (see Tables B.10-B.13).
Tables B.14-B.19 replicate Tables 11-15 and Table 17, restricting the sample to non-citizens
aged 18-35, and with a high school degree or equivalent. For most of the outcomes the results lean
in the same direction and point estimates are not substantially different, although due to the small
sample sizes, standard errors increase substantially and many of the coefficients are not precisely
estimated.
3.4 CONCLUSION
The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) is currently a subject of intense political
debate. Previous studies showed evidence of positive effects of this reform on labor market par-
ticipation and income of those at the bottom of the income distribution, but documented some
negative effects on academic outcomes. Furthermore, there is evidence that DACA had positive
effects on adult mental health and child health outcomes.
We examine the effects of DACA on health insurance coverage and provide evidence that DACA
eligibility increased insurance coverage. This increase was driven by an increase in public coverage
in states that extended Medicaid access to low-income DACA-eligible immigrants. However, even
in states that did not expand Medicaid to include DACA-eligible immigrants, there was an increase
in individually purchased health insurance. Despite the increase in insurance coverage, there is
little evidence of significant increases in health care use, although DACA-eligible individuals were
more likely to report a usual place of care and less likely to delay health care due to financial
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constraints. Finally, we find some evidence that DACA led to improvement in self-reported health,
mental health, stress, and hypertension. These positive effects are concentrated among individuals
with income below the federal poverty level. Our findings are broadly consistent with previous
experimental evidence on the health effects of health insurance coverage (Aron-Dine et al., 2013;
Finkelstein et al., 2012).
Overall, our results suggest that DACA promoted financial security through its effects on in-
come and insurance coverage, and improved perceived health and mental health of DACA-eligible
immigrants – particularly those with an income below the federal poverty level – without signif-
icantly changing their demand for care. These effects should not be neglected when examining
the impact of DACA. In contrast, restricting DACA might have detrimental effects on the access
to care and mental health of DACA-eligible individuals, and particularly on the nearly 1 million
people who benefited from the program thus far. The lack of alternative policy solutions will pose
difficult challenges to health care providers and public health officials across the country.
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Figure 6: DACA and Insurance Coverage in U.S.
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graph. The dependent variable - Any Coverage - is binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently with health insurance coverage.
Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are
taken from the 2008-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex,
race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed
effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at state-year level.
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Figure 7: DACA and Medicaid Coverage in U.S.
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in
the graph. The dependent variable - Medicaid - is binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently on Medicaid. Estimates are
derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the
2008-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity,
marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year
fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at state-year level.
Figure 8: DACA and Any Private Coverage in U.S.
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graph. The dependent variable - Any Private - is binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently with private health insurance
(i.e. via employer/union or purchased directly from insurer). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35
with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2008-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for
DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies
(age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard
errors are clustered at state-year level.
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Table 10: The Effects of DACA on Health Insurance Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any Coverage Medicaid Any Private Employer-Sponsored Indiv. Purchased
Panel A: Entire U.S.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0224*** 0.0084 0.0137** 0.0061 0.0081**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Observations 395,902 395,902 395,902 395,902 395,902
R-squared 0.221 0.079 0.250 0.188 0.095
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.642 0.089 0.558 0.435 0.137
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.480 0.284 0.497 0.496 0.344
Panel B: California & New York
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0409*** 0.0256*** 0.0134* 0.0114 0.0025
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Observations 127,886 127,886 127,886 127,886 127,886
R-squared 0.193 0.111 0.261 0.207 0.124
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.662 0.147 0.521 0.409 0.127
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.473 0.354 0.500 0.492 0.333
Panel C: Entire U.S. (except California and New York)
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0145* -0.0019 0.0171** 0.0074 0.0107**
(0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Observations 268,016 268,016 268,016 268,016 268,016
R-squared 0.249 0.059 0.267 0.198 0.101
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.632 0.061 0.575 0.447 0.142
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.482 0.240 0.494 0.497 0.349
Notes - Any Coverage - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with health insurance coverage; Medicaid - binary var.
equal 1 if individual currently on Medicaid; Any Private - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with private health
insurance (i.e. via employer/union or purchased directly from insurer); Employer-Sponsored - binary var. equal 1 if individual
currently with health insurance via employer or union; Indiv. Purchased - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with health
insurance purchased directly from insurer. Standard errors in parentheses, heteroskedasticity-robust (Panel B), and clustered
at state-year level (Panels A and C). Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least
a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2008-2016 waves of ACS. All regressions control for Post-DACA
implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA
eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends.
In addition, all columns in Panels A and C control for state fixed effects, while all columns in Panel B control for PUMA fixed
effects. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Figure 9: DACA and Employer-Sponsored Coverage in U.S.
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graph. The dependent variable - Employer-Sponsored - is binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently with health insurance
via employer or union. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or
equivalent). Data are taken from the 2008-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic
characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education
attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at state-year
level.
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Figure 10: DACA and Individually Purchased Coverage in U.S.
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graph. The dependent variable - Indiv. Purchased - is binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently with health insurance
purchased directly from insurer. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school
diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2008-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for DACA eligibility dummy,
demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S.,
education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at
state-year level.
Figure 11: DACA and Insurance Coverage in California and New York
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graph. The dependent variable - Any Coverage - is binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently with health insurance coverage.
Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are
taken from the 2008-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex,
race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), PUMA
fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Figure 12: DACA and Medicaid Coverage in California and New York
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in
the graph. The dependent variable - Medicaid - is binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently on Medicaid. Estimates are
derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the
2008-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity,
marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), PUMA fixed effects, year
fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
Figure 13: DACA and Any Private Coverage in California and New York
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graph. The dependent variable - Any Private - is binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently with private health insurance (i.e.
via employer/union or purchased directly from insurer). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at
least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2008-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for DACA
eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age,
age of entering U.S., education attainment), PUMA fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard
errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Figure 14: DACA and Employer-Sponsored Coverage in California and New York
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graph. The dependent variable - Employer-Sponsored - is binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently with health insurance
via employer or union. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or
equivalent). Data are taken from the 2008-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic
characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education
attainment), PUMA fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
Figure 15: DACA and Individually Purchased Coverage in California and New York
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary variable
for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph. The
dependent variable - Indiv. Purchased - is binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently with health insurance purchased directly
from insurer. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent).
Data are taken from the 2008-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics
(sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment),
PUMA fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Figure 16: DACA and Insurance Coverage in U.S. (outside CA, NY)
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graph. The dependent variable - Any Coverage - is binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently with health insurance coverage.
Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are
taken from the 2008-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex,
race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed
effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at state-year level.
Figure 17: DACA and Medicaid Coverage in U.S. (outside CA, NY)
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in
the graph. The dependent variable - Medicaid - is binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently on Medicaid. Estimates are
derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the
2008-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity,
marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year
fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at state-year level.
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Figure 18: DACA and Any Private Coverage in U.S. (outside CA, NY)
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graph. The dependent variable - Any Private - is binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently with private health insurance
(i.e. via employer/union or purchased directly from insurer). Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35
with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2008-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for
DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies
(age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard
errors are clustered at state-year level.
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Figure 19: DACA and Employer-Sponsored Coverage in U.S. (outside CA, NY)
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graph. The dependent variable - Employer-Sponsored - is binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently with health insurance
via employer or union. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or
equivalent). Data are taken from the 2008-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic
characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education
attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at state-year
level.
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Figure 20: DACA and Individually Purchased Coverage in U.S. (outside CA, NY)
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graph. The dependent variable - Indiv. Purchased - is binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently with health insurance
purchased directly from insurer. Estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school
diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2008-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for DACA eligibility dummy,
demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S.,
education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors are clustered at
state-year level.
Figure 21: DACA and Health Care Access, Affordability (Entire U.S.: NHIS)
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graphs. Following dependent variables were used in the regressions (left-to-right): Usual - binary var. equal 1 if individual has
usual place to go to when sick or needing health advice; Any Care Delay - binary var. equal 1 if any member of respondent’s
family delayed seeking medical care due to cost (in past 12 months). All estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens
and citizens ages 18-50 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2000-2016 waves of NHIS.
Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA
eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment), region fixed effects, year fixed effects, and region-specific time trends.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Figure 22: DACA and Health Care Access (California: CHIS)
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graphs. Following dependent variables were used in the regressions (left-to-right): Usual - binary var. equal 1 if individual has
usual place to go to when sick or needing health advice; Personal MD - binary var. equal 1 if individual has personal doctor
as main medical provider. All estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at least a high
school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2003-2015 waves of CHIS. Regressions control for DACA eligibility
dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education
attainment), county fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Figure 23: DACA and Health Care Use (Entire U.S.: NHIS)
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graphs. Following dependent variables were used in the regressions (left-to-right, starting with the uppermost row): Doctor -
binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to any doctor in past 12 months; # Visits - total number of doctor’s office visits in
past 12 months; Care 10+ - binary var. equal 1 if individual received medical care 10+ times in past 12 months; Hosp. Night
- binary var. equal 1 if individual was in a hospital overnight in past 12 months; ER - binary var. equal 1 if individual visited
emergency room in past 12 months; Saw Mental - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to mental health professional
(psychiatrist, psychologist, etc.) in past 12 months. All estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens and citizens ages
18-50 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2000-2016 waves of NHIS. Regressions
control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria
dummies (age, education attainment), region fixed effects, year fixed effects, and region-specific time trends. Standard errors
are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Figure 24: DACA and Health Care Use (California: CHIS)
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graphs. Following dependent variables were used in the regressions (left-to-right, starting with the uppermost row): Doctor -
binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to any doctor in past 12 months; # Visits - total number of doctor’s office visits
in past 12 months; ER - binary var. equal 1 if individual visited emergency room in past 12 months; Saw Mental - binary
var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to a medical professional (psychiatrist, psychologist, etc.) for mental or alcohol/drug
problems in past 12 months. All estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at least a high
school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2003-2015 waves of CHIS. Regressions control for DACA eligibility
dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education
attainment), county fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Figure 25: DACA and Health (Entire U.S.: NHIS)
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained from estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary
variable for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the
graphs. Following dependent variables were used in the regressions (left-to-right, starting with the uppermost row): Health -
self-reported general health status (categorical variable: 1 - poor, 2 - fair, 3 - good, 4 - very good, 5 - excellent); Good Health
- binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as excellent, very good, or good (categories 5, 4,
3); Depressed - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling sad or depressed such that “nothing could cheer them up”
some/most/all of the time in past 30 days; Hopeless - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling hopeless some/most/all
of the time in past 30 days; K6 Scale - continuous measure of nonspecific psychological distress during the past 30 days using
Kessler 6-Item (K6) Psychological Distress Scale (0-24; higher values represent higher levels of distress); Distress - binary var.
equal 1 if individual experienced moderate or serious psychological distress in past 30 days (i.e. K6 Scale >= 5). All estimates
are derived from a sample of non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are
taken from the 2000-2016 waves of NHIS. Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex,
race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment), region fixed effects, year fixed
effects, and region-specific time trends. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Figure 26: DACA and Health (California: CHIS)
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary variable
for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graphs.
Following dependent variables were used in the regressions (left-to-right, starting with the uppermost row): Health - self-
reported general health status (categorical variable: 1 - poor, 2 - fair, 3 - good, 4 - very good, 5 - excellent); Good Health -
binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as excellent, very good, or good (categories 5, 4,
3); Depressed - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling sad or depressed such that “nothing could cheer them up”
some/most/all of the time in past 30 days; Hopeless - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling hopeless some/most/all
of the time in past 30 days; K6 Scale - continuous measure of nonspecific psychological distress during the past 30 days using
Kessler 6-Item (K6) Psychological Distress Scale (0-24; higher values represent higher levels of distress); Distress - binary var.
equal 1 if individual experienced moderate or serious psychological distress in past 30 days (i.e. K6 Scale >= 5). All estimates
are derived from a sample of non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are
drawn the 2003-2015 waves of CHIS. Regressions control for DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race,
ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment), county fixed effects, and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Table 11: DACA and Health Care Access, Affordability (Entire U.S.: NHIS)
(1) (2) (3)
Usual Any Care Delay Special. Not Afford.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0146 -0.0325*** -0.0511**
(0.031) (0.011) (0.024)
Observations 247,900 583,051 92,841
R-squared 0.072 0.025 0.017
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.812 0.157 0.052
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.390 0.364 0.221
Notes - Usual - binary var. equal 1 if individual has usual place to go to when sick or needing health advice; Any Care Delay -
binary var. equal 1 if any member of respondent’s family delayed seeking medical care due to cost (in past 12 months); Special.
Not Afford. - binary var. equal 1 if individual needed but couldn’t afford specialist (in past 12 months). Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at least a
high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2000-2016 waves of NHIS. All regressions control for Post-DACA
implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA
eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment), year fixed effects, region fixed effects, and region-specific time trends.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 12: DACA and Health Care Access (California: CHIS)
(1) (2)
Usual Personal MD
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0918** 0.0913
(0.046) (0.066)
Observations 106,247 31,396
R-squared 0.079 0.108
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.848 0.683
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.359 0.465
Notes - Usual - binary var. equal 1 if individual has usual place to go to when sick or needing health advice; Personal MD -
binary var. equal 1 if individual has personal doctor as main medical provider. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates
in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at least a high school diploma (or
equivalent). Data are taken from the 2003-2015 waves of CHIS. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy,
DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies
(age, education attainment), county fixed effects, and year fixed effects. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the
5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 13: DACA and Health Care Use (Entire U.S.: NHIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Doctor # Visits Care 10+ Hosp. Night ER Saw Special Saw Eye Saw Mental
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0112 0.0411 0.0001 0.0012 0.0089 -0.0119 0.0013 0.0083
(0.031) (0.109) (0.006) (0.007) (0.022) (0.014) (0.027) (0.010)
Observations 246,178 246,178 582,213 582,929 247,041 247,025 247,090 247,101
R-squared 0.072 0.073 0.019 0.018 0.024 0.027 0.042 0.020
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.776 2.243 0.082 0.065 0.195 0.192 0.315 0.086
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.417 2.161 0.274 0.247 0.396 0.394 0.464 0.281
Notes - Doctor - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to any doctor in past 12 months; # Visits - total number of
doctor’s office visits in past 12 months; Care 10+ - binary var. equal 1 if individual received medical care 10+ times in past
12 months; Hosp. Night - binary var. equal 1 if individual was in a hospital overnight in past 12 months; ER - binary var.
equal 1 if individual visited emergency room in past 12 months; Saw Special - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to
medical specialist in past 12 months; Saw Eye - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to eye doctor in past 12 months;
Saw Mental - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to mental health professional (psychiatrist, psychologist, etc.) in past
12 months. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens and
citizens ages 18-50 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2000-2016 waves of NHIS. All
regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race,
ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment), year fixed effects, region fixed effects,
and region-specific time trends. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 14: DACA and Health Care Use (California: CHIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Doctor # Visits ER Saw Mental # Mental Visits
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0094 0.9150 -0.0084 0.0387* 0.8404*
(0.047) (0.918) (0.040) (0.023) (0.487)
Observations 106,247 106,247 85,776 66,315 66,315
R-squared 0.055 0.028 0.020 0.041 0.018
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.807 4.075 0.184 0.159 1.808
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.395 9.201 0.387 0.366 8.541
Notes - Doctor - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to any doctor in past 12 months; # Visits - total number of doctor’s
office visits in past 12 months; ER - binary var. equal 1 if individual visited emergency room in past 12 months; Saw Mental -
binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to a medical professional (psychiatrist, psychologist, etc.) for mental or alcohol/drug
problems in past 12 months; # Mental Visits - # of visits to professional for problems with mental health or drugs/alcohol
(during past 12 months). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all
non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2003-2015 waves
of CHIS. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics
(sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment), county fixed effects, and
year fixed effects. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 15: DACA and General Health Status, Mental Health (Entire U.S.: NHIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Health Poor Health Good Health Depressed Hopeless Effort K6 Scale Distress Hyperten.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.1188*** -0.0036*** 0.0071 -0.0254 -0.0076 -0.0311 -0.2014 -0.0389 -0.0103
(0.028) (0.001) (0.005) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.208) (0.024) (0.017)
Observations 583,085 583,085 583,085 246,199 246,172 246,032 245,701 245,701 249,479
R-squared 0.079 0.011 0.033 0.025 0.016 0.018 0.033 0.025 0.064
Mean of Dep. Var. 4.009 0.011 0.937 0.106 0.063 0.148 2.484 0.194 0.142
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.950 0.105 0.243 0.307 0.243 0.356 3.726 0.395 0.349
Notes - Health - self-reported general health status (categorical variable: 1 - poor, 2 - fair, 3 - good, 4 - very good, 5 -
excellent); Poor Health - binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as poor (category 1);
Good Health - binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as excellent, very good, or good
(categories 5, 4, 3); Depressed - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling sad or depressed such that “nothing could
cheer them up” some/most/all of the time in past 30 days; Hopeless - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling hopeless
some/most/all of the time in past 30 days; Effort - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling “everything was an effort”
some/most/all of the time in past 30 days; K6 Scale - continuous measure of nonspecific psychological distress during the past
30 days using Kessler 6-Item (K6) Psychological Distress Scale (0-24; higher values represent higher levels of distress); Distress
- binary var. equal 1 if individual experienced moderate or serious psychological distress in past 30 days (i.e. K6 Scale >= 5);
Hyperten. - binary var. equal 1 if individual was ever told had hypertension/high blood pressure. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at least a
high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2000-2016 waves of NHIS. All regressions control for Post-DACA
implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA
eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment), year fixed effects, region fixed effects, and region-specific time trends.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 16: DACA and General Health Status, Mental Health - Individuals in Poverty (Entire U.S.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Health Poor Health Good Health Depressed Hopeless Effort K6 Scale Distress Hyperten.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.1778*** -0.0011 0.0094 -0.0688** -0.0639** -0.0845** -0.8849** -0.0905** -0.0445**
(0.065) (0.005) (0.014) (0.029) (0.026) (0.039) (0.353) (0.042) (0.020)
Observations 57,449 57,449 57,449 32,371 32,361 32,338 32,277 32,277 32,827
R-squared 0.151 0.043 0.104 0.051 0.044 0.041 0.064 0.046 0.118
Mean of Dep. Var. 3.661 0.034 0.850 0.190 0.129 0.248 3.867 0.316 0.155
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 1.105 0.182 0.357 0.393 0.335 0.432 4.857 0.465 0.362
Notes - Health - self-reported general health status (categorical variable: 1 - poor, 2 - fair, 3 - good, 4 - very good, 5 - excellent);
Poor Health - binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as poor (category 1); Good Health -
binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as excellent, very good, or good (categories 5, 4,
3); Depressed - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling sad or depressed such that “nothing could cheer them up”
some/most/all of the time in past 30 days; Hopeless - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling hopeless some/most/all
of the time in past 30 days; Effort - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling “everything was an effort” some/most/all
of the time in past 30 days; K6 Scale - continuous measure of nonspecific psychological distress during the past 30 days using
Kessler 6-Item (K6) Psychological Distress Scale (0-24; higher values represent higher levels of distress); Distress - binary var.
equal 1 if individual experienced moderate or serious psychological distress in past 30 days (i.e. K6 Scale >= 5); Hyperten. -
binary var. equal 1 if individual was ever told had hypertension/high blood pressure. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at least a high school diploma
(or equivalent). This sample is further restricted to contain only individuals with family’s before-tax income (from preceding
calendar year) below U.S. Census Bureau’s official poverty threshold. Data are taken from the 2000-2016 waves of NHIS. All
regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race,
ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment), year fixed effects, region fixed effects,
and region-specific time trends. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
73
Table 17: DACA and General Health Status, Mental Health (California: CHIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Health Poor Health Good Health Depressed Hopeless Restless K6 Scale Distress Hyperten.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.3920** 0.0098 -0.0166 0.0190 0.0139 -0.0357 0.1003 -0.1035 0.0342
(0.167) (0.015) (0.037) (0.031) (0.036) (0.041) (0.396) (0.073) (0.033)
Observations 106,247 106,247 106,247 85,731 85,731 85,731 85,776 85,731 106,247
R-squared 0.079 0.016 0.044 0.020 0.019 0.024 0.041 0.034 0.058
Mean of Dep. Var. 3.703 0.023 0.880 0.076 0.096 0.274 3.637 0.298 0.154
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 1.016 0.151 0.326 0.265 0.295 0.446 3.686 0.457 0.361
Notes - Health - self-reported general health status (categorical variable: 1 - poor, 2 - fair, 3 - good, 4 - very good, 5 - excellent);
Poor Health - binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as poor (category 1); Good Health -
binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as excellent, very good, or good (categories 5, 4,
3); Depressed - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling sad or depressed such that “nothing could cheer them up”
some/most/all of the time in past 30 days; Hopeless - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling hopeless some/most/all
of the time in past 30 days; Restless - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling restless or anxious some/most/all of the
time in past 30 days; K6 Scale - continuous measure of nonspecific psychological distress during the past 30 days using Kessler
6-Item (K6) Psychological Distress Scale (0-24; higher values represent higher levels of distress); Distress - binary var. equal 1 if
individual experienced moderate or serious psychological distress in past 30 days (i.e. K6 Scale >= 5); Hyperten. - binary var.
equal 1 if individual was ever told had hypertension/high blood pressure. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates
in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at least a high school diploma (or
equivalent). Data are taken from the 2003-2015 waves of CHIS. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy,
DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies
(age, education attainment), county fixed effects, and year fixed effects. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the
5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 18: DACA and General Health Status, Mental Health - Individuals in Poverty (CA: CHIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Health Poor Health Good Health Depressed Hopeless Restless K6 Scale Distress Hyperten.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.3255 0.0454 0.1016 -0.0325 -0.0791 -0.1777* -1.6753 -0.2354* -0.0600**
(0.316) (0.071) (0.106) (0.053) (0.091) (0.098) (1.131) (0.123) (0.024)
Observations 12,060 12,060 12,060 10,176 10,176 10,176 10,188 10,176 12,060
R-squared 0.096 0.068 0.073 0.048 0.050 0.049 0.067 0.052 0.114
Mean of Dep. Var. 3.192 0.063 0.735 0.160 0.182 0.327 5.021 0.435 0.182
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 1.101 0.243 0.441 0.367 0.386 0.469 4.682 0.496 0.386
Notes - Health - self-reported general health status (categorical variable: 1 - poor, 2 - fair, 3 - good, 4 - very good, 5 - excellent);
Poor Health - binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as poor (category 1); Good Health -
binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as excellent, very good, or good (categories 5, 4,
3); Depressed - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling sad or depressed such that “nothing could cheer them up”
some/most/all of the time in past 30 days; Hopeless - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling hopeless some/most/all
of the time in past 30 days; Restless - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling restless or anxious some/most/all of
the time in past 30 days; K6 Scale - continuous measure of nonspecific psychological distress during the past 30 days using
Kessler 6-Item (K6) Psychological Distress Scale (0-24; higher values represent higher levels of distress); Distress - binary var.
equal 1 if individual experienced moderate or serious psychological distress in past 30 days (i.e. K6 Scale >= 5); Hyperten. -
binary var. equal 1 if individual was ever told had hypertension/high blood pressure. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at least a high school diploma
(or equivalent). This sample is further restricted to contain only individuals with family’s before-tax income (from preceding
calendar year) below U.S. Census Bureau’s official poverty threshold. Data are taken from the 2003-2015 waves of CHIS. All
regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race,
ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment), county fixed effects, and year fixed
effects. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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4 GULAGS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE: ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE RUSSIAN MAFIA
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Transnational organized crime has been a worldwide phenomenon, with estimated profits generated
by various illicit markets totalling some $6.2 trillion (10% of global GDP) in 2011 (Novakoff,
2015). During the chaotic 1990s post-communist transition, Russian Federation experienced an
unprecedented proliferation of organized crime groups (OCGs). According to Klebnikov (2000),
by 1994, the number of OCGs operating in Russia was estimated to be around 5,700, totaling
some 3 million members. These groups managed to penetrate almost every aspect of Russia’s
legal economy, with 40 percent of private businesses, 60 percent of state-owned enterprises, and
85 percent of banks having proven or suspected ties to organized crime. The boom in Russian
organized crime during the 1990s brought about significant costs to the society. To mention just
the most prominent example, during the 1992-93 “Great Chechen Bank Fraud”, a network of
corrupt officials and (mostly) Chechen organized crime groups managed to embezzle at least $500
million from Russia’s Central Bank (a third of the credit line the IMF granted to Russia that year)
(Klebnikov, 2000).
This paper focuses on a specific organized crime group operating in Russia during the 1990s –
the criminal fraternity vory-v-zakone (Eng. “thieves-with-a-code-of-honor”). Tracing its roots back
to the Stalinist GULAG archipelago, vory became the primary non-state actor supplying private
protection to legal businesses at the time of weak institutions that accompanied Russia’s chaotic
transition to capitalism during the 1990s. In addition, they were known as co-ordinators in Russia’s
illicit markets, orchestrating illegal activities and governing the underworld in their territories.
Sharing a number of similarities41 with mafia-type organizations in other countries, such as the
Sicilian Cosa Nostra or the Italian-American Mafia, vory-v-zakone – unlike other OCGs operating
in Russia at the time – can thus be considered the Russian Mafia (Varese, 2001, 1996).
This paper studies the origins of the Russian Mafia, its persistence under the repressive Soviet
41E.g. initiation ritual, strict code of conduct, control over the market for private protection,
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state apparatus, and finally its impact on Russia’s communities in mid-1990s. To that end, I web
scraped a unique data source which contains detailed biographical information of more than 5,000
members of the vory-v-zakone criminal fraternity. This database, dubbed the PCNA Dataset, spans
more than a century of the mafia existence, from the very first initiation in 1916, until the last
recorded death in 2017. Information available includes, among other things, members’ year and
place of birth, initiation, and death, as well as their place of residence and prison history.
Using the PCNA Dataset, I first show that the Russian Mafia originated in the Soviet GULAG –
a system of nearly 500 forced labor camp complexes spread across the entire USSR, which operated
between 1920s-1950s and housed, on average, roughly four million prisoners at any given time.
This finding builds upon previous studies which argue that vory-v-zakone originated in GULAG
sometime in late 1920s/early 1930s (Varese, 2001, 1998; Serio, 2008). I contribute to this literature
by providing first systematic empirical evidence in support of this claim. More specifically, using
information about vory deaths and places of residence, I show that in 1921-1960, half of them lived
in a 19km radius of the nearest gulag, while half of all vory deaths during this period occurred
within just 3km of the nearest camp.
Second, I document that vory remained near camps in the period 1961-1991, despite the fact
that majority of the camps were shut down by 1960. In particular, half of the initiation rituals
during this period took place only 12km away from the nearest gulag, while half of all deaths
were recorded within 15km of the nearest camp. Among those alive between 1961-1991, 50% lived
within just 32km of the nearest gulag. These findings can be attributed primarily to the heavy
restrictions on criminals’ mobility imposed by Soviet authorities as well as the internal code of
conduct according to which those released from the camps had to remain living nearby (Varese,
2001, 1998).
Third, using the PCNA Dataset, I build direct measures of both the extensive and the intensive
margin of mafia presence across Russia’s subregions in mid-1990s. The former is captured by a
binary variable equal to 1 if a vor resides in a subregion between 1994-95 (1994-97, respectively),
while the latter is measured by the number of vory per 100,000 population during the same time
period. Using these measures, I show that distance to the nearest gulag is a strong negative
predictor of mafia presence (both extensive and intensive margins) in Russia’s subregions in the
mid-1990s. More specifically, based on the estimates from the preferred specification, a subregion
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located within 27km of the nearest camp (15th percentile) is 14 percentage points (0.5 standard
deviations) more likely to host mafia in 1994-97 than a subregion located further away.
Finally, using an instrumental variable approach which exploits the proximity of mafia to the
gulags, I consider the effect of mafia presence on local crime and violence in Russia in mid-1990s. In
particular, I show that places with mafia presence experienced a rapid rise in crime driven by turf
wars which erupted among rival clans in the early 1990s. In particular, hosting mafia in 1994-97
led to an increase in 1998 crime rate by 36 crimes per 10,000 (0.16 std. deviations). Moreover, the
probability that a subregion witnessed an attack against a member of Russia’s economic elite in
1996-98 rose by 36 percentage points due to mafia presence. Considering the heterogeneity in these
attacks, I find that the rise in violence in mid-1990s was indiscriminate – mafia presence led to a
higher likelihood of an attack regardless of whether the victim was a politician, a law enforcement
official, a businessmen, or a fellow criminal.
4.2 DATA
4.2.1 PRIME CRIME NEWS AGENCY: INTRODUCING THE DATASET
This project combines several data sources. First and foremost, I have assembled a novel, arguably
the most comprehensive dataset on the Russian Mafia to date. This dataset contains detailed bio-
graphical information of 5,043 current and former members of the vory-v-zakone criminal fraternity
operating in the countries of the (former) Soviet Union at some point between 1916-2017. The data
has been web scraped from the Prime Crime News Agency (PCNA)42, a mass media website op-
erating in Russia since 2006. PCNA is the culmination of more than 20 years of data collection
and compilation by the website’s founder, a Moscow-based businessman known only by his first
name – Alexander. Figure 27 shows an excerpt from the website’s profile of the vor Vyacheslav
Kirillovich Ivankov (nicknamed “Yaponchik”; Eng. “The Jap”), one of the most prominent vory
in the post-Soviet period. His profile is divided into two main parts - a detailed biography on the
left-hand side and a summary table with a profile picture on the right-hand-side (Figure 27). In
addition, the profile contains an extensive collection of photos of Mr. Ivankov as well as a comment
section where fans, wannabes, and even criminals can anonymously post their comments or request
42www.primecrime.ru
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corrections (not shown in Figure 27).
PCNA has been described by the media as “perhaps the world’s most exhaustive information
resource about the vory-v-zakone available to the public” (Schreck, 2009), and is regularly cited in
news stories on Russian organized crime (Schwirtz, 2008). PCNA has also been cited as an impor-
tant primary source of information about the vory fraternity in the academic literature (Varese,
2018; Galeotti, 2018; Belokurova, 2014; Slade, 2017, 2013). Further credibility of this data source
is suggested by the fact that the vory themselves (as well as other Russian criminals) follow the
website closely in order to get updates about the organization (e.g. who has been initiated, killed,
arrested, etc.). For example, in January 2013, Italian police intercepted a phone conversation be-
tween two prominent vory discussing the recent assassination of the boss Ded Khasan in front of
a Moscow restaurant (Tribunale Bari, 2012). Another vor was recorded boasting about his online
PCNA profile during a phone conversation intercepted in December 2012 (Tribunale Bari, 2012).
Even “official” documents pertaining to the organization have been leaked to the website in the
past. As Varese (2018) mentions, in December 2012, after an initiation ceremony that took place
in Dubai, a document containing the names of all 16 newly-admitted members appeared on the
PCNA. It is thus not surprising then that the Italian police believes that the Russian Mafia uses
the PCNA as a means of communication (Varese, Lonsky, and Podvysotskiy, 2019).
In Varese, Lonsky, and Podvysotskiy (2019), we further verify the validity the PCNA dataset
by comparing it to two external data sources, both of which contain a significantly smaller number
of vory compared to the PCNA dataset. Slade (2013) analyzes personal information of 279 vory
residing in Georgia after 1991. This data was obtained from the Special Operations Department
of the Georgian Anti-Organized Crime Unit (AOCU). Although we do not have access to Slade
(2013)’s data, using the PCNA dataset, we were able to derive a distribution of vory across the 12
Georgian regions which is consistent with the distribution presented in Slade (2013)43.
In addition, in Varese, Lonsky, and Podvysotskiy (2019), we digitized a 1994 document produced
by the Russia’s Ministry of the Interior (MVD), which contains full names, nicknames, and birth
years of 266 vory present in Russia after 1991 (see Podlesskikh and Tereshonok (1994), Varese
(2001)). Using full name and nickname as matching variables, we were able to merge all 266 mafia
bosses into our PCNA dataset. We then compared the birth years of these individuals across the
43Figure 5.2 (page 99). The figure shows the distribution of vory by region of birth within Georgia.
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two dataset and found a 95.11% match. These findings further suggest the reliability and accuracy
of the PCNA dataset.
4.2.2 PCNA DATASET: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The PCNA is an individual-level dataset with each observation representing a Russian Mafia boss
- a full member of the vory-v-zakone criminal fraternity. The data contains 5,043 individuals, a
substantially larger number than any previous estimate of the size of the organization (Varese,
2001; Slade, 2011; Serio, 2008).44 This minimizes my concern that the PCNA dataset misses some
non-trivial share of vory-v-zakone members.
Table 19 presents select descriptive statistics and the information about missing values for all
main variables in the PCNA dataset. There is significant variation in the share of non-missing
values across variables, ranging from 6.78% for Place of status revocation to 91.59% for National-
ity/ethnicity. However, the key variable for the empirical analysis - Place of residence - is missing
only for a relatively low fraction of criminals (less than 26%). Moreover, for some of the variables,
such as Year of death or Year of status revocation, it is mostly impossible to distinguish between
values that are truly missing and the cases in which the individual is still alive or has not had his
status revoked.
PCNA dataset spans the entire known period of existence of the vory fraternity, from the early
days of the Soviet Union until the present-day Putin Russia (Varese, 2001). The first recorded
initiation took place in 1916 while the most recent death is from December 2017. Figure 33 shows
the trends in recorded initiations, deaths, and status revocations over time. It is important to keep
in mind, however, that Year of initiation is available only for about a quarter of the sample (Table
19), which means that the initiations - particularly in the early period of the vory existence (1920s-
1950s) - are grossly underestimated. Nevertheless, taken together, the three graphs in Figure 33
clearly show the major historic milestones in the organization, as described in the previous literature
(Varese, 2018, 2001, 1998; Slade, 2013; Cheloukhine, 2008). In particular, the rise in deaths45 and
status revocations in the 1950s is consistent with the occurrence of the such’ia voina (Eng. bitches’
44Slade (2011), for example, estimates the number of vory in the post-Soviet space to be around 1,000-1,200. By
contrast, my conservative estimate suggests that there have been at least 1,678 vory operating in the countries of the
former Soviet Union since 1991.
45Mostly violent deaths, as shown in Figure C.1.
80
war), an internal conflict between two opposing factions which almost destroyed the organization
(Varese, 2001, 1998; Cheloukhine, 2008). Second, Figure 33 shows the proliferation of the Russian
Mafia after the dissolution of USSR in 1991, brought about by the chaotic transition to capitalism
which increased both demand and supply of protection (Varese, 1996, 1994). Moreover, as Figure
33 suggests, this was accompanied by a sharp rise in violence, as rival clans competed for new
territories and criminal opportunities. And finally, after a brief hiatus in the 2000s, early 2010s
saw another rise in initiations which could be attributed to the conflict between the Tbilisi clan
ledear Aslan (“Grandpa Khasan”) Usoyan and the Kutaisi clan leader Tariel (“The Tarot”) Oniani
(Varese, 2018; Schwirtz, 2008). However, in contrast with previous conflicts, after the assassination
of Mr. Usoyan in December 2012, this conflict appears to have been resolved without further
bloodshed (i.e. status revocations increased but violent deaths did not; see Figures 33 and C.1).
Figure 33 also offers a unique piece of evidence not mentioned in the literature before. There is a
sudden spike in deaths in late 1930s coinciding with the Great Terror - a brutal campaign of Stalin’s
political repression carried out in 1937-38 (Applebaum, 2003). Indeed, my dataset suggests that in
1937 alone, 90 vory lost their lives, 86 of which were confirmed executions in front of a firing squad.
It is rather surprising that the vory were caught up in the politically-motivated Great Terror, given
the “apolitical” stance of the criminal fraternity, as suggested by their code of behavior (Varese,
2001).
Last but not least, in Table 20, I present a breakdown of the PCNA dataset by recorded
nationality/ethnicity of its members. Interestingly, Russians make up only about 30% of the sample.
Indeed, almost half of the mafia bosses belong to one of Caucasian ethnic groups (mainly Georgians,
Armenians, and Azerbaijani). Other Soviet ethnic minorities such as Jews or Yazidis are also over-
represented relative to their shares in the general population. However, such a disproportionately
high representation of minority groups within the mafia is not a unique feature of the vory-v-
zakone. As Hill (2003) points out, the same is true for the Japanese Yakuza whose clans, such as
the Yamaguchi-gumi family, have disproportionately high shares of ethnic Koreans and those with
burakumin origin.
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4.2.3 OTHER DATA SOURCES
Data on location of Gulag camps operating in USSR between 1921-1960 was compiled by Tatiana
Mikhailova,46 based on the information gathered by The Memorial (Moscow-based NGO). The
dataset includes precise locations of 460 camps as well as information about the estimated prison
population and the type of industrial activity in each camp.
My analysis also uses the Russian elite economic violence dataset (REEV Dataset) - a compila-
tion of roughly 6,000 attacks against business, judicial, and political elites in Russia between 1990
and 2010. The database, which was compiled by Galina Belokurova,47 contains exact date and
location of each attack as well as information about the victim(s) and sometimes perpetrator(s)
(see Belokurova (2018)). This paper is the first to exploit the precise geographical locations of the
attacks.
Finally, my analysis uses subregional-level48 data from 1990s Russia. In particular, I take
advantage of the data on the 1995 Russia’s legislative election as well as various 1990s’ socioeconomic
indicators (e.g. population density, crime rate, unemployment rate, average wage, etc.), provided by
Enikolopov et al. (2011). In addition, 1990s’ road and railroad densities were calculated using spatial
data from the DIVA-GIS database, while the exact locations of 1,030 prisons operating across the
Russian Federation in the 1990s were obtained from the Russian daily newspaper Kommersant.49
The spatial data from PCNA as well as all prison locations were geocoded using Google Maps
Geocoding API which enables high-precision geocoding of unparsed physical address written in
Cyrillic script.
4.3 ORIGINS OF THE RUSSIAN MAFIA: 1919-1960
It has been argued in criminology literature that the proto-mafia group vory-v-zakone originated
in the Soviet GULAG in the late 1920s or early 1930s (Varese, 2001, 1998; Slade, 2013; Serio,
2008; Serio and Razinkin, 1995). Using the PCNA dataset, I provide the most systematic empirical
evidence to date in support of this claim.
46Data can be obtained on her personal website: https://sites.google.com/a/nes.ru/tatiana-mikhailova/
home
47Dataset can be accessed here: https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/101540/version/V1/viewe
48Equivalent to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) 3 classification.
49https://www.kommersant.ru/. The prison database can be accessed on: http://www.index.org.ru/turma/st/
vsetur.htm?fbclid=IwAR353q1naW6w55M3C-dknSvI-iIN9KXv8Rpa9HzzULkI0v3AGFSV6nOqwFQ
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4.3.1 GULAG (1919-1960)
GULAG50 was a system of force labor camps that existed throughout the USSR between 1920s-
1950s. Although a few of the camps had been remnants of the Czarist Russia, the vast majority
of them were constructed after the 1917 October Revolution in order to house political opponents
and other “enemies of the state”, as well as ordinary criminals (Applebaum, 2003; Ivanova, 2000;
Varese, 2001). From 1929 onwards, USSR experienced a rapid expansion in the camps mainly due
to Stalin’s politically-motivated cleansing culminating with the Great Terror of 1937-38. Although
the camps continued to expand after the World War II, following Stalin’s death in March 1953,
the Soviet political leadership decided to gradually dismantle them. The final order to shut down
the camps came from the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) in 1960, although some of them were
transformed and remained operational throughout the 1980s (Applebaum, 2003; Varese, 2001).
According to Applebaum (2003), there were at least 476 distinct camp complexes spread across
the Soviet Union between 1921-1960.51 These consisted of thousands of individual camps. Using
information that was gathered and digitized by the Moscow-based NGO - Memorial Society52 -
Tatiana Mikhailova geocoded 460 of these camp complexes.53 Figure 23 shows the distribution of
gulags across the Soviet Union. Although the highest concentration of camps was in the European
part of USSR, they were clearly spread out across all twelve Soviet time zones. In Table 21, I
provide basic characteristics of the Gulag system (based on Mikhailova’s data). The total prisoner
population averaged across the 1921-1960 period was more than 4 million, although half of the
complexes had fewer than 5,000 prisoners. Overall, it is estimated that some 18 million people
passed through the Gulag system between 1929 and 1953 (Applebaum, 2003).
As a source of forced labor, gulags were important in the pre-World War II industrialization of
USSR (Applebaum, 2003). Table 21 shows the main types of economic activity taking place in the
camps. By far, the majority of them were focused on building infrastructure (61%). Other impor-
tant activities included engineering (38%), forrest and woodwork (34%), and housing construction
(24%). Naturally, a single camp was often involved in multiple economic activities.
Gulag prison population consisted of political prisoners (“politicals”) as well as ordinary crimi-
50The acronym stands for Glavnoe Upravlenie Lagerei or Main Camp Administration. The term Gulag (or gulag),
however, became a symbol of Soviet political repression in general (Applebaum, 2003).
51Same number is also given by Ivanova (2000).
52https://www.memo.ru/en-us/
53https://sites.google.com/a/nes.ru/tatiana-mikhailova/home
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nals. Before World War II, the vast majority of inmates were criminals (roughly 82-88% in 1937-38),
although the share of politicals rose to about 30% after the war. However, it is important to point
out that many of the criminal prisoners had been sentenced for “crimes” which would hardly con-
stitute crimes in other societies54 (Applebaum, 2003). Thus, the share of actual criminals was
substantially lower.
4.3.2 VORY-V-ZAKONE IN THE CAMPS
Gulag system played an exceptional role in the development of the vory-v-zakone criminal fraternity.
Although the vory likely evolved from criminal groups operating in the pre-Revolutionary Russia,
gulags enabled their rapid expansion across the Soviet Union (Varese, 2001, 1998; Serio, 2008).
The rules of the organization were also unified within the camp walls. Vory become known for
their highly selective membership, obscure initiation ritual (which involved a candidate choosing
his own nickname), and strict code of behavior. This involved, for example, no cooperation with
camp authorities, systematic refusal to work, contempt towards accumulation of assets, and strong
opposition to unnecessary violence (including murder) (Varese, 2001, 1998).
By early 1930s, vory-v-zakone established a firm foothold within the camp structure. According
to official government estimates at the time, the fraction of vory within the ranks of professional
criminals in the camps did not exceed 6-7 percent (Varese, 2001). This “elitist” criminal society
enjoyed prominent status in gulags with many privileges over ordinary prisoners. Vory had a
common fund - obshchak - which supported all members. They also had their own courts called
skhodki (meetings). At such a meeting, vory discussed any breaches of the code of conduct by
fellow members and determined proper punishment (often severe), which was then swiftly carried
out. Any decisions made at the meeting were communicated across the camps, and, if necessary,
the punishment was effectively meted out by members in a different camp (Varese, 2001).
The expansion of the criminal fraternity continued until the end of World War II when an
internal conflict broke out between two rivals factions. This so called Bitches’ War (approx. 1948-
1954), was a conflict between traditional vory – those who obeyed the strict code of behavior – and
the suki (“bitches”) – those who had served in the Red Army during World War II and/or decided
54For example, a man received a five-year camp sentence for being repeatedly late for work; a woman was sent to
camps for stealing a pencil at work for her son to use at school (Applebaum, 2003).
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to cooperate with camp authorities. Depicted in Figures 33 and C.1, this full-scale mob war almost
wiped out the organization by the end of 1950s (Varese, 2001, 1998; Serio, 2008).
In this section, I provide new empirical evidence showing that the early period of the vory-v-
zakone criminal fraternity was indeed closely tied to the Gulag camp system. Using the PCNA
dataset, I calculated the distance to the nearest camp for all recorded: (1) initiation rituals, (2)
places of residence, and (3) deaths during the official period of GULAG existence (1921-1960).
Resulting distributions are depicted in Figure 33. Histograms for both places of residence and
deaths show a clear pattern of proximity to the camps. In particular, during this period, 284 out
of 568 vory lived within 18.8 km of the nearest gulag, while 101 out of 202 vory died within just
3.2 km of the nearest camp. Unfortunately, the histogram for initiations is not very informative
due to a limited underlying sample size (only 35 observations). These findings are consistent with
previous literature. According to Varese (2001), movement across the USSR was heavily restricted
for former criminals and gulag convicts. Any vor released from a camp was required to register
his residency in a nearby community. Moreover, according to the rules of the fraternity, he was
expected to join other free vory in a local commune known as kodla. Members of such communes
were expected to support each other as well as those still locked up in the camps (Varese, 2001,
1998). Thus, during the early period of vory-v-zakone existence, it was unlikely that any vor could
be found residing far away from the camps.
4.4 VORY-V-ZAKONE IN POST-GULAG USSR (1961-1991)
The Bitches’ War (1948-1954) led to an almost complete destruction of vory-v-zakone. As Serio
(2008) notes, law enforcement organs in the Soviet Union were convinced that the criminal frater-
nity had practically disappeared by the end of the 1950s. However, as Figure 33 clearly shows,
initiations continued (albeit in modest numbers) even after the Bitches’ War and throughout the
1960s. The early 1970s saw a resurgence of vory, as the number of initiations increased and the
organization regrouped (Fig. 33). An upward trend in initiations continued throughout the 1980s,
eventually leading to an explosion in the membership in the early 1990s. Interestingly, 1980s also
saw an increase in the number of expulsions from the organization (Fig. 33), while violent deaths
remained low (Fig. C.1). As Varese, Lonsky, and Podvysotskiy (2019) argue, this ability to regulate
membership by non-violently revoking status made the organization more resilient to internal and
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external pressures.
As mentioned in the previous section, GULAG was officially closed down in 1960. However,
some of the camps were re-designed and turned into regular prisons which operated until the 1980s
(Applebaum, 2003; Varese, 2001).55 The prison population during the post-GULAG period was
made up mostly of criminals. According to Amnesty International’s estimates from mid-1970s, only
about 1% of all prisoners had political sentences (Applebaum, 2003). Despite large-scale amnesties
in the 1950s, which reduced the camp population by some 80% between 1953-1960 (Dobson, 2009),
many vory remained imprisoned through the 1960s and 1970s. Figure 31 shows the pattern of vory
prison releases, as recorded in the PCNA dataset. First large-scale release saw 21 vory leave prison
in 1976-77.56 Releases then continued throughout the 1980s, peaking just before the dissolution
of USSR in 1991 (Fig. 31). Even upon their release, vory were still not allowed to move away
from the prisons due to restrictions on mobility imposed by authorities and the internal rules of
the fraternity (Varese, 2001). Moreover, as Kozlov (2002) suggests, many politicals were unwilling
to leave familiar places where they had spent much of their lives serving lengthy prison sentences.
Using PCNA data, I show that during the post-GULAG period of 1961-1991, vory-v-zakone
remained in close geographic proximity to the Gulags. Using the initial distribution of 460 camp
complexes, I once again calculated the distance to the nearest camp for each initiation and each
death between 1961-1991, and for the places of residence of all vory alive in this period. Figure
32 presents the results. Remarkably, the median initiation took place only 11.9 km away from the
camps, while the median death was recorded just 15.3 km away form the nearest camp. Further-
more, 50% of vory lived within 32 km of the nearest camp walls during this period. This confirms
that by 1991, vory-v-zakone organization was still geographically clustered around the locations of
the original 460 Gulag camps.
4.5 RUSSIAN MAFIA IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA
In this section, I show that as vory-v-zakone evolved into a mafia-type organization operating
in post-Soviet Russia, the territories under their control remained in the vicinity of the original
GULAG locations. This paper is the first to argue that gulags played a key role in determining
55Such as Perm-36 which has since been turned into a museum.
56With 10 of them released on June 26, 1976, according to PCNA data.
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the presence of Russian Mafia across Russia in the early-to-mid 1990s. I contribute to the recent
economics literature exploring the origins of organized crime in general, and mafia-type groups in
particular. These studies have focused mainly on the case of Sicilian Mafia (Buonanno et al., 2015;
Dimico et al., 2017; Acemoglu et al., 2018). However, a recent paper also explores the roots of
Mexican cartels (Murphy and Rossi, 2017).
4.5.1 TRANSITION TO CAPITALISM & WEAK INSTITUTIONS
Although Soviet citizens were entitled to items of personal property, state owned all means of
production. This began to change when Mikhail Gorbachev introduced economic reforms in 1986,
which led to a dramatic increase in the number of property owners. In July 1991, a large-scale pri-
vatization began in USSR and continued in Russia after the dissolution of USSR in December 1991
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). By 1993, there were 82,000 privatized enterprises and 49,770 private
peasant farms operating in Russia – almost one third of the entire value of Russia’s productive
capital (Varese, 1994). This increase in property ownership was, however, not matched by clearly
defined and enforced property rights, business regulation, tax regulations, and copyright laws. In
addition, a sharp increase in crime – especially violent crime57 – during this period meant that the
state was not able to protect the lives and property of its own citizens. Weak legal institutions
thus created a demand for protection from non-state actors, which vory-v-zakone readily supplied
(Varese, 2001, 1994).
Vory operated in both legal and illegal markets. Their main trade was the provision of pro-
tection. Vory not only sold protection, they seeked to monopolize the market for protection. In
the overworld, vory provided a so-called “roof” (krysha) to legal businesses which mainly consisted
of protection from “unprofessional” racketeers (and other street criminals). However, in many
cases, vory also helped enforce contracts and resolve disputes with other businesses (Varese, 1996;
Sokolov, 2004). In essence, vory-v-zakone thus served as a substitute for weak state institutions,
more specifically, the backlogged courts and ineffective law enforcement agencies.
In the underworld, vory led their own criminal groups while also serving as co-ordinators orches-
trating activities of other criminal elements, namely the pseudo-businessmen, gangsters, “embezzlers
of state property”, and corrupt officials (Varese, 1996). As Varese (1996) further explains:
57Between 1989 and 1992, the number of murders in Russia rose by 70% (Varese, 1994).
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1. Co-ordinators ensure[d] protection to pseudo-businessmen from gangsters and pro-
vide[d] a ‘shield’ of corrupt officials to them.
2. They help[ed] gangsters to divide spheres of influence among themselves, find new
targets for criminal activities, and ensure[d] protection from the authorities through
their contacts with corrupt officials who operate[d] in institutions of law enforce-
ment.
3. They ensure[d] those that steal state properties (embezzlers of state property) with
opportunities to dispose of their loot, protection from gangsters and again provide[d]
them with a ‘shield’ against corrupt officials.
4. They suppl[ied] corrupt officials with new clients to be ‘sheltered’ and provide[d]
them with opportunities to arrest criminals who [had] disobeyed criminal rules.
Corrupt public officials thus maintain[ed] the impression of fighting crime actively.
Thus, one can think of vory-v-zakone as an organization whose goal was not only to operate in
the underworld, but also to “govern” it. As a criminal fraternity with a strict code of conduct and
an obscure initiation ritual, which provided protection and extra-legal governance in its territories,
vory – unlike other criminal groups operating in Russia at the time – can justifiably be called the
Russian Mafia (Varese, 2001).
4.5.2 MEASURING RUSSIAN MAFIA PRESENCE IN MID-1990S RUSSIA
The wealth of personal information assembled in the PCNA dataset enables the construction of a
direct, first-of-its-kind measure of Russian Mafia presence in Russia’ subregions during the period
of early post-Soviet transition. This novel approach differs from previous studies of mafia-type
organizations, which use various proxies for mafia presence such as mafia-related crimes or city
council dissolutions due to mafia infiltration.58
The approach proposed in this paper employs two steps. First, using information on each
member’s year of birth, initiation, status revocation & death (if any), I determine which vory were
“made” members of the organization between 1994-95 (1994-97, respectively). Second, I distribute
these mafiosi into Russia’s 2,445 subregions according to their place of residence (i.e. exact street
58See for example Peri (2004), Barone and Narciso (2015), or Daniele and Dipoppa (2017).
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address). Those living outside of Russia are omitted. Information about the place of residence is
available for 74% (3,746 out of 5,043) of individuals in the PCNA dataset. While a single address is
available for 70% of these individuals (2,609 out of 3,746), the remaining 1,137 vory have multiple
addresses on record. In such cases, moving date(s) are used to determine their most likely address
during the period of interest.59
Such approach enables the construction of variables measuring both the extensive and the
intensive margin of mafia presence in Russia’ subregions. Extensive margin is captured by a binary
variable equal to 1 if a vor resides in a subregion in 1994-95 (1994-97, resp.), and 0 otherwise.
It is important to note that vory-v-zakone is a fraternity of equals (even though distinction can
be made between junior and senior vory), and each member is expected to lead his own criminal
group (Varese, 2001). Thus, observing a vor in a subregion means there is a local criminal group
around him. Such groups, consisting of many non-member associates, can be large. For instance,
the Solntsevskaya Bratva, one of the largest clans operating in Moscow during the 1990s, had an
estimated 9,000 members in total. However, only 12 of them were made vory, each leading his own
crew. These 12 vory formed the leadership of Solntsevskaya Bratva – the supreme council – which
met regularly to discuss group’s organizational matters (Varese, 2001).
The intensive margin of mafia presence is captured by the total number of vory per 100,000
population living in a subregion during 1994-95 (1994-97, resp.). This variable approximates the
strength of the Russian Mafia in a given subregion. Figure 33 shows the geographic distribution of
Russian Mafia across Russia’s subregions. In 1994-95, 236 subregions (9.7%) had Mafia presence.
These included the ten most populous cities in Russia.60 By 1997, vory spread to 14 additional
subregions. Among these were two large cities – Irkutsk and Cheboksary.
4.5.3 1990S RUSSIAN MAFIA AND GULAGS: EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Remarkably, as Figures 29 and 33 suggest, most subregions where Russian Mafia operated in the
mid-1990s had been in a close proximity to the GULAG camps during the 1920s-1950s, despite the
fact that the majority of camps were shut down by 1960. To test how the distance to the nearest
camp predicts Mafia presence in post-Soviet Russia, I estimate the following cross-sectional model
59If moving date(s) are missing, the first address on record is used (since addresses are ranked chronologically).
60Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, Nizhny Novgorod. Kazan, Chelyabinsk, Omsk, Samara,
and Rostov-on-Don.
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using ordinary least squares:
Mafiai = α+ β1Gulagi + γXi + ηs + i (6)
where Mafiai is the measure of extensive/intensive margin of mafia presence in subregion i in the
mid-1990s (as defined in section 5.2). Gulagi is a binary variable derived from the distance of
subregion i’s centroid to its nearest camp. To derive this variable, I first determine the overall
distribution of the distance to the nearest labor camp (across all 2,445 Russia’s subregions). Then,
I use the 10th (17.6km), 15th (26.9km), and 20th (37.4km) percentiles from this distribution as
alternative cutoff points to define Gulagi. For example, a subregion is assigned the value 1 if it
lies within 17.6km of the nearest camp, and 0 otherwise. As discussed in previous sections, most
vory remained close to the camps once released due to the restrictions on mobility imposed by both
the authorities as well as the internal rules governing the criminal fraternity. Gulagi is therefore
defined as a binary variable to capture this non-linear relationship. Moreover, I test different higher
order polynomials as alternative explanatory variables. Finally, eq. 6 also controls for region fixed
effects (ηs) and subregion-specific characteristics (Xi).
61 Standard errors (i) are heteroskedasticity
robust.
4.5.4 1990S RUSSIAN MAFIA AND GULAGS: RESULTS
Table 23 presents the results of estimating eq. 6 with foucs on the extensive margin of mafia
presence. As expected, the distance to the nearest camp is a strong negative predictor of mafia
locations in mid-1990s. In particular, across all specifications, the coefficient estimates are positive
and significant at 1%, suggesting that the likelihood of a subregion hosting mafia increases in
the immediate vicinity of the camps. According to the coefficient from the preferred specification
(column 4), subregions located within 27km of the nearest camp have 14 p.p. higher probability
of hosting mafia in 1994-97 than those located further away. The effect is large in magnitude
611990s road & railroad densities (in km per km2) – proxies for local economic development; Distance to region’s
administrative center – proxy for strength of local institutions; and Distance to nearest prison in 1990s.
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– chances of having mafia in these subregions increase by 0.5 standard deviations on average.
The non-linearity of the relationship between mafia presence and distance to the nearest gulag is
confirmed by estimating eq. 6 with second and third degree distance polynomials instead of the
binary variables (see Table C.1).
The analysis of the intensive margin of mafia presence (i.e. number of vory per 100,000 inhab-
itants) paints a similar picture. Results are shown in Table C.2. The “strength” of the Russian
Mafia increases, on average, by 0.16 vory per 100,000 (0.2 standard deviations) when a subregion
is located within 27km of the nearest gulag (Table C.2, col. 4).
4.6 CONSEQUENCES OF THE RUSSIAN MAFIA IN 1990S RUSSIA
The effect of organized crime groups on local communities is an important policy-relevant question.
Previous studies have documented detrimental effects on local economies (Pinotti, 2015; Peri, 2004;
Daniele and Marani, 2011), allocation of public resources (Daniele and Dipoppa, 2018; Barone and
Narciso, 2015), as well as local political outcomes (Feo and Luca, 2017; Daniele and Geys, 2015;
Acemoglu, Feo, and Luca, 2018) and political violence (Alesina, Piccolo, and Pinotti, 2019; Daniele
and Dipoppa, 2017). This study is the first to estimate the effect of mafia presence on local crime.
In addition, I contribute to the studies of political violence by considering the impact of mafia on
both political and non-political violence in 1990s Russia.
The effect of mafia presence on crime is ex ante ambiguous. As Varese (2014) explains, on one
hand, mafia may shield other criminals from authorities, thus promoting ordinary crimes. It may
even allow some types of crime to go unpunished in order to keep the demand for its protection
services high. Moreover, if an open conflict between rival clans breaks out, this can lead to a surge in
violent crime in affected communities. Such conflict will also likely divert law enforcement resources
away from battling street crime (especially property crime), thus emboldening petty criminals to
scale up their activities.
On the other hand, in the absence of any conflict between the clans, mafia might want to
keep petty crimes low in order not to attract police attention (Varese, 2014). After all, mafia-type
organizations strive to govern the underworld, and it is unlikely that any illicit activity could take
place in its territory without its prior approval. Mafia may also choose to provide some kind od
public safety in its neighborhoods. Indeed, as Gambetta (1993) describes: “The [Sicilian M]afia at
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times polices its territory as if it were responsible for public safety. Young thugs are recruited just
to keep them off the street.” Finally, even a violent mafia feud can lead to a decrease in the overall
crime in the long run, if state and/or regional authorities response to such conflict by allocating a
disproportionate amount of law enforcement resources to the affected localities. Thus, the effect of
mafia on local crime remains an empirical question.
4.6.1 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
To determine the effect of Russian Mafia on local crime and violence, I estimate the following
cross-sectional specification:
Outcomei = α+ β1Mafiai + γXi + ηs + µi (7)
where Outcomei is the crime rate (per 10,000 inhabitants) in subregion i in 1998, and Mafiai is
the measure of extensive/intensive margin of mafia presence in 1994-97 (defined in section 5.2).
Alternatively, the dependent variable used is a binary measure equal to 1 if subregion i experienced
an attack against a member of Russia’s economic elite between 1996-98. In such specification,
Mafiai is measured in 1994-95. The term “economic elite”, as broadly defined by Belokurova
(2018), encompasses politicians, judges, law enforcement & army officers, businessmen & managers,
journalists, and even prominent criminals. In further analysis, a breakdown of attacks into four
categories explores potential heterogeneity across different types of victims: (1) businessmen and
managers; (2) criminals; (3) law enforcement, army, and judges; (4) politicians and public figures.
These categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, a number of individuals in
the REEV dataset are classified as both businessmen and criminals.
Eq. 7 further controls for region fixed effects (ηn) and a broad set of subregion-specific charac-
teristics (Xi), which are divided into three groups: (1) economic controls;
62 (2) population controls;
63 and (3) institutional controls.64 Finally, µi is the idiosyncratic heteroskedasticity-robust error
621998 unemployment rate, 1996 log of average wage, 1990s road & railroad densities (in km/km2).
631996 population density, 1998 share of retired people.
64Distance to region’s administrative center, Distance to nearest prison in 1990s.
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term. The location choices of mafia members, conditional on observables, are likely endogenous to
both the outcome of interest and some unobserved factors. Thus, OLS estimate of β1 will likely be
biased.
4.6.2 IDENTIFICATION
To identify a plausibly causal effect of mafia presence on local crime and violence, I employ in-
strumental variable approach that exploits the proximity of 1990s Russian Mafia to the 1921-1960
GULAG archipelago, as detailed in Table 23. The instrument of choice is defined as:
Gulag IVi =

1, if distance of subregion i to nearest gulag < 26.9km
0, otherwise
(8)
where 26.9km is the 15th percentile from the population distribution of the distance to the nearest
camp across Russia’s subregions. However, I test different distance thresholds as well as higher
order distance polynomials as alternative instruments. As shown in Table 23, distance to the nearest
camp is a strong negative predictor of mafia presence in mid-1990s Russia. For the instrument to
be exogenous, the initial placement of the camps has to be orthogonal to any socioeconomic factors
of that time, which could have persisted, affecting the spatial distribution of crime and violence in
1990s Russia. To argue that this is indeed the case, I use data from Acemoglu et al. (2011) to show
that gulag and non-gulag regions are not systematically different in a number of socioeconomics
indicators in the early period of GULAG history. In addition, during the German invasion of USSR
in 1941, Soviet leadership implemented a “scorched earth” tactics, moving industrial production
that was in the path of the advancing German Army behind Ural Mountain, and destroying the
capital that could not be moved. Given that the majority of gulags were built in the European
part of USSR (see Figure 29), this developmnet during the war makes it even less likely that
any economic conditions that determined the gulag initial placement could have persisted into the
1990s.
Second concern with the exclusion restriction is the potential direct effect of gulags on 1990s
crime and violence in the communities nearby. However, most of the camps were shut down by 1960.
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To account for a possible direct effect of those camps that remained open and were transformed
into regular prisons, I control directly for the distance to the nearest correctional institution in
Russia in the 1990s. This measure is derived using exact addresses of 1,033 jails, prisons, corrective
colonies, medical correctional facilities, and educational colonies operating in Russia throughout
the 1990s.65
4.6.3 RESULTS
Tables 24, 25, and 26 present the results. First, I consider the effect of mafia presence on local
crime rates. As Table 24 suggests, both the extensive and the intensive margin of mafia presence
positively affect the overall crime rate in a subregion. According to the result from the preferred
specification (Table 24, col. 5), the presence of a vor in a subregion increases crime rate by about
150 crimes per 10,000 pop. (0.7 standard deviations of the dependent variable).
To better understand which type of crime drives this result, I turn to the Russian Economic
Elite Violence dataset. As Table 25 indicates, the presence of the mafia in mid-1990s led to a spike
in the attacks against local economic elites in the surrounding communities. These attacks appear
to have been indiscriminate – targeting fellow criminals, businessmen, police officers, and politicians
alike (Table 26). Klebnikov (2000) helps to shed more light on the situation in the Russian criminal
underworld in the early-to-mid-1990s. In April 1993, a war broke out between the Chechens and
the vory (with many vory siding with the Chechens), which quickly spread throughout Russia.
Virtually all organized crime groups in Russia at the time sided with one faction or the other.
Importantly, the attacks against prominent local elites became a primary weapon of this war –
which officially lasted until the end of 1994, but likely lingered on throughout the 1990s. Criminals
from one faction murdered those on the other side of the front, businessmen used contract killers to
eliminate their competition, while many police officers and judges died trying to stem this violence
(Klebnikov, 2000).
65Full list of correctional institutions was provided by Russian daily newspaper Komm-
ersant, and can be accessed here: http://www.index.org.ru/turma/st/vsetur.htm?fbclid=
IwAR0nEekNNZjHrSqqB8lZrm25xvCfrUnCpmERTvL3T5B3rryR5lrO4xN3BC8.
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4.7 CONCLUSION
This dissertation chapter studies the origins and consequences of the Russian Mafia, known as
vory-v-zakone. I assembled a unique data set that contains detailed biographies of more than
5,000 members of the vory criminal fraternity. Using this dataset, I then show that the Russian
Mafia originated in the Soviet Gulag system, and remained near gulags even some 30+ years after
the camps were officially shut down in 1960. Moreover, using an instrumental variable approach
that exploits the spatial distribution of gulags in the USSR, I show that communities with mafia
presence in the mid-1990s experienced a significant increase in crime driven by violence among rival
organized crime groups. This paper provides a unique perspective on the study of organized crime
through its use of a one-of-a-kind dataset that spans more than 100 years of history of the Russian
Mafia. The results of this study could help policymakers and law enforcement officials design better
policies that address the resurgence of organized crime in countries that undergo a sudden transition
from communism to capitalism, which is often accompanied by inadequate institutional reforms.
95
Figure 27: Excerpt From the Profile of Mafia Leader Vyacheslav Kirillovich Ivankov (“The Jap”)
Notes - Source: Prime Crime News Agency. The figure shows only an excerpt from Mr. Ivankov’s profile. The full profile can
be accessed here: http://www.primecrime.ru/characters/574/.
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Figure 28: Mafia Initiations, Deaths, and Status Revocations over Time
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Notes - Data comes from Prime Crime News Agency. Underlying sample sizes are as follows: 1,230 unique initiations (top-left
hist.); 1,681 deaths (top-right hist.); 460 unique status revocations (bottom hist.). USSR was dissolved on December 26, 1991.
100% of sample is depicted in each histogram. The number of bins is set to 50.
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Figure 29: 460 Labor Camps of the Soviet Gulag (1921-1960)
Soviet Gulags (1921-1960)
Avg Prison Population
0.000000 - 13493.423000
13493.423001 - 50956.000000
50956.000001 - 109047.290000
Notes - Geocoded locations of all 460 camps were provided by Tatiana Mikhailova based on the information from the Moscow-
based NGO - Memorial Society. Only camps with available geographical location (latitude & longitude) are used in the analysis.
34 of the camps have missing info on average prison population, and thus are labeled as 0. The map uses Asia North Albers
Equal Area Conic projected coordinate system, and shows NUTS 2 (region-level) classification of the Soviet Union (as of 1989).
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Figure 30: Mafia Deaths, Initiations, and Places of Residence During GULAG Period: 1919-1960
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Notes - Data comes from Prime Crime News Agency. Underlying sample sizes are as follows: 35 unique initiations (top-left)
– 100% of sample is depicted in hist.; 568 unique places of residence (top-right) – 98.2% of sample is depicted in hist.; 202
deaths (bottom-center) – 96.5% of sample is depicted in hist. Number of bins was set to: 25 (top-left); 30 (top-right); 20
(bottom-center).
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Figure 31: All Recorded Camp/Prison Releases: 1947-2018
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Notes - Data comes from Prime Crime News Agency. The histogram was generated using 719 unique prison releases. USSR
was dissolved on December 26, 1991. 100% of sample is depicted in the histogram. The number of bins is set to 40.
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Figure 32: Mafia Deaths, Initiations, and Places of Residence in Post-GULAG Period: 1961-1991
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Notes - Data comes from Prime Crime News Agency. Underlying sample sizes are as follows: 323 unique initiations (top-left)
– 99.1% of sample is depicted in hist.; 1,185 unique places of residence (top-right) – 97.5% of sample is depicted in hist.; 308
deaths (bottom-center) – 98.7% of sample is depicted in hist. Number of bins was set to: 25 (top-left); 35 (top-right); 30
(bottom-center).
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Figure 33: Russian Mafia Presence in Russia’s Subregions (1994-95 vs. 1994-97)
Notes - Data comes from Prime Crime News Agency. Vory-v-zakone presence across Russia’s subregions. Blue areas indicate
those subregions with at least 1 vor present in: (1) 1994-95 (above); (2) 1994-97 (below).
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Table 19: PCNA Dataset: Main Variables & Select Descriptive Statistics
Variable Non-Missing Values (#) Non-Missing Values (%) Mean Standard Deviation
Full name 3,466 68.73 – –
Nickname 4,478 88.80 – –
Nationality/ethnicity 4,619 91.59 – –
Year of birth 2,820 55.92 1949.62 22.06
Place of birth 3,775 74.86 – –
Year of initiation 1,230 24.39 1988.58 17.35
Place of initiation 1,001 19.85 – –
Age at initiation 1,190 23.60 27.21 7.27
Place of residence 3,746 74.28 – –
Year of status revocation 460 9.12 1990.90 19.16
Place of status revocation 342 6.78 – –
Year of death 1,682 33.35 1988.23 20.53
Place of death 1,409 27.94 – –
Age at death 1,398 27.72 45.54 15.20
Exact cause of death 897 17.79 – –
Notes - Source: Prime Crime News Agency. The total number of observations is 5,043. Each observation represents an
individual (vor).
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Table 20: PCNA Dataset: Vory by Nationality/Ethnicity
Nationality/Ethnicity # % of Total
Russian 1,485 29.45
Georgian 1,249 24.77
Armenian 884 17.53
Azerbaijani 175 3.47
Other Caucasian nationality/ethnicity 134 2.66
Jew 172 3.41
Yazidi 129 2.56
Ukrainian 112 2.22
Other (non-Caucasian) nationality/ethnicity 279 5.53
No information provided 424 8.41
Total 5,043 100
Notes - Source: Prime Crime News Agency. Each observation represents an individual (vor). Other Caucasian nation-
ality/ethnicity - Abkhazian, Adyghean, Avar, Balkar, Bosha, Chechen, Circassian, Dargin, Ingush, Kabardian, Karachay,
Kumyk, Lak, Lezgin, Ossetian, Talysh. Other (non-Caucasian) natinality/ethnicity - Assyrian, Bashkir, Belarusian, Bulgarian,
Buryat, Chuvash, Gagauz, German, Greek, Gypsy, Iranian, Kazakh, Komi-Zyryan, Korean, Kyrgyz, Lithuanian, Moldovan,
Mordvin, Pole, Serb, Spaniard, Tajik, Tatar, Turk, Turkmen, Udmurt, Uyghur, Uzbek.
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Table 21: Soviet Gulags (1921-1960): Basic Characteristics
Total # of Labor Camps 460
Total Prisoner Population 4,180,304
Median Prison Population 5,000
Std. Dev. of Prison Population 13,622.77
% Infrastructure Construction 60.65%
% Engineering/Industrial Engineering 37.85%
% Forrest and Woodwork 33.91%
% Housing Construction 23.91%
% Agriculture 21.74%
% Construction of Mining Plants 19.35%
% Mining of Coal/Uranus/Ore/Gold/Apatite/Tin/Rock 15.73%
% Services 15.00%
% Fuel and Energy Complex 6.74%
% Metallurgy 4.57%
% Military Industrial Complex 4.57%
% Research & Development 4.13%
% of Transit Points 1.09%
Notes - Data comes from Tatiana Mikhailova. Only camps with available geographical location (latitude & longitude) are used
in the analysis. Total Prisoner Population - total number of prisoners averaged over the entire period (1921-1960). The shares
are computed based on the number of camps with available information for the given industrial activity.
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Table 22: Average Characteristics of Mafia vs Non-Mafia Subregions of Russia
Mafia Subegions Non-Mafia Subregions Difference-in-means test
OUTCOME Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD t Prob(|T| > |t|)
Population (1996) 203 170,895 274,160 1,802 41,911 53,126 -17.32 0.000
Population Density (1996) 203 1,820.8 11,104.1 1,802 4,340.3 25,847.8 1.37 0.170
Share of Retired Population (1998) 201 25.40 10.36 1,774 25.35 10.78 -0.07 0.948
Log of Avg. Wage (1996) 196 2.66 2.89 1,771 2.53 2.82 -0.62 0.537
1990s Road Density (km per km2) 250 0.59 1.83 2,195 1.46 13.73 0.99 0.320
1990s Railrod Density (km per km2) 250 0.65 5.72 2,195 0.94 7.09 0.61 0.541
Dist. to region’s administrative center (km) 250 93.24 123.28 2,195 169.43 208.44 5.67 0.000
Dist. to nearest prison in 1990s (km) 250 29.39 49.47 2,195 75.06 132.07 5.42 0.000
# Doctors per 10,000 pop. (1998) 201 33.42 29.40 1,774 22.05 13.07 -9.84 0.000
# Nurses per 10,000 pop. (1998) 201 93.22 74.77 1,774 86.91 36.81 -2.01 0.045
Crime Rate (1998) 201 190.22 312.73 1,774 161.58 205.47 -1.76 0.079
Notes - Data comes from Prime Crime News Agency.
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Table 23: Gulag & Mafia Presence in 1990s (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia presence Mafia presence Mafia presence Mafia presence Mafia presence Mafia presence
(1994-95) (1994-97) (1994-95) (1994-97) (1994-95) (1994-97)
Gulag distance < 10th percentile 0.145∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(10p = 17.6km) (0.029) (0.030)
Gulag distance < 15th percentile 0.131∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(15p = 26.9km) (0.024) (0.024)
Gulag distance < 20th percentile 0.107∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(20p = 37.4km) (0.020) (0.020)
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Road & Railroad Densities (km/km2) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Distance to region’s admin. center (km) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Distance to nearest prison in 1990s (km) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,445 2,445 2,445 2,445 2,445 2,445
F-statistic 47.29 47.23 52.68 55.69 42.40 43.48
R-squared 0.120 0.126 0.122 0.129 0.118 0.125
Mean of dep. variable 0.097 0.102 0.097 0.102 0.097 0.102
Std. dev. of dep. variable 0.295 0.303 0.295 0.303 0.295 0.303
Notes - Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimation sample consists of Russia’s subregions (equivalent
to NUTS 3 classification). Mafia presence (1994-95) - binary var. equal 1 if at least one vor present in subregion between
1994-95. Mafia presence (1994-97) - binary var. equal 1 if at least one vor present in subregion between 1994-97. Gulag
distance < 10th percentile - binary var. equal 1 if subregion is located within 17.6km of the nearest gulag camp. Gulag distance
< 15th percentile - binary var. equal 1 if subregion is located within 26.9km of the nearest gulag camp. Gulag distance < 20th
percentile - binary var. equal 1 if subregion is located within 37.4km of the nearest gulag camp. Estimation sample consists of
all 2,445 subregions within the Russian Federation (as of 1992). *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 24: Mafia Presence & Local Crime in 1990s Russia
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (IV) (IV) (IV)
Crime rate Crime rate Crime rate Crime rate Crime rate Crime rate
(1998) (1998) (1998) (1998) (1998) (1998)
Presence of mafia (1994-97) 35.78*** 33.79*** 151.60** 149.60**
(10.25) (10.36) (67.46) (75.25)
Mafia per 100,000 pop. (1994-97) 10.40*** 117.8*
(3.921) (65.70)
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Population & Economic controls YES YES YES YES
Road & Railroad Densities (km/km2) YES YES YES YES
Institutional controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,975 1,938 1,938 1,975 1,938 1,938
Adjusted R-squared 0.807 0.811 0.810 – – –
Mean of dep. variable 164.5 166.5 166.5 164.5 166.5 166.5
Std. dev. of dep. variable 218.9 220.2 220.2 218.9 220.2 220.2
Angrist-Pischke F-stat – – – 32.62 28.53 9.430
Notes - Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimation sample consists of Russia’s subregions (equivalent
to NUTS 3 classification). Crime rate (1998) - # of crimes per 10,000 inhabitants in 1998. Presence of mafia (1994-97) - binary
var. equal 1 if a vor present in subregion in 1994-97. Mafia per 100,000 pop. (1994-97) - # of vory per 100,000 inhabitants
present in subregion in 1994-97. The instrument used in the IV estimation is a binary var. equal 1 if subregion was within
26.9km km (i.e. 15th percentile) of the nearest gulag. Population controls: population density (1996), share of retired people
(1998). Economic controls: unemployment rate (1998), log of average wage (1996). Institutional controls: distance to region’s
administrative center, distance to the nearest prison (operating in the 1990s). *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at
the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 25: Mafia Presence & Economic Elite Attacks in 1990s Russia
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (IV) (IV) (IV)
Any Attack Any Attack Any Attack Any Attack Any Attack Any Attack
(1996-98) (1996-98) (1996-98) (1996-98) (1996-98) (1996-98)
Presence of mafia (1994-95) 0.366*** 0.350*** 0.747*** 0.916***
(0.033) (0.037) (0.115) (0.148)
Mafia per 100,000 pop. (1994-95) 0.062*** 0.701***
(0.014) (0.209)
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Road & Railroad Densities (km/km2) YES YES YES YES
Institutional controls YES YES YES YES
Population & Economic controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,445 1,938 1,938 2,445 1,938 1,938
Adjusted R-squared 0.230 0.218 0.107 – – –
Mean of dep. variable 0.079 0.077 0.077 0.079 0.077 0.077
Std. dev. of dep. variable 0.270 0.267 0.267 0.270 0.267 0.267
Angrist-Pischke F-stat – – – 62.06 44.79 11.69
Notes - Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimation sample consists of Russia’s subregions (equivalent
to NUTS 3 classification). Any Attack (1996-98) - binary equal 1 if any attack against a member of the Russia’s economic elite
(see Belokurova (2018)) occurred in 1996-98. Presence of mafia (1994-95) - binary var. equal 1 if a vor present in subregion
in 1994-95. Mafia per 100,000 pop. (1994-95) - # of vory per 100,000 inhabitants present in subregion in 1994-95. The
instrument used in the IV estimation is a binary var. equal 1 if subregion was within 26.9km km (i.e. 15th percentile) of the
nearest gulag. Economic controls: unemployment rate (1998), log of average wage (1996). Institutional controls: distance to
region’s administrative center, distance to the nearest prison (operating in the 1990s). Population controls: population density
(1996), share of retired people (1998). *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10%
level.
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Table 26: Mafia Presence & Elite Attacks by Type in 1990s Russia
(IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
Any Attack Any Business Attack Any Criminal Attack Any Police Attack Any Political Attack
(1994-98) (1994-98) (1994-98) (1994-98) (1994-98)
Presence of mafia (1994-95) 0.886*** 0.712*** 0.735*** 0.379*** 0.191***
(0.150) (0.130) (0.116) (0.083) (0.068)
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES
Road & Railroad Densities (km/km2) YES YES YES YES YES
Institutional controls YES YES YES YES YES
Population & Economic controls YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,938 1,938 1,938 1,938 1,938
Mean of dep. variable 0.093 0.074 0.042 0.021 0.018
Std. dev. of dep. variable 0.291 0.262 0.200 0.144 0.133
Angrist-Pischke F-stat 44.79 44.79 44.79 44.79 44.79
Notes - Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimation sample consists of Russia’s subregions (equivalent
to NUTS 3 classification). Any Attack (1994-98) - binary equal 1 if any attack against a member of the Russia’s economic
elite occurred in 1994-98. Any Business Attack (1994-98) - binary equal 1 if any attack against a businessman or manager
occurred in 1994-98. Any Criminal Attack (1994-98) - binary equal 1 if any attack against a criminal occurred in 1994-98.
Any Police Attack (1994-98) - binary equal 1 if any attack against a member of law enforcement, army, or against a judge
occurred in 1994-98. Any Political (1994-98) - binary equal 1 if any attack against a politican or public figure occurred
in 1994-98. Presence of mafia (1994-95) - binary var. equal 1 if a vor present in subregion in 1994-95. The instrument
used in the IV estimation is a binary var. equal 1 if subregion was within 26.9km km (i.e. 15th percentile) of the nearest
gulag. Economic controls: unemployment rate (1998), log of average wage (1996). Institutional controls: distance to region’s
administrative center, distance to the nearest prison (operating in the 1990s). Population controls: population density (1996),
share of retired people (1998). *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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5 CONCLUSION
The goal of this interdisciplinary doctoral thesis is to provide new knowledge and policy insights into
hotly-debated issues in international migration and organized crime. Building upon extensive prior
literature in economics, political science, public health, psychology, and criminology, this thesis
draws three main conclusions. First, under certain circumstances, local foreign in-migration can
lead to a decrease in the electoral support for the far-right parties in Europe. Second, immigrant
legalization programs can have positive effects on immigrant health insurance coverage, access to
health care, and their mental health. Third, presence of mafia-type organizations in countries
with rapid institutional transition (particularly from communism to capitalism) tends to increase
(rather than contain) local crime and violence. My hope is that these findings will provide valuable
information to policymakers as well as law enforcement officials across the globe, and further
stimulate much-needed research into these topics.
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APPENDIX A
• Log of total population - to capture demographic dynamics (Barone et al., 2016).
• Population density (inhabitants per km2; proxy for urbanization) - far-right parties tend
to gather larger support among people from rural municipalities.
• Share of women in the adult population - women tend to be less supportive of the Finns
Party (Niemi, 2012).
• Share of old people in the adult population (65 and above) - far-right parties generally
score high points among old people (appeal to tradition, conservatism, etc.).
• Total crime rate (crimes per 100,000 inhabitants) - far-right parties often campaign on
issues related to law and order. Higher crime rate might therefore lead to higher Finns
Party’s popularity.
• Unemployment rate - poor economic performance of a municipality reflected in high un-
employment rate is expected to be a strong predictor of far-right support.
• Share of population (25-64) with tertiary education - people with university education
are less likely to accept nationalist-populist agenda, and therefore are less likely to vote for
the far-right parties.
• Skill ratio (skilled/unskilled workers) - proxied by the number of people (aged 20 or above)
with education levels 2 and 3 divided by the number of people with education level 1 (Mayda,
2006). Level 1 corresponds to ISCED66 categories 0, 1, 2 (i.e. basic education), level 2 to
ISCED categories 3, 4 (i.e. completed upper secondary education), and level 3 to ISCED
categories 5-8 (i.e. tertiary education). Literature suggests that low-skilled workers are more
likely to vote for far-right parties than high-skilled ones.
• Median disposable income of household unit per consumption unit (in EUR) -
controls for differences in standards of living across municipalities. Municipalities with higher
66UNESCO’s International Standard Classification of Education.
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income level should be less prone to vote for the Finns Party. There are two drawbacks with
this variable: first, it is not adjusted for the variation in price levels across municipalities.
Second, according to Statistics Finland, due to revisions in income concepts, 1995-2009 and
2010-2014 data are not fully comparable. Nevertheless, since municipality-level GDP data is
not available, median disposable income together with the unemployment rate are the best
economic measures on the municipality level that I have available.
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Robustness checks and further results
Main IV analysis: first-stage estimates
Table A.1: IV: First Stage Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Share of foreign Share of foreign Share of foreign
citizens citizens citizens
Predicted share of foreign citizens 0.943∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗
(% of population in 2003) (0.120) (0.111) (0.116)
Municipality/Election Year FE YES YES YES
Time-varying controls (lag) YES YES
Region FE x Election Year FE YES
Observations 2079 2079 2079
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 62.32 34.53 22.77
Stock-Yogo weak ID test (10% max. IV size c.v.) 16.38 16.38 16.38
Notes - Share of foreign citizens - share of foreign citizens (% of population in 2003). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at municipality level. Time-varying controls: log of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated,
share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data
comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant
at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level.
114
IV estimation using 1991 as base year
Table A.2: IV Results Using 1991 Distributions (Second Stage)
(1) (2) (3)
Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party
Share of foreign citizens -2.379∗∗∗ -5.707∗∗∗ -5.026∗
(% of population in 1991) (0.544) (1.445) (2.093)
Municipality/Election Year FE YES YES YES
Time-varying controls (lag) YES YES
Region FE x Election Year FE YES
Observations 2079 2079 2079
Mean of dep. variable 12% 12% 12%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 7.56% 7.56% 7.56%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 32.65 14.81 6.51
Anderson-Rubin chi-sq. test p-val. 0.00000
Notes - Finns Party - Finns Party’s share of valid votes. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level.
Time-varying controls: log of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+,
ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics
Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. †
Significant at the 10% level.
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Exclusion of all European elections
Table A.3: 2009 and 2014 European Elections Omitted (IV Results)
(1) (2) (3)
Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party
Share of foreign citizens -1.802∗∗∗ -4.365∗∗∗ -3.954∗∗∗
(% of population in 2003) (0.424) (0.879) (1.126)
Municipality/Election Year FE YES YES YES
Time-varying controls (lag) YES YES
Region FE x Election Year FE YES
Observations 1485 1485 1485
Mean of dep. variable 11.9% 11.9% 11.9%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 8.53% 8.53% 8.53%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 62.50 33.60 22.06
Notes - Finns Party - Finns Party’s share of valid votes. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level.
Time-varying controls: log of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+,
ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics
Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. †
Significant at the 10% level.
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Checking for outliers: exclusion of 9 largest Finnish municipalities
To check if outliers are not driving the main results, I exclude 9 largest municipalities from the
analysis. These municipalities are the only ones with population of 100,000 or more during the
2006-2015 period. The following municipalities are omitted: Helsinki, Espoo, Tampere, Vantaa,
Turku, Oulu, Jyva¨skyla¨, Lahti, and Kuopio. With the exception of Oulu (which is in central
Finland), all of them are located in the southern part of the country. Results are presented in
Table A.4. Overall, the analysis suggests that outliers do not drive the main IV estimates.
Table A.4: 9 Largest Municipalities Omitted (IV Results)
(1) (2) (3)
Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party
Share of foreign citizens -1.889∗∗∗ -5.001∗∗∗ -4.975∗
(% of population in 2003) (0.564) (1.136) (2.180)
Municipality/Election Year FE YES YES YES
Time-varying controls (lag) YES YES
Region FE x Election Year FE YES
Observations 2016 2016 2016
Mean of dep. variable 12.1% 12.1% 12.1%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 7.6% 7.6% 7.6%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 46.34 23.78 10.74
Anderson-Rubin chi-sq. test p-val. 0.0026
Notes - Finns Party - Finns Party’s share of valid votes. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level.
Time-varying controls: log of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+,
ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics
Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. †
Significant at the 10% level.
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Alternative specification using net flow of immigrants
I estimate an alternative, first-difference version of equation (1) which uses net immigrant flow as
the main independent variable. The specification is based on the main estimating equation in Sa´
(2014) and has the following form:
∆Far-righti,t = β
(
∆ Foreign-borni,t
Populationi,2003
)
+X ′i,t−1γ + λt + σi + i,t (9)
where ∆Far-right i,t is the level change in Finns Party’s vote share in municipality i between elections
at t− 1 and t.67 ∆Foreign-borni,t is the change in the number of foreign citizens in municipality i
between t − 1 and t. To be consistent with equation (1), I standardize the change in the number
of immigrants by population in the base year (2003). Covariates are included in lagged levels
(Xi,t−1) since the level changes between t− 1 and t are endogenous to immigration. Estimating a
first-difference model means that the municipality-specific fixed effects are differenced out. Thus,
σi captures municipality-specific trends in Finns Party’s vote share. Finally, λt captures national
trends in factors that affect far-right vote share, such as the trend in Finland’s GDP per capita. To
deal with endogeneity in β (the coefficient of interest), I construct the following instrument which
uses the same distributions of immigrants by background continent in 2003 as the instrument in
my main analysis:
∑6
j=1 δi,j,2003 ∗∆Foreign-bornj,t
Populationi,2003
(10)
where δi,j,2003 is the share of immigrants with background continent j living in municipality i in
2003. ∆Foreign-bornj,t is the change in the overall number of foreign citizens from continent j in
mainland Finland between t − 1 and t. Estimation results are presented in Table A.5. In column
(2), I replicate the analysis with population at t − 1 (instead of the population in 2003) in the
denominator. Although the interpretation of β in the first-difference case differs from that in my
67For those election years that are more than one calendar year apart, t− 1 refers to the preceding election year
and not the preceding calendar year.
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main specification, the results in Table A.5 are clearly consistent with my main IV estimates.
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Table A.5: Alternative First-Difference Specification (IV Results)
(1) (2)
∆ Finns Party ∆ Finns Party
Net Immigrant Flow -4.566∗
(% of population in 2003) (2.059)
Net Immigrant Flow -5.269∗
(% of population in t-1) (2.279)
Observations 1782 1782
Mean of dep. variable 2.55% 2.55%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 7.52% 7.52%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 53.52 45.88
Notes - ∆ Finns Party - level change in Finns Party’s share of valid votes between elections at t − 1 at t. Net Immigrant
Flow - change in number of foreign citizens between election year t − 1 and t. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
municipaity level. All regressions control for municipality-specific time trends (municipality dummies), national trends (election
year dummies), and the following set of municipality-specific time-varying controls (measured at t − 1): log of population,
population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime
rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant
at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level.
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Immigration and Finns Party vote share: separate analyses by election type
Table A.6: Parliamentary, Presidential, and European Elections IV Estimates
(IV) (IV) (IV)
Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party
(parliamentary) (presidential) (European)
Share of foreign citizens -3.941∗∗ -2.963∗∗ -2.236∗∗
(% of population in 2003) (1.204) (0.740) (0.845)
Observations 891 594 594
Mean of dep. variable 14.9% 7.33% 12.3%
Std. dev. of dep. variable 9.31% 4.21% 4.23%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 20.40 21.70 18.92
Notes - Finns Party - Finns Party’s share of valid votes. First column uses data from parliamentary elections in 2007, 2011,
2015; second column uses data from presidential elections in 2006, 2012; third column uses data from European parliamentary
elections in 2009, 2014. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level. All regressions control for municipality
fixed effects, election year fixed effects, region-by-election year fixed effects, and the following municipality-specific time-varying
controls (in lagged form): log of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+,
ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics
Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. †
Significant at the 10% level.
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IV sensitivity to native sorting
Table A.7: Municipality, Subregional, and Regional IV Estimates
(IV) (IV) (IV)
Finns Party Finns Party Finns Party
(municipality) (subregion) (region)
Share of foreign citizens (% of population in 2003) -1.820∗∗∗
(0.285)
Share of foreign citizens (% of population in 2003) -2.619∗∗∗
(0.542)
Share of foreign citizens (% of population in 2003) -1.428∗∗
(0.351)
Observations 2079 469 126
Mean of dep. variable 12% 11.7% 11.7%
Standard deviation of dep. variable 7.56%. 6.95% 6.49%
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat. 97.71 40.08 60.61
Notes - Finns Party - Finns Party’s share of valid votes. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at respective levels (munici-
pality, subregion, region). All regressions control for election year fixed effects, and the following municipality/subregion/region-
specific time-varying controls (in lagged form): log of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated,
share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data
comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database. *** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant
at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level.
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Immigration and election outcomes (all main parties): OLS
Table A.8: Immigration and Election Outcomes (All Main Parties): OLS
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
Finns Party Vihr SFP/RKP Kok Kesk SDP KD
Share of foreign citizens -0.656∗ 0.147 0.746∗ -0.208 0.235 -0.162 -0.074
(% of population in 2003) (0.303) (0.094) (0.333) (0.160) (0.224) (0.224) (0.110)
Observations 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079
Adjusted R-squared 0.880 0.881 0.637 0.881 0.598 0.939 0.513
Mean (dep. var.) 12% 5% 4.07% 17.4% 33.4% 17.5% 3.95%
Std. dev. (dep. var.) 7.56% 4.36% 13.6% 10% 16.8% 12.6% 3.38%
Notes - Finns Party - Finns Party’s share of valid votes; Vihr - Green League’s share of valid votes; SFP/RKP - Swedish
People’s Party’s share of valid votes; Kok - National Coalition Party’s share of valid votes; Kesk - Centre Party’s share of
valid votes; SDP - Social Democratic Party’s share of valid votes; KD - Christian Democrats’ share of valid votes. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level. All regressions control for municipality fixed effects, election year fixed
effects, region-by-election year fixed effects, and the following municipality-specific time-varying controls (in lagged form): log
of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database.
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level.
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Immigration and voter turnout, protest vote: OLS
Table A.9: Immigration and Voter Turnout, Protest Vote: OLS
(IV) (IV)
Voter turnout Protest vote
Share of foreign citizens 0.369∗ 0.005
(% of population in 2003) (0.154) (0.012)
Observations 2079 2079
Adjusted R-squared 0.985 0.453
Mean (dep. var.) 59.7% 0.51%
Std. dev. (dep. var.) 15.4% 0.24%
Notes - Voter turnout - share of eligible voters who cast ballot in election. Protest vote - share of invalid ballots. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level. Both regressions control for municipality fixed effects, election year fixed
effects, region-by-election year fixed effects, and the following municipality-specific time-varying controls (in lagged form): log
of population, population density, share of females, share of tertiary educated, share of aged 65+, ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor, total crime rate, unemployment rate, median household income. Data comes from Statistics Finland’s StatFin database.
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. † Significant at the 10% level.
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APPENDIX B
Figure B.1: DACA and Labor Market Outcomes (U.S.)
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary variable
for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graphs.
Following dependent variables were used in the regressions (left-to-right, starting with the uppermost row): In Labor Force -
binary var. equal 1 if individual currently participates in the labor force; Working - binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently
working; Unemployed - binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently unemployed; Worked Last Year - binary var. equal 1 if
individual had worked at all for profit, pay, or as an unpaid family worker during previous 12 months; Self-Employed - binary
var. equal 1 if individual is currently self-employed. All estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at
least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2005-2016 waves of ACS. Regressions control for DACA
eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age,
age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard errors
are clustered at state-year level.
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Figure B.2: DACA and Labor Market Outcomes/Working Conditions (U.S.)
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary variable
for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graphs.
Following dependent variables were used in the regressions (left-to-right, starting with the uppermost row): Working Night
Shifts - binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently working night shifts (i.e. individual departs for work between 6pm and
6am); Index of Job’s Communication Intensity - index of communication skill intensity of occupation (0-100; see Peri and
Sparber (2009) for more details); Income (IHS Transformation) - inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation of individual’s
total pre-tax personal income (or losses) from all sources for the previous 12 months; Usual Hours Worked - number of hours
per week respondent usually worked in past 12 months. All estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35
with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2005-2016 waves of ACS. Regressions control for
DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies
(age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. Standard
errors are clustered at state-year level.
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Figure B.3: DACA and Labor Market Outcomes (California)
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary variable
for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph.
Following dependent variables were used in the regressions (left-to-right, starting with the uppermost row): In Labor Force -
binary var. equal 1 if individual currently participates in the labor force; Working - binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently
working; Unemployed - binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently unemployed; Worked Last Year - binary var. equal 1 if
individual had worked at all for profit, pay, or as an unpaid family worker during previous 12 months; Self-Employed - binary
var. equal 1 if individual is currently self-employed. All estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at
least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2005-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for DACA
eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age,
age of entering U.S., education attainment), PUMA fixed effects, and year fixed. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Figure B.4: DACA and Labor Market Outcomes/Working Conditions (California)
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Notes - The figure plots the coefficients obtained estimating Eq.(5) with the variable Eligit interacted with a binary variable
for each year (2012 is the omitted interaction). 95% confidence limits of the interaction estimates are included in the graph.
Following dependent variables were used in the regressions (left-to-right, starting with the uppermost row): Working Night
Shifts - binary var. equal 1 if individual is currently working night shifts (i.e. individual departs for work between 6pm and
6am); Index of Job’s Communication Intensity - index of communication skill intensity of occupation (0-100; see Peri and
Sparber (2009) for more details); Income (IHS Transformation) - inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation of individual’s
total pre-tax personal income (or losses) from all sources for the previous 12 months; Usual Hours Worked - number of hours
per week respondent usually worked in past 12 months. All estimates are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with
at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2005-2016 waves of ACS. Regression controls for DACA
eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age,
age of entering U.S., education attainment), PUMA fixed effects, and year fixed. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Table B.1: The Effects of DACA on Health Insurance Coverage (State-Level Clustering)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any Coverage Medicaid Any Private Employer-Sponsored Indiv. Purchased
Panel A: Entire U.S.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0224*** 0.0084 0.0137** 0.0061 0.0081**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Observations 395,902 395,902 395,902 395,902 395,902
R-squared 0.221 0.079 0.250 0.188 0.095
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.642 0.089 0.558 0.435 0.137
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.480 0.284 0.497 0.496 0.344
Panel B: Entire U.S. (except California and New York)
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0145** -0.0019 0.0171** 0.0074 0.0107**
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Observations 268,016 268,016 268,016 268,016 268,016
R-squared 0.249 0.059 0.267 0.198 0.101
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.632 0.061 0.575 0.447 0.142
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.482 0.240 0.494 0.497 0.349
Notes - Any Coverage - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with health insurance coverage; Medicaid - binary var. equal
1 if individual currently on Medicaid; Any Private - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with private health insurance (i.e.
via employer/union or purchased directly from insurer); Employer-Sponsored - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with
health insurance via employer or union; Indiv. Purchased - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with health insurance
purchased directly from insurer. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level. Estimates in all columns are derived
from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2008-
2016 waves of ACS. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic
characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education
attainment), year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant
at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.2: The Effects of DACA on Health Insurance Coverage (Residual Method)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any Coverage Medicaid Any Private Employer-Sponsored Indiv. Purchased
Panel A: Entire U.S.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0261*** 0.0112* 0.0147** 0.0057 0.0080**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Observations 382,069 382,069 382,069 382,069 382,069
R-squared 0.226 0.083 0.252 0.189 0.096
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.640 0.085 0.559 0.437 0.138
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.480 0.279 0.496 0.496 0.345
Panel B: California & New York
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0422*** 0.0264*** 0.0134* 0.0103 0.0018
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Observations 125,317 125,317 125,317 125,317 125,317
R-squared 0.196 0.112 0.262 0.209 0.124
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.659 0.144 0.521 0.409 0.127
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.474 0.351 0.500 0.492 0.333
Panel C: Entire U.S. (except California and New York)
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0195** 0.0019 0.0185*** 0.0073 0.0109**
(0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Observations 256,752 256,752 256,752 256,752 256,752
R-squared 0.257 0.063 0.270 0.199 0.103
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.631 0.056 0.578 0.451 0.143
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.482 0.231 0.494 0.498 0.350
Notes - Any Coverage - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with health insurance coverage; Medicaid - binary var.
equal 1 if individual currently on Medicaid; Any Private - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with private health
insurance (i.e. via employer/union or purchased directly from insurer); Employer-Sponsored - binary var. equal 1 if individual
currently with health insurance via employer or union; Indiv. Purchased - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with health
insurance purchased directly from insurer. Standard errors in parentheses, heteroskedasticity-robust (Panel B), and clustered
at state-year level (Panels A and C). Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of (likely) unauthorized immigrants
ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data comes from the 2008-2016 waves of ACS. All regressions
control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity,
marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), year fixed effects, and
state-specific time trends. In addition, all columns in Panels A and C control for state fixed effects, while all columns in Panel
B control for PUMA fixed effects. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.3: DACA and Health Care Access/Use - Individuals in Poverty (Entire U.S.: NHIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Usual Doctor # Visits Care 10+ Hosp. Night ER Saw Special Saw Eye Saw Mental
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0868 -0.0795 -0.0390 0.0293 0.0097 -0.0427 -0.0009 -0.0219 -0.0080
(0.058) (0.064) (0.221) (0.018) (0.019) (0.040) (0.022) (0.051) (0.019)
Observations 32,610 32,381 32,381 57,405 57,448 32,472 32,488 32,510 32,508
R-squared 0.066 0.073 0.080 0.044 0.024 0.044 0.034 0.049 0.050
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.739 0.735 2.326 0.113 0.096 0.293 0.172 0.258 0.130
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.439 0.441 2.347 0.316 0.295 0.455 0.377 0.438 0.336
Notes - Usual - binary var. equal 1 if individual has usual place to go to when sick or needing health advice; Doctor - binary
var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to any doctor in past 12 months; # Visits - total number of doctor’s office visits in past
12 months; Care 10+ - binary var. equal 1 if individual received medical care 10+ times in past 12 months; Hosp. Night -
binary var. equal 1 if individual was in a hospital overnight in past 12 months; ER - binary var. equal 1 if individual visited
emergency room in past 12 months; Saw Special - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to medical specialist in past 12
months; Saw Eye - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to eye doctor in past 12 months; Saw Mental - binary var. equal
1 if individual saw/talked to a mental health professional (psychiatrist, psychologist, etc.) in past 12 months. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at
least a high school diploma (or equivalent). This sample is further restricted to contain only individuals with family’s before-tax
income (from preceding calendar year) below U.S. Census Bureau’s official poverty threshold. Data are taken from the 2000-
2016 waves of NHIS. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic
characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment), year fixed
effects, region fixed effects, and region-specific time trends. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *
Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.4: DACA and Health Care Access/Use - Individuals in Poverty (California: CHIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Usual Doctor # Visits ER Saw Mental # Mental Visits
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0318 -0.1637 2.0765 -0.0827 0.0375 0.2156
(0.131) (0.119) (3.207) (0.123) (0.082) (1.205)
Observations 12,060 12,060 12,060 10,188 8,548 8,548
R-squared 0.086 0.083 0.045 0.066 0.089 0.037
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.743 0.746 4.772 0.255 0.194 2.537
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.437 0.435 12.74 0.436 0.396 12.08
Notes - Usual - binary var. equal 1 if individual has usual place to go to when sick or needing health advice; Doctor - binary
var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to any doctor in past 12 months; # Visits - total number of doctor’s office visits in past 12
months; ER - binary var. equal 1 if individual visited emergency room in past 12 months; Saw Mental - binary var. equal 1 if
individual saw/talked to a medical professional (psychiatrist, psychologist, etc.) for mental or alcohol/drug problems in past 12
months; # Mental Visits - # of visits to professional for problems with mental health or drugs/alcohol (during past 12 months).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens and citizens ages
18-50 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). This sample is further restricted to contain only individuals with
family’s before-tax income (from preceding calendar year) below U.S. Census Bureau’s official poverty threshold. Data are
taken from the 2003-2015 waves of CHIS. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility
dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education
attainment), county fixed effects, and year fixed effects. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *
Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.5: DACA and General Health Status, Mental Health - Hispanics in Poverty (U.S.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Health Poor Health Good Health Depressed Hopeless Effort K6 Scale Distress Hyperten.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.2280*** 0.0049 0.0035 -0.0632* -0.0949*** -0.1366*** -1.4069*** -0.1490*** -0.0710***
(0.078) (0.007) (0.019) (0.035) (0.034) (0.045) (0.432) (0.050) (0.026)
Observations 15,018 15,018 15,018 6,827 6,823 6,820 6,806 6,806 6,891
R-squared 0.067 0.031 0.052 0.057 0.043 0.051 0.068 0.051 0.084
Mean of Dep. Var. 3.670 0.025 0.872 0.179 0.124 0.197 3.349 0.271 0.121
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 1.064 0.157 0.334 0.384 0.330 0.398 4.700 0.445 0.326
Notes - Health - self-reported general health status (categorical variable: 1 - poor, 2 - fair, 3 - good, 4 - very good, 5 - excellent);
Poor Health - binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as poor (category 1); Good Health -
binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as excellent, very good, or good (categories 5, 4,
3); Depressed - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling sad or depressed such that “nothing could cheer them up”
some/most/all of the time in past 30 days; Hopeless - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling hopeless some/most/all
of the time in past 30 days; Effort - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling “everything was an effort” some/most/all
of the time in past 30 days; K6 Scale - continuous measure of nonspecific psychological distress during the past 30 days using
Kessler 6-Item (K6) Psychological Distress Scale (0-24; higher values represent higher levels of distress); Distress - binary var.
equal 1 if individual experienced moderate or serious psychological distress in past 30 days (i.e. K6 Scale >= 5); Hyperten. -
binary var. equal 1 if individual was ever told had hypertension/high blood pressure. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at least a high school diploma
(or equivalent). This sample is further restricted to contain only Hispanic/Latino individuals with family’s before-tax income
(from preceding calendar year) below U.S. Census Bureau’s official poverty threshold. Data are taken from the 2000-2016 waves
of NHIS. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics
(sex, race, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment), year fixed effects, region fixed effects,
and region-specific time trends. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.6: The Effects of DACA on Health Insurance Coverage (Omitting 2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any Coverage Medicaid Any Private Employer-Sponsored Indiv. Purchased
Panel A: Entire U.S.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0165** 0.0065 0.0093 0.0020 0.0077**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Observations 352,047 352,047 352,047 352,047 352,047
R-squared 0.220 0.081 0.247 0.186 0.093
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.647 0.090 0.562 0.438 0.139
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.478 0.285 0.496 0.496 0.346
Panel B: California & New York
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0292*** 0.0198*** 0.0071 0.0070 -0.0004
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004)
Observations 113,520 113,520 113,520 113,520 113,520
R-squared 0.193 0.114 0.259 0.207 0.123
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.669 0.149 0.527 0.413 0.128
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.471 0.356 0.499 0.492 0.334
Panel C: Entire U.S. (except California and New York)
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0097 -0.0038 0.0136* 0.0039 0.0111**
(0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 238,527 238,527 238,527 238,527 238,527
R-squared 0.248 0.060 0.265 0.196 0.100
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.636 0.061 0.579 0.450 0.144
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.481 0.240 0.494 0.497 0.351
Notes - Any Coverage - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with health insurance coverage; Medicaid - binary var.
equal 1 if individual currently on Medicaid; Any Private - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with private health
insurance (i.e. via employer/union or purchased directly from insurer); Employer-Sponsored - binary var. equal 1 if individual
currently with health insurance via employer or union; Indiv. Purchased - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with health
insurance purchased directly from insurer. Standard errors in parentheses, heteroskedasticity-robust (Panel B), and clustered
at state-year level (Panels A and C). Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least
a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2008-2011 & 2013-2016 waves of ACS. 2012 is omitted as it is
the year DACA was implemented. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy,
demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S.,
education attainment), year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. In addition, all columns in Panels A and C control for
state fixed effects, while all columns in Panel B control for PUMA fixed effects. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant
at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.7: DACA and Health Care Access, Affordability - Omitting 2012 (Entire U.S.: NHIS)
(1) (2) (3)
Usual Any Care Delay Special. Not Afford.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0083 -0.0280** -0.0305
(0.031) (0.011) (0.029)
Observations 232,067 544,039 77,045
R-squared 0.072 0.025 0.016
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.815 0.155 0.050
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.389 0.362 0.218
Notes - Usual - binary var. equal 1 if individual has usual place to go to when sick or needing health advice; Any Care Delay
- binary var. equal 1 if any member of respondent’s family delayed seeking medical care due to cost (in past 12 months);
Special. Not Afford. - binary var. equal 1 if individual needed but couldn’t afford specialist (in past 12 months). Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50
with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2000-2011 & 2013-2016 waves of NHIS. 2012
is omitted as it is the year DACA was implemented. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA
eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age,
education attainment), year fixed effects, region fixed effects, and region-specific time trends. *** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.8: DACA and Health Care Use - Omitting 2012 (Entire U.S.: NHIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Doctor # Visits Care 10+ Hosp. Night ER Saw Special Saw Eye Saw Mental
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0073 0.0531 -0.0001 0.0021 0.0081 -0.0100 0.0019 0.0065
(0.031) (0.110) (0.007) (0.007) (0.022) (0.014) (0.027) (0.010)
Observations 230,469 230,469 543,238 543,911 231,289 231,271 231,332 231,341
R-squared 0.072 0.072 0.019 0.018 0.023 0.027 0.042 0.020
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.778 2.248 0.082 0.065 0.195 0.193 0.315 0.086
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.416 2.161 0.275 0.247 0.396 0.395 0.464 0.280
Notes - Doctor - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to any doctor in past 12 months; # Visits - total number of
doctor’s office visits in past 12 months; Care 10+ - binary var. equal 1 if individual received medical care 10+ times in past
12 months; Hosp. Night - binary var. equal 1 if individual was in a hospital overnight in past 12 months; ER - binary var.
equal 1 if individual visited emergency room in past 12 months; Saw Special - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to
medical specialist in past 12 months; Saw Eye - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to eye doctor in past 12 months;
Saw Mental - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to mental health professional (psychiatrist, psychologist, etc.) in past
12 months. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens and
citizens ages 18-50 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2000-2011 & 2013-2016 waves
of NHIS. 2012 is omitted as it is the year DACA was implemented. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation
dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria
dummies (age, education attainment), year fixed effects, region fixed effects, and region-specific time trends. *** Significant at
the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.9: DACA and General Health Status, Mental Health - Omitting 2012 (Entire U.S.: NHIS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Health Poor Health Good Health Depressed Hopeless Effort K6 Scale Distress Hyperten.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.1250*** -0.0036*** 0.0059 -0.0252 -0.0096 -0.0388* -0.2205 -0.0388 -0.0121
(0.028) (0.001) (0.005) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.212) (0.025) (0.017)
Observations 544,085 544,085 544,085 230,250 230,222 230,090 229,775 229,775 233,492
R-squared 0.079 0.011 0.033 0.025 0.017 0.018 0.033 0.025 0.063
Mean of Dep. Var. 4.011 0.011 0.938 0.106 0.063 0.149 2.496 0.195 0.141
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.949 0.105 0.242 0.308 0.243 0.356 3.733 0.396 0.348
Notes - Health - self-reported general health status (categorical variable: 1 - poor, 2 - fair, 3 - good, 4 - very good, 5 -
excellent); Poor Health - binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as poor (category 1);
Good Health - binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as excellent, very good, or good
(categories 5, 4, 3); Depressed - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling sad or depressed such that “nothing could
cheer them up” some/most/all of the time in past 30 days; Hopeless - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling hopeless
some/most/all of the time in past 30 days; Effort - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling “everything was an effort”
some/most/all of the time in past 30 days; K6 Scale - continuous measure of nonspecific psychological distress during the
past 30 days using Kessler 6-Item (K6) Psychological Distress Scale (0-24; higher values represent higher levels of distress);
Distress - binary var. equal 1 if individual experienced moderate or serious psychological distress in past 30 days (i.e. K6 Scale
>= 5); Hyperten. - binary var. equal 1 if individual was ever told had hypertension/high blood pressure. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at
least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2000-2011 & 2013-2016 waves of NHIS. 2012 is omitted
as it is the year DACA was implemented. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility
dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education
attainment), year fixed effects, region fixed effects, and region-specific time trends. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant
at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.10: The Effects of DACA on Health Insurance Coverage (Omitting Individuals Aged 30-31 in 
2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any Coverage Medicaid Any Private Employer-Sponsored Indiv. Purchased
Panel A: Entire U.S.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0233*** 0.0091 0.0140** 0.0060 0.0083**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Observations 344,148 344,148 344,148 344,148 344,148
R-squared 0.217 0.080 0.245 0.177 0.103
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.635 0.091 0.550 0.420 0.145
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.481 0.287 0.497 0.494 0.352
Panel B: California & New York
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0419*** 0.0273*** 0.0125* 0.0110 0.0023
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Observations 111,238 111,238 111,238 111,238 111,238
R-squared 0.191 0.113 0.257 0.199 0.136
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.655 0.150 0.512 0.393 0.133
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.475 0.357 0.500 0.488 0.340
Panel C: Entire U.S. (except California and New York)
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0154* -0.0016 0.0177** 0.0067 0.0114**
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 232,910 232,910 232,910 232,910 232,910
R-squared 0.245 0.059 0.263 0.187 0.109
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.626 0.062 0.568 0.432 0.150
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.484 0.241 0.495 0.495 0.357
Notes - Any Coverage - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with health insurance coverage; Medicaid - binary var. equal
1 if individual currently on Medicaid; Any Private - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with private health insurance (i.e.
via employer/union or purchased directly from insurer); Employer-Sponsored - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with
health insurance via employer or union; Indiv. Purchased - binary var. equal 1 if individual currently with health insurance
purchased directly from insurer. Standard errors in parentheses, heteroskedasticity-robust (Panel B), and clustered at state-
year level (Panels A and C). Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high
school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2008-2016 waves of ACS. Individuals aged 30-31 in 2012 are omitted
from 2013-2016 waves. Individuals aged 31-32 (at the time of interview) are omitted from 2008-2012 waves. All regressions
control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity,
marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, age of entering U.S., education attainment), year fixed effects, and
state-specific time trends. In addition, all columns in Panels A and C control for state fixed effects, while all columns in Panel
B control for PUMA fixed effects. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.11: DACA and HC Access, Affordability - Omitting Aged 30-31 in 2012 (Entire U.S.)
(1) (2) (3)
Usual Any Care Delay Special. Not Afford.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0218 -0.0284** -0.0378
(0.032) (0.011) (0.023)
Observations 231,623 547,821 86,579
R-squared 0.073 0.025 0.017
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.813 0.157 0.051
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.390 0.364 0.221
Notes - Usual - binary var. equal 1 if individual has usual place to go to when sick or needing health advice; Any Care Delay -
binary var. equal 1 if any member of respondent’s family delayed seeking medical care due to cost (in past 12 months); Special.
Not Afford. - binary var. equal 1 if individual needed but couldn’t afford specialist (in past 12 months). Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at
least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2000-2016 waves of NHIS. Individuals aged 30-31 in 2012
are omitted from 2013-2016 waves. Individuals aged 31-32 (at the time of interview) are omitted from 2000-2012 waves. All
regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race,
ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment), year fixed effects, region fixed effects,
and region-specific time trends. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.12: DACA and Health Care Use - Omitting Individuals Aged 30-31 in 2012 (Entire U.S.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Doctor # Visits Care 10+ Hosp. Night ER Saw Special Saw Eye Saw Mental
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0148 0.0427 0.0006 0.0017 0.0055 -0.0115 0.0012 0.0102
(0.032) (0.112) (0.007) (0.007) (0.022) (0.015) (0.027) (0.010)
Observations 229,994 229,994 547,022 547,706 230,814 230,793 230,859 230,870
R-squared 0.072 0.071 0.019 0.017 0.024 0.028 0.043 0.019
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.777 2.243 0.082 0.064 0.195 0.193 0.317 0.086
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.416 2.159 0.274 0.245 0.396 0.395 0.465 0.281
Notes - Doctor - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to any doctor in past 12 months; # Visits - total number of
doctor’s office visits in past 12 months; Care 10+ - binary var. equal 1 if individual received medical care 10+ times in past
12 months; Hosp. Night - binary var. equal 1 if individual was in a hospital overnight in past 12 months; ER - binary var.
equal 1 if individual visited emergency room in past 12 months; Saw Special - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to
medical specialist in past 12 months; Saw Eye - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to eye doctor in past 12 months;
Saw Mental - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to mental health professional (psychiatrist, psychologist, etc.) in
past 12 months. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens
and citizens ages 18-50 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2000-2016 waves of NHIS.
Individuals aged 30-31 in 2012 are omitted from 2013-2016 waves. Individuals aged 31-32 (at the time of interview) are omitted
from 2000-2012 waves. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic
characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment), year fixed
effects, region fixed effects, and region-specific time trends. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *
Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.13: DACA and Health Status, Mental Health - Omitting Aged 30-31 in 2012 (Entire U.S.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Health Poor Health Good Health Depressed Hopeless Effort K6 Scale Distress Hyperten.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.1190*** -0.0036*** 0.0057 -0.0269 -0.0091 -0.0364* -0.2235 -0.0406 -0.0045
(0.028) (0.001) (0.005) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.215) (0.025) (0.018)
Observations 547,852 547,852 547,852 230,017 229,990 229,864 229,553 229,553 233,107
R-squared 0.080 0.011 0.034 0.025 0.016 0.018 0.032 0.024 0.066
Mean of Dep. Var. 4.005 0.011 0.936 0.106 0.063 0.148 2.488 0.194 0.144
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.952 0.106 0.244 0.308 0.243 0.356 3.736 0.396 0.351
Notes - Health - self-reported general health status (categorical variable: 1 - poor, 2 - fair, 3 - good, 4 - very good, 5 - excellent);
Poor Health - binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as poor (category 1); Good Health -
binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as excellent, very good, or good (categories 5, 4,
3); Depressed - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling sad or depressed such that “nothing could cheer them up”
some/most/all of the time in past 30 days; Hopeless - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling hopeless some/most/all
of the time in past 30 days; Effort - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling “everything was an effort” some/most/all
of the time in past 30 days; K6 Scale - continuous measure of nonspecific psychological distress during the past 30 days using
Kessler 6-Item (K6) Psychological Distress Scale (0-24; higher values represent higher levels of distress); Distress - binary var.
equal 1 if individual experienced moderate or serious psychological distress in past 30 days (i.e. K6 Scale >= 5); Hyperten. -
binary var. equal 1 if individual was ever told had hypertension/high blood pressure. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens and citizens ages 18-50 with at least a high school diploma
(or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2000-2016 waves of NHIS. Individuals aged 30-31 in 2012 are omitted from 2013-2016
waves. Individuals aged 31-32 (at the time of interview) are omitted from 2000-2012 waves. All regressions control for Post-
DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status),
DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment), year fixed effects, region fixed effects, and region-specific time
trends. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
141
Table B.14: DACA and HC Access, Affordability (NHIS: All Non-Citizens, 18-35, with HS Degree)
(1) (2) (3)
Usual Any Care Delay Special. Not Afford.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0343 -0.0173 -0.0430*
(0.034) (0.012) (0.026)
Observations 13,074 31,650 4,998
R-squared 0.093 0.029 0.030
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.618 0.145 0.048
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.486 0.352 0.214
Notes - Usual - binary var. equal 1 if individual has usual place to go to when sick or needing health advice; Any Care Delay
- binary var. equal 1 if any member of respondent’s family delayed seeking medical care due to cost (in past 12 months).
Special. Not Afford. - binary var. equal 1 if individual needed but couldn’t afford specialist (in past 12 months). Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least
a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2000-2016 waves of NHIS. All regressions control for Post-
DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status),
DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment, # years in U.S.), year fixed effects, region fixed effects, and
region-specific time trends. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.15: DACA and Health Care Access (CHIS: All Non-Citizens, 18-35, with HS Degree)
(1) (2)
Usual Personal MD
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0586 0.0141
(0.053) (0.074)
Observations 6,010 1,691
R-squared 0.111 0.234
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.695 0.380
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.460 0.485
Notes - Usual - binary var. equal 1 if individual has usual place to go to when sick or needing health advice; Personal MD -
binary var. equal 1 if individual has personal doctor as main medical provider. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates
in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data
are taken from the 2003-2015 waves of CHIS. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility
dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education
attainment, age at entering U.S.), county fixed effects, and year fixed effects. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at
the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.16: DACA and Health Care Use (NHIS: All Non-Citizens, 18-35, with HS Degree)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Doctor # Visits Care 10+ Hosp. Night ER Saw Special Saw Eye Saw Mental
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0248 0.0777 -0.0043 0.0073 -0.0051 -0.0167 0.0075 0.0191*
(0.034) (0.117) (0.007) (0.008) (0.024) (0.017) (0.028) (0.010)
Observations 12,990 12,990 31,633 31,659 13,022 13,023 13,029 13,029
R-squared 0.113 0.121 0.019 0.044 0.018 0.029 0.052 0.015
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.610 1.505 0.042 0.061 0.136 0.098 0.176 0.028
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.488 1.846 0.201 0.240 0.343 0.298 0.381 0.163
Notes - Doctor - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to any doctor in past 12 months; # Visits - total number of
doctor’s office visits in past 12 months; Care 10+ - binary var. equal 1 if individual received medical care 10+ times in past 12
months; Hosp. Night - binary var. equal 1 if individual was in a hospital overnight in past 12 months; ER - binary var. equal
1 if individual visited emergency room in past 12 months; Saw Special - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to medical
specialist in past 12 months; Saw Eye - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to eye doctor in past 12 months; Saw
Mental - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to a mental health professional (psychiatrist, psychologist, etc.) in past
12 months. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens ages
18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2000-2016 waves of NHIS. All regressions
control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity,
marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment, # years in U.S.), year fixed effects, region fixed
effects, and region-specific time trends. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10%
level.
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Table B.17: DACA and Health Care Use (CHIS: All Non-Citizens, 18-35, with HS Degree)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Doctor # Visits ER Saw Mental # Mental Visits
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 -0.0239 0.8294 -0.0337 0.0379 0.9387*
(0.054) (0.865) (0.046) (0.029) (0.511)
Observations 6,010 6,010 4,661 3,583 3,583
R-squared 0.101 0.091 0.069 0.060 0.051
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.694 2.830 0.144 0.072 0.504
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.461 5.053 0.351 0.259 3.189
Notes - Doctor - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to any doctor in past 12 months; # Visits - total number of
doctor’s office visits in past 12 months; ER - binary var. equal 1 if individual visited emergency room in past 12 months; Saw
Mental - binary var. equal 1 if individual saw/talked to a medical professional (psychiatrist, psychologist, etc.) for mental or
alcohol/drug problems in past 12 months; # Mental Visits - # of visits to professional for problems with mental health or
drugs/alcohol (during past 12 months). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates in all columns are derived from a
sample of all non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data are taken from the 2003-2015 waves
of CHIS. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics
(sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education attainment, age at entering U.S.),
county fixed effects, and year fixed effects. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the
10% level.
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Table B.18: DACA and General/Mental Health (NHIS: All Non-Citizens, 18-35, with HS Degree)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Health Poor Health Good Health Depressed Hopeless Effort K6 Scale Distress Hyperten.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.0826*** -0.0001 0.0024 -0.0183 0.0031 -0.0261 -0.1321 -0.0330 0.0004
(0.031) (0.001) (0.006) (0.020) (0.018) (0.022) (0.226) (0.026) (0.019)
Observations 31,662 31,662 31,662 12,999 12,988 12,982 12,962 12,962 13,157
R-squared 0.039 0.003 0.012 0.016 0.013 0.017 0.026 0.022 0.015
Mean of Dep. Var. 4.119 0.003 0.968 0.102 0.053 0.105 1.900 0.150 0.047
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 0.878 0.056 0.175 0.302 0.223 0.306 3.137 0.358 0.213
Notes - Health - self-reported general health status (categorical variable: 1 - poor, 2 - fair, 3 - good, 4 - very good, 5 - excellent);
Poor Health - binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as poor (category 1); Good Health -
binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as excellent, very good, or good (categories 5, 4,
3); Depressed - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling sad or depressed such that “nothing could cheer them up”
some/most/all of the time in past 30 days; Hopeless - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling hopeless some/most/all
of the time in past 30 days; Effort - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling “everything was an effort” some/most/all
of the time in past 30 days; K6 Scale - continuous measure of nonspecific psychological distress during the past 30 days using
Kessler 6-Item (K6) Psychological Distress Scale (0-24; higher values represent higher levels of distress); Distress - binary var.
equal 1 if individual experienced moderate or serious psychological distress in past 30 days (i.e. K6 Scale >= 5); Hyperten. -
binary var. equal 1 if individual was ever told had hypertension/high blood pressure. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Estimates in all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or
equivalent). Data are taken from the 2000-2016 waves of NHIS. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy,
DACA eligibility dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies
(age, education attainment, # years in U.S.), year fixed effects, region fixed effects, and region-specific time trends. ***
Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.19: DACA and General/Mental Health (CHIS: All Non-Citizens, 18-35, with HS Degree)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Health Poor Health Good Health Depressed Hopeless Restless K6 Scale Distress Hyperten.
DACA-Eligible * Post 2012 0.3117* 0.0155 -0.0438 0.0301 0.0377 0.0001 0.3795 -0.1005 0.0492
(0.173) (0.014) (0.042) (0.035) (0.039) (0.047) (0.413) (0.076) (0.034)
Observations 6,010 6,010 6,010 4,661 4,661 4,661 4,661 4,661 6,010
R-squared 0.142 0.053 0.082 0.052 0.049 0.061 0.086 0.079 0.051
Mean of Dep. Var. 3.554 0.013 0.857 0.098 0.122 0.213 3.686 0.318 0.068
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 1.001 0.112 0.350 0.297 0.327 0.409 3.460 0.466 0.252
Notes - Health - self-reported general health status (categorical variable: 1 - poor, 2 - fair, 3 - good, 4 - very good, 5 - excellent);
Poor Health - binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as poor (category 1); Good Health -
binary var. equal 1 if individual self-reported his/her general health status as excellent, very good, or good (categories 5, 4,
3); Depressed - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling sad or depressed such that “nothing could cheer them up”
some/most/all of the time in past 30 days; Hopeless - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling hopeless some/most/all
of the time in past 30 days; Restless - binary var. equal 1 if individual reported feeling restless or anxious some/most/all of the
time in past 30 days; K6 Scale - continuous measure of nonspecific psychological distress during the past 30 days using Kessler
6-Item (K6) Psychological Distress Scale (0-24; higher values represent higher levels of distress); Distress - binary var. equal 1 if
individual experienced moderate or serious psychological distress in past 30 days (i.e. K6 Scale >= 5); Hyperten. - binary var.
equal 1 if individual was ever told had hypertension/high blood pressure. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates in
all columns are derived from a sample of all non-citizens ages 18-35 with at least a high school diploma (or equivalent). Data
are taken from the 2003-2015 waves of CHIS. All regressions control for Post-DACA implementation dummy, DACA eligibility
dummy, demographic characteristics (sex, race, ethnicity, marital status), DACA eligibility criteria dummies (age, education
attainment, age at entering U.S.), county fixed effects, and year fixed effects. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at
the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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APPENDIX C
Figure C.1: Mafia Initiations, Deaths, and Status Revocations over Time (Histograms)
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Notes - Data comes from Prime Crime News Agency. Underlying sample consists of 485 unique violent deaths. USSR was
dissolved on December 26, 1991. In the histogram, I set the number of bins to 50.
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Figure C.2: Mafia Deaths and Initiations in USSR: 1919-1960 vs. 1961-1991 (Histograms)
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Notes - Data comes from Prime Crime News Agency. Underlying sample sizes are as follows: upper-left figure (202 individuals);
upper-right figure (308 individuals); lower-left figure (35 individuals); lower-right figure (323 individuals).
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Table C.1: Gulag & Mafia Presence in 1990s (OLS): Linear Term & Higher Order Polynomials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia presence Mafia presence Mafia presence Mafia presence Mafia presence Mafia presence
(1994-95) (1994-97) (1994-95) (1994-97) (1994-95) (1994-97)
Gulag distance (in 100s of km) -0.0077 -0.0035 -0.0592∗∗∗ -0.0594∗∗∗ -0.1080∗∗∗ -0.1100∗∗∗
(0.0080) (0.0084) (0.0134) (0.0136) (0.0228) (0.0232)
Gulag distance2 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0095∗∗∗ 0.0266∗∗∗ 0.0280∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0058) (0.0060)
Gulag distance3 -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Road & Railroad Densities (km/km2) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Distance to region’s admin. center (km) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Distance to nearest prison in 1990s (km) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,445 2,445 2,445 2,445 2,445 2,445
F-statistic 0.695 0.134 12.72 14.02 11.27 12.20
R-squared 0.103 0.109 0.112 0.119 0.115 0.122
Mean of dep. variable 0.097 0.102 0.097 0.102 0.097 0.102
Std. dev. of dep. variable 0.295 0.303 0.295 0.303 0.295 0.303
Notes - Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimation sample consists of Russia’s subregions (equivalent
to NUTS 3 classification). Mafia presence (1994-95) - binary var. equal 1 if at least one vor present in subregion between
1994-95. Mafia presence (1994-97) - binary var. equal 1 if at least one vor present in subregion between 1994-97. Gulag distance
(in 100s of km) - distance to the nearest GULAG camp complex (in 100s of km). Gulag distance2 - squared term of the distance
polynomial. Gulag distance3 - cubed term of the distance polynomial. Estimation sample consists of all 2,445 subregions within
the Russian Federation (as of 1992). *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10%
level.
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Table C.2: Gulag & Mafia Presence in 1990s (OLS): Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vory per 100,000 Vory per 100,000 Vory per 100,000 Vory per 100,000 Vory per 100,000 Vory per 100,000
(1994-95) (1994-97) (1994-95) (1994-97) (1994-95) (1994-97)
Gulag distance < 10th percentile 0.192∗∗ 0.188∗∗
(10p = 17.6km) (0.078) (0.078)
Gulag distance < 15th percentile 0.152∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(15p = 26.9km) (0.059) (0.059)
Gulag distance < 20th percentile 0.128∗∗ 0.126∗∗
(20p = 37.4km) (0.053) (0.053)
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Road & Railroad Densities (km/km2) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Distance to region’s admin. center (km) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Distance to nearest prison in 1990s (km) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,005 2,005 2,005 2,005 2,005 2,005
F-statistic 9.127 8.405 8.027 8.318 6.910 6.506
R-squared 0.048 0.052 0.047 0.052 0.047 0.051
Mean of dep. variable 0.182 0.191 0.182 0.191 0.182 0.191
Std. dev. of dep. variable 0.736 0.751 0.736 0.751 0.736 0.751
Notes - Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimation sample consists of Russia’s subregions (equivalent
to NUTS 3 classification). Vory per 100,000 (1994-95) - # of vory present in subregion between 1994-95, per 100,000 inhabitants.
Vory per 100,000 (1994-97) - # of vory present in subregion between 1994-97, per 100,000 inhabitants. Gulag distance < 10th
percentile - binary var. equal 1 if subregion is located within 17.6km of the nearest gulag camp. Gulag distance < 15th percentile
- binary var. equal 1 if subregion is located within 26.9km of the nearest gulag camp. Gulag distance < 20th percentile - binary
var. equal 1 if subregion is located within 37.4km of the nearest gulag camp. Estimation sample consists of all 2,445 subregions
within the Russian Federation (as of 1992). *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the
10% level.
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Table C.3: Mafia Presence & Attacks by Type in 1990s Russia: Intensive Margin
(IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
Any Attack Any Business Attack Any Criminal Attack Any Police Attack Any Political Attack
(1994-98) (1994-98) (1994-98) (1994-98) (1994-98)
Mafia per 100,000 pop. (1994-95) 0.678*** 0.545*** 0.563*** 0.290*** 0.146**
(0.202) (0.170) (0.166) (0.098) (0.064)
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES
Road & Railroad Densities (km/km2) YES YES YES YES YES
Institutional controls YES YES YES YES YES
Population & Economic controls YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,938 1,938 1,938 1,938 1,938
Mean of dep. variable 0.093 0.074 0.042 0.021 0.018
Std. dev. of dep. variable 0.291 0.262 0.200 0.144 0.133
Angrist-Pischke F-stat 11.69 11.69 11.69 11.69 11.69
Notes - Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimation sample consists of Russia’s subregions (equivalent
to NUTS 3 classification). Any Attack (1994-98) - binary equal 1 if any attack against a member of the Russia’s economic
elite occurred in 1994-98. Any Business Attack (1994-98) - binary equal 1 if any attack against a businessman or manager
occurred in 1994-98. Any Criminal Attack (1994-98) - binary equal 1 if any attack against a criminal occurred in 1994-98.
Any Police Attack (1994-98) - binary equal 1 if any attack against a member of law enforcement, army, or against a judge
occurred in 1994-98. Any Political (1994-98) - binary equal 1 if any attack against a politican or public figure occurred in 1994-
98. Mafia per 100,000 pop. (1994-95) - # of vory per 100,000 inhabitants present in subregion in 1994-95. The instrument
used in the IV estimation is a binary var. equal 1 if subregion was within 26.9km km (i.e. 15th percentile) of the nearest
gulag. Economic controls: unemployment rate (1998), log of average wage (1996). Institutional controls: distance to region’s
administrative center, distance to the nearest prison (operating in the 1990s). Population controls: population density (1996),
share of retired people (1998). *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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